Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

249. Editorial Note

On December 12, 1962, Secretary Rusk arrived in Paris in preparation for the NATO Ministerial Meeting to be held December 13-15. In the course of deliberations on Alliance matters of mutual concern, the Secretary explored with the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers prospects for promoting an agreement with the Soviet Union on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. The Secretary submitted a draft non-transfer declaration to Lord Home on December 12. The declaration was intended to make more precise the Soviet concerns about the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to states that did not possess them. The first paragraph of this 3-paragraph draft is identical to the paragraph, quoted in Document 248, that Rusk read to Dobrynin on December 10. The second was a declaration by the other signatory governments that they would not manufacture nuclear weapons, would refrain from acquiring them directly or indirectly, and would “not ask or receive assistance from the other states in the manufacture of any such weapons.” The third paragraph outlined conditions for implementation and abrogation of the agreement. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200) For text of the declaration, see the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk also forwarded the draft declaration under cover of a December 12 letter to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. The Secretary’s letter explained that the United States had three main objectives in promoting the declaration: First, there was the remote chance that a four-power agreement on non-diffusion might “throw some obstacles across the path of a Chinese nuclear development.” The letter noted that “the Soviets might be able to use the proposal as pressure on Peiping, disagreement between them on the subject could benefit the West, and, as a minimum, Peiping would have to bear the responsibility for no progress.” The second goal was “to devise a means for diverting the Soviets away from special arrangements with regard to Germany,” and third, it was in the interest of nuclear weapons states to take some such action to try to prevent the likely spread of nuclear weapons to other states. The Secretary hoped that if he, Home, and Couve de Murville could agree on the declaration, they would consult the Germans and then the Soviets and other governments. “Paragraph two,” he concluded, “would need the adherence of many governments if the declaration is to achieve its purpose. Certainly we would not be interested in a formal agreement which did not include Peiping.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200) The letter is in the Supplement.

During the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Secretary Rusk also shared with the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers a minute of interpretation as guidance respecting the disposition of a nuclear weapon in connection with a regional arrangement. “Such actions,” the minute stated, “are prohibited if they would give to any state which is a member of the regional arrangement and which does not possess nuclear weapons the ability to make a determination to use these weapons on the basis of its national decision alone.” The minute then listed five illustrative points, as follows:

• “1. The draft declaration would prohibit the four powers possessing nuclear weapons from placing nuclear weapons under the control of units of national forces of nations in the NATO or Warsaw Pact which do not now possess nuclear weapons.
• “2. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from deploying nuclear weapons in support of the forces of member nations which are assigned to the forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, respectively, even though these members do not themselves have such weapons. The arrangements would be such that the four nuclear signatories retain control over the weapons so that they could not be deployed or used solely on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.
• “3. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from placing nuclear weapons in the custody of units of a multinational defense force within the framework of NATO, or Warsaw Pact defense forces, respectively, if weapons could not be deployed or used on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.
• “4. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from entering into multinational consultative procedures with respect to the deployment and use of nuclear weapons with countries not now possessing such weapons.
• “5. The draft declaration assures adherence to the declaration by all potential nuclear states or authorities. It would not become operative until the four nuclear signatories were satisfied that such adherences had been obtained, and until both had ratified it pursuant to their constitutional processes.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200)

In a cable to Acting Secretary Ball and the President at the end of the NATO meeting, Secretary Rusk noted, among other things, that on the non-transfer declaration “British fully agree. Germans will agree if Peiping’s adherence is required. French are studying and will let us know. Am slightly encouraged that we have not had oracular rejection from Paris.” (Secto 22 from Paris, December 15; ibid., Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1562)