Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

141. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, March 11, 1966, 1915Z.

5750. Alphand received me this afternoon at 5:30. De la Grandville was present. He handed me the memorandum,² which will be following in succeeding telegrams, both French version and English rough translation.³

After I had read the memorandum, I very briefly repeated to Alphand what I said to Couve de Murville⁴ in regard to (1) absence of consultation for so serious a step; General De Gaulle’s rather general vague remarks could not be regarded in this light, particularly since not forthcoming in reply to questions. (2) That we did not agree that the situation had changed in such a basic manner as the French Government professed; Russia basically remained the same in its political set up, ideologically, and in continuous military preparation; Germany and Berlin remained divided, meaning that Berlin at anytime could set off another crisis. (3) It was difficult for us to believe the basis on which this action was taken since there was in effect no integration of command in NATO; genuine integration of European armies had been refused by French in 1954, and since there was no integration there could be no subordination, and France had in effect without any attempted interference from allies pursued her own military policy for a number of years. There really was no danger of France or any other European country being drawn into a war in Asia through the operation of NATO mechanism.

Alphand made briefly, and in a semi-halfhearted manner, standard replies. On the first point he said we had known for some time that France was opposed to integration, that this time had been selected in order to give plenty of time before 1969 to work out the practicalities of the decision. He said we might have different views in regard to Russia, but no one could deny that the general world situation had changed since 1950, to which I replied that the growth of Soviet nuclear power, which was more in their favor than in ours, would seem to imply more cooperation rather than less.

I then asked Alphand whether or not a reply was expected to this memorandum, who was to take the initiative, where and in what manner the discussions would be conducted. He said he could not tell me that nor could he give me any indication as to the timing, but obviously it will not be in the immediate future. In fact Alphand’s replies were so vague on this point that I had the very strong impression that the French have really not thought through any of these questions.

In conclusion I mentioned to Alphand that I had noticed in the French press there were continuing statements that the U.S. had rejected French proposals to discuss Franco/American pacts on a bilateral basis.

I pointed out that this was not true, and referred Alphand to my conversation with him on February 25 (Embtel 5243);⁵ and that De Gaulle’s letter⁶ did not propose any specific negotiation. Alphand was quick to “assure” me that this did not come from the Quai d’Orsay but felt that impression had been received from manner in which the American press treated the President’s reply.⁷

I said that, as he knew, the President’s reply did not make any reference to form of negotiation one way or the other.

Comment: I find the memorandum very little more explicit than the letter although it does state that Headquarters SHAPE and AFCENT when French withdraw will have to leave France, and it is plain to us, helped by other background knowledge, that there is nothing to discuss in regard to bilaterals except the modalities of departure and turnover.

I think the whole handling of the subject, including the letter, and particularly the memorandum, shows with what haste the entire operation was conducted from the French side.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and passed to the White House.
2. Document 142.
3. The French text and the Embassy translation were transmitted in telegrams 5749 and 5757 from Paris, March 11, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO)
4. See Document 136.
5. Dated February 25. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO)
6. Document 137.
7. See footnote 2, Document 137.