Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, February 18, 1966, 7:51 p.m.

2063. From Leddy. Subj: EmbTel 2492; rptd Geneva 192.² I plan to discuss your proposal with the Secretary or the Under Secretary when they have had an opportunity to study it. Meanwhile, my own feeling is that this matter is best left alone for the time being. Chancellor Erhard made known the clear views of the German Government in the memorandum which he left with the President. The President promised that the United States would discuss the German memorandum with the British and authorized Ambassador Bruce to do so. These discussions have not yet taken place for a number of reasons. Various consultative approaches, as you know, had been very thoroughly studied here, with the help of Embassy Bonn, prior to the Chancellor’s visit. To revert at this point to a consultative proposal would in my view be tantamount to rejection of the German memorandum even before the discussions which we promised to hold with the British were begun.

This is not to say that some nuclear consultative arrangement may not eventually emerge from the discussions going on in the Special Committee. These discussions have just started and will undoubtedly continue over a period of at least several months. It is entirely possible that they will result in recommendations for an effective system of nuclear consultation, which would be all to the good and which, in my view, has an importance quite independently of the idea of a collective nuclear weapons system. But for the U.S. at this juncture to come forward with a consultative system as a substitute for the German proposals in a probably vain effort to satisfy the Soviets on non-proliferation would, I am afraid, constitute a breach of faith with the Germans. I have not commented on the specifics of your proposal, which raise a number of questions, since, as I say, I feel strongly that the matter should be left alone for time being.

In view of Ambassador Bruce’s responsibilities for following up the German memorandum with the United Kingdom, I am repeating your cable and this message to him.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Leddy and cleared by Spiers. Repeated to London for Ambassador Bruce only and Geneva for Foster and Timberlake only.
2. In telegram 2492, February 16, McGhee proposed the creation of a small NATO nuclear consultative committee consisting of the United States, France, Italy, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, which would be a substitute for a multilateral weapons system and would assist the U.S. President and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, with respect to the planning and use of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed for the defense of Europe. (Ibid.)