Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, September 1, 1965, 0420Z.

533. For President and Secretary from Under Secretary. Following NATO portion of my August 31 discussion with General De Gaulle:²

At the conclusion of our discussion of Southeast Asia,³ I told General De Gaulle that I would like to review certain problems that we foresaw in connection with the Western Alliance.

The American people had made a very serious commitment with regard to NATO. This was a commitment both to the treaty and the organization. The United States had become an active participant in NATO because of our reading of the lessons of two world wars.

The first lesson related to the Alliance. Many Europeans—including members of General De Gaulle’s government—had remarked that the United States had come too late into both world wars. We agreed with this statement. Had the United States been clearly committed to the defense of Europe in advance both of the First and Second World Wars, neither conflict might have occurred, and the world would have been saved two major catastrophes. But our commitment had not been clearly defined and the aggressor had, therefore, not been forced to take United States power into account.

As a result of this experience the American people had made a great national decision. They had thrown aside the isolation that had marked a hundred years of our national history. They had made a commitment in peacetime to defend Europe from aggression.

The second lesson from the two world wars was, in our view, that an alliance could not be effective unless it was reenforced by a combined or integrated command, by common planning, and by forces in being. After all, in the First World War it had taken four years to achieve the appointment of Marshal Foch as combined commander. In the Second World War the allies had suffered greatly from the lack of effective collective preparation.

The American people would not, therefore, be able to understand a solemn commitment such as their commitment to NATO if that commitment were not reenforced by arrangements that gave reality to common defense. For that reason the NATO Treaty and the NATO organization were, in our view, inextricably linked, and it was very important that this point be clearly understood.

This did not mean, of course, that all the arrangements were perfect or immutable. We were prepared at any time to consider any changes that might be proposed by any member of the Alliance. We recognized that conditions changed, and that it might be necessary from time to time to revise arrangements in order to accommodate to evolving conditions.

General De Gaulle replied that we did not have time today to go into all the details of NATO. Anyway, the matter was not urgent. The treaty ran until 1969 and there was no reason to move quickly to change the organization. France and the United States were allied and it was natural that they should remain allied so long as the Soviet menace persisted. In his view, this menace would last for a considerable time to come.

If the Soviet Union attacked France—or conceivably attacked even the United States—France and America would be in the war together. The French Government certainly did not intend to break up the Alliance. There would be a de facto understanding for common defense between the United States and France even if no signed treaty existed.

The organization—as distinguished from the Alliance—was a different question. The organization had not existed at the time the treaty was signed. And since it was established, two major changes had taken place.

The first change was the advent of atomic weapons. In 1949 there were no Soviet atomic weapons. But with the development of such weapons the United States could not be sure—nor could its allies—as to what the United States would do in the atomic field in the event of attack.

The second change had been the vast transformation of the nations of Western Europe. They had moved from positions of weakness and dependency and were now reasserting their national personalities.

France, for example, was no longer prepared to accept the principle of subordination—which was what was meant by integration—or the control of “foreign authority”, however amicable or friendly.

General De Gaulle said that, so far as he was concerned, the Alliance would remain, but the organization was no longer suitable. It must be reexamined. He hoped this could be done in concert, but the United States should understand that France was not alone in this field. Other countries were beginning to feel the same way. The Germans, for example, were beginning to see, in the future, the need for an alliance without subordination.

So far as France was concerned, he wanted to make it clear that there could be no foreign forces on her soil except those under French command. The French Government was making no proposals now. Later on it would not make proposals but it would lay down conditions. Those conditions would be made by discussions between the two governments—the United States and France. Such discussions would not involve Germany or the United Kingdom.

The conversation had been running for a long time and I did not wish to protract it unduly. I stated, however, that I must make clear the position of the United States. We were not interested in domination. We were interested in efficiency. We wanted to make certain that the West would be defended effectively. The problem that preoccupied us was how we and our allies could organize our common defense in the most efficient manner.

We felt that history had made it crystal clear that, to have an effective common defense, a consolidated or integrated command was necessary.

