Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

114. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 29, 1965, 2010Z.

Polto 918. Pass to OSD for Secretary McNamara.

1. Tripartite dinner of DefMins preceding Special Committee (the three DefMins plus three PermReps) was significant mostly for being the first of its kind. It produced no notable political backlash; Germans apparently let it be known that von Hassel was dining with US and UK colleagues, but fact was not generally noticed by French press or foreign correspondents here.

2. A good part of evening’s discussion was devoted to tactics for Special Committee meeting next day, and has been overtaken by reports (Polto Circulars 18 and 19)² on that meeting. Three Ministers were in full agreement on such issues as composition of working groups, their terms of reference, nature of report to Ministerial Council and other procedural matters. They also agreed that staff work for working groups would have to be provided essentially by governments.

3. Main substantive discussion was touched off by Von Hassel’s reference to existing plans for use of nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara, strongly supported by Healey, told Von Hassel that in his judgment there exists no rational plan for the use of nuclear weapons now located in Europe. Only real plan is for their use in conjunction with, and if effect as supplement to, strategic weapons in SAC and Polaris. But their use in this mode assumed general nuclear war. Far more likely contingency was some form of limited war which raised question of selective use of nuclear weapons. But there is no realistic plan for selective use, and contingencies short of general war have not been thought through. Nor are there effective procedures for consultation at political level. Secretary McNamara summarized kinds of questions President and his advisers would be bound to ask (and Prime Ministers and Chancellors would ask too) before permitting military authorities use nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara said that allies had not even decided how and where arms should be used in Germany.

4. Healey chimed in by saying he had initially been somewhat skeptical contribution Special Committee could make. But the more he studied problems nuclear strategy the more convinced he had become that absence of rational plan for use nuclear weapons in situation short of general war was major problem facing Alliance. Special Committee was designed precisely to solve this problem.

5. Von Hassel seemed rather taken aback by all this, and kept protesting that he had thought that SACEUR had a plan for use of nuclear weapons in Germany’s defense. The revelation that his colleagues representing nuclear powers were very dissatisfied with the present status of nuclear planning seemed to be a new and sobering thought to Von Hassel.

6. In general, neither Von Hassel nor Grewe contributed their share to tripartite discussion. My impression was that Von Hassel felt somewhat out of his league, because he lacked some of the fundamental knowledge and he had not thought as deeply about nuclear defense as US and UK Ministers have done. There may also have been a feeling of constraint and even embarrassment at the company he was keeping—that is, a consciousness that other allies would raise their eyebrows if they knew he was there at all.

7. In discussion with Shuckburgh today I found he also had been struck by von Hassel’s reticence even at an intimate and informal dinner.

8. Ministers tentatively agreed that same six (DefMins and PermReps) should have dinner together again December 13th, night before opening of NATO Ministerial Council.³ Location this time will be at Schuckburgh’s house. This arrangement was made on explicit assumption that neither DefMins nor NATO PermReps would be involved in traditional quadripartite dinner of FonMins that same evening. Dept please confirm whether this assumption is correct.

Cleveland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Bonn and passed to OSD.
2. Document 113 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. The second tripartite Defense Ministers meeting spent the majority of its time on arrangements for and the program of the Special Committee, and the Embassy in Paris described it as “relaxed, amicable, and businesslike.” (Telegram 3379, December 14; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO)