Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations¹

Washington, July 11, 1965, 10:26 a.m.

53. Following are points US intends to make to UK with respect to general question of non-proliferation treaty and specifically re their new draft (CA-13995).² We hope that British, in light these comments, will not pursue subject at this time, but if they do continue to desire discussions in NAC, US should be guided by these points.

1. US believes draft non-proliferation agreement which Secretary gave Dobrynin April 13, 1963,³ after document had been circulated in NAC in February 1963, represents best position for West to adhere to, certainly for the present. We are prepared to drop Minute attached to that draft (CA-6451 of December 13, 1962)⁴ and to substitute a withdrawal clause based on limited test ban treaty for last sentence of present paragraph 3.⁵ US does not see any particular tactical advantage to tabling revision of this draft at this time.

2. We do not see that UK draft has any advantages over US 1963 proposal, although we are prepared, of course, to listen to British arguments in this connection.

3. UK draft has number of substantial drawbacks in our view. We consider particularly that it would be tactically dangerous to negotiate on basis UK formulation whereby exclusion of MLF/ANF from ban on transfer of control of nuclear weapons to “any association of states” (Article I (1)) hangs tenuously on definition of “control” in separate and subsequent article (Article III (c)). Exposed definition of “control” might be so tempting a target for Soviet negotiators that it could be self-defeating in terms of Western effort to bring Soviets to face-saving agreement.

4. Language of UK draft would also limit evolution of MLF/ANF under “European clause” by requiring maintenance of veto by one of existing nuclear powers. The “European clause” was introduced into MLF discussions in response to apparent desire of Europeans and in reflection their aspirations towards eventual political unity. As far as US is concerned, we are not ourselves insisting that any MLF/ANF charter must include a “European clause,” but we do wish to respond effectively to largest possible consensus among interested European allies, and their collective view of this matter is not yet clear.

5. As indicated above, we are ready to introduce in non-proliferation agreement withdrawal clause similar to that in test ban.

6. We continue to attach importance to having agreement cast in terms of prohibiting transferring weapons into national control of individual states so as not to leave any ambiguity re effect of agreement on new NATO nuclear arrangements such as ANF/MLF which in our view are consistent with our non-proliferation objectives and should not be precluded by non-proliferation agreement.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers (EUR/RPM) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA), cleared by Thompson (G), Leddy (EUR), Jeanne W. Davis (S/S-S), Ball (U), Klein (White House), and initialed by C. Arthur Borg (S) for Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, London, Ottawa, and Rome. A July 12 memorandum from Fisher to Rusk states that Weiler’s name was added to the source text as a co-drafter without his knowledge. Weiler had worked with Spiers on an earlier draft which ACDA concurred in except for paragraph 6. It included an FYI section, supported by ACDA, which reads as follows: “US non-proliferation policy is currently under review, and it is possible that new approaches and changes in past position will result. Accordingly, we do not want to give impression that 1963 draft treaty or above points are immutable.” Fisher’s memorandum maintains that this section was excised from the draft telegram transmitted to Rusk without ACDA’s being informed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6)
2. CA-13995 to NATO capitals, Moscow, New Delhi, Tokyo, Wellington, Dublin, and Geneva, June 25, transmitted a copy of the U.K. draft Non-Dissemination Treaty, May 1965, as Attachment A, and a copy of the Canadian draft treaty, “Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,” April 8, as Attachment B; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18.
3. Secretary of State Rusk handed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin a draft Non-Transfer Declaration with an appended clarifying Minute on April 12, 1963. ( Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VII, Supplement)
4. CA-6451, December 13, 1962, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/12-1362. The draft Minute of interpretation is quoted in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VII, Document 249.

5. A cover memorandum from Fisher to Bundy, July 12, transmitting a copy of the Draft Non-Transfer Declaration together with the Minute which Secretary of State Rusk discussed with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on April 12, 1963, reads in part as follows: “If amended pursuant to Topol 53, the Minute would be dropped and the attached clause would be substituted in lieu of paragraph 3 of the Declaration.”

   The attached clause reads as follows: “Test Ban Type Withdrawal Clause for 1963 U.S. Non-Proliferation Declaration. This declaration shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of any signatory to withdraw from the declaration if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the declaration have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other signatories three months in advance.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6)