Of course, the atom had brought about significant changes and we were deeply concerned about the unfinished business of how to prevent the proliferation of atomic power. We would be as disturbed as France by the development of a German national nuclear capability. But this did not mean that the problem of atomic management could be disregarded. In our view, nations that had historically played a great role in world affairs could not be expected to accept forever a situation in which they had no part in their own atomic defense. Yet the option was clear enough—either we permitted such nations to develop national nuclear systems of their own or we provided some kind of collective approach which would permit them nuclear participation without the need to develop their own national systems.

With this in mind, we had proposed a collective arrangement in which the non-nuclear powers of Europe could participate, in the form of a multilateral force. Within the next few months it was going to be necessary for us to resume consideration of this matter. We were not wedded to any particular collective formula, but it seemed to us that some collective solution was necessary.

All of this, I felt, had an obvious relevance to the NATO organization. I made it clear that we were prepared to discuss with France and our other allies any proposed changes that might make that organization more effective. If there were to be such a discussion we saw efficacy in not postponing it too long, since the operation of the present organization could be seriously impaired if too many unresolved questions were left pending.

General De Gaulle replied that he felt the efficiency of an alliance would be seriously impaired if some members felt subordinated to others, which was the present situation of the NATO Alliance. So far as Germany was concerned, he must express a note of caution. We all knew that the Germans were a great people. Because they were a great people it was not possible to tell exactly what they would do. France had been prepared to sign a treaty of friendship with the Germans and to join with the Germans in the organization of Europe. But this did not mean that Germany could be accepted on the same basis as other nations with reference to nuclear matters.

France had suffered from German invasions. Germany had been vanquished in the last war. German participation—whether partial or indirect—in the control of atomic weapons would certainly ruin any possible contacts with Soviet Russia or Eastern Europe.

Germany, he insisted, was not in a “normal situation”. Therefore, it should not be involved in atomic matters. Such involvement would affect not only the Russians but also the French. France could not forget the past.

I replied that we clearly had a difference of view as to the safest method of dealing with Germany in relation to the destructive power of the atom. I must point out that, in our view, the history of the last fifty years had demonstrated that German aggressiveness was stimulated by German isolation—by the feeling that Germany was not an equal member of the Western community—and that any discrimination or sense of grievance or inequality would play into the hands of demagogues.

In our view we should try, in dealing with Germany, to eliminate any sense of discrimination and to provide the Germans with the feeling that they were equal members of the Western community. We should try to forestall the emergence of a drive for a German national nuclear system by giving the Germans effective participation in some kind of collective nuclear arrangement.

I said further that while it was too late to discuss the question today, I must make it clear that the problem of atomic management remained unresolved.

It was a problem of great concern to the United States and we would certainly feel it necessary to have further discussions with the French Government in regard to it at some future date.

I thanked General De Gaulle for the courtesy he had shown and for the observation he had made. He concluded the interview by remarking that great powers have to choose between great difficulties. The United States was a very great power, and our choices, therefore, were exceptionally difficult. He wished President Johnson to know that France had sympathy for the United States and for him in the problems which they faced.⁴

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Paris and London for the Ambassadors and passed to the White House.
2. On August 25, President Johnson had written to President De Gaulle informing him that Ball was going to visit Europe and asking De Gaulle to receive him. (Telegram 865 to Paris, August 25; ibid., POL 7 US/BALL)
3. A report on the discussion of Southeast Asia was transmitted in telegram 532 from Rome, September 1. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

4. Following his visit to Rome, Ball returned to Paris, and on August 6 he paid a courtesy call on Couve de Murville. After discussing the situation in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, Ball and Couve talked about NATO along lines similar to the conversation reported here. Ball transmitted his account of the conversation in Secun 3 from Paris, September 6. (Ibid., ORG 7 U)

   In a September 1 memorandum to Bundy for the President’s evening reading, Executive Secretary Read characterized the conversation as follows:

   “On the Atlantic Alliance we see no daylight. The Under Secretary made an effective and full presentation of our views regarding the need for continuing effective NATO machinery, including an integrated command system. De Gaulle’s responses indicate no hope that he is likely to change his basic views. He merely offered the possibility that there would be no hurry in bringing about the changes that he wants. He was perhaps clearer and more emphatic than ever before in saying that there could be no foreign forces on French soil except those under French command, and that Germany should not be involved in atomic matters.” (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 74 D 164)