Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

266. Notes of Meetings¹

Washington, August 7, 1968.

[Here follows discussion of a telephone conversation with Donald Hornig on the upcoming IAEA Conference, testing, and the Fermi Award.]

At 10:30 a.m. I met with the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals in the Secretary of State’s Conference Room. Present were Rusk (Chairman), Foster, Fisher, Bohlen, Hornig, Keeney, Helms, Scoville, Harold Brown, General Wheeler, Nitze, Clifford, Warnke; plus Labowitz, Kirby Gean, Ivan Selin (DOD), et al. Rusk opened the meeting by emphasizing that there is a need for finding positive ways to make progress in arms limitation. He suggested that the meeting start with a status report on the work of the interagency Working Group, and called on Adrian Fisher to give the report.

Fisher called attention to the fact that the Working Group’s conclusions were summarized in his memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, dated July 31, 1968 (copy attached), which enclosed the summary paper, “Strategic Missile Talks Proposal.”² He said that, in view of this, and assuming that the Principals have read the paper, he would not take the time to describe it here. He said that it deals solely with a freeze on missiles and not on the production problem. Fisher also referred to the CIA documents analyzing the national detection capabilities. He said we don’t yet have individual agency positions on this matter, but we do have a DOD analysis on the military effectiveness of the strategic missile proposal.

Rusk then called for the DOD report. Clifford said that this has been a priority item within DOD and Selin would present the briefing. He stated that this material has not yet been evaluated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Selin then made an analysis comparing the U.S. and USSR strategic forces and their effectiveness in first strikes and retaliation from first strikes with and without an agreement on limitation of strategic missiles. He gave us a paper that summarized his remarks. Secretary Clifford then called on General Wheeler to give us his views. Wheeler said that such an arrangement to limit strategic missiles would lead to political problems; one of these would be that it would create a strain within the alliance, another was the possibility the Soviets would clandestinely increase their land-based mobile system, which would be possible because we don’t have means of verification. Another problem would arise if we should attempt to limit the radars because we can’t verify this. He said he thought the limitations on the ABM might be the core of the problem, that this could make us vulnerable to attacks from Nth countries.

Rusk raised the question whether we couldn’t establish a Joint U.S.-USSR Commission on Strategic Missiles to serve as a forum to discuss the problems on a day-to-day basis and to monitor the progress in missile limitation. Such a Commission would look into any allegations of violations. This might be better than a formal treaty such as we have for the test ban. In this connection, he asked Foster to think of the form as well as the content of a strategic missiles limitation. Wheeler said he could visualize such a Joint Commission within a treaty, but that a Joint Commission alone would not receive the approval of Congress because they would want to have the terms spelled out. Both Rusk and Foster responded by saying they thought the Joint Commission could be put in a form so that Congress would approve; perhaps a joint resolution of Congress could be used for this purpose.

Rusk asked me whether I had any comment. In referring to the briefing by Selin, I said I thought the Soviets surely would go to the building of MIRVs. I asked why this was considered as an uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions. Rusk said that they might want to seek an agreement to prohibit MIRVs, but that if MIRVs were not prohibited, it would seem like the Soviets would add them to their arsenal. I said we should make an analysis of the consequences of both sides eliminating MIRVs and bombers.

We then turned to the third agenda item, even though Clifford had left the meeting to take a phone call. Nitze introduced this item, which had to do with the U.S. MIRV test program. He gave us a paper covering this item.³ Rusk raised the question as to why MIRVs are better than separate re-entry vehicles, and was told by several people present that, for a given launch capability and cost, more coverage could be accomplished with MIRVs than with separate re-entry vehicles. Rusk asked when the first MIRV test is scheduled to take place and Nitze indicated it would be on August 15th or 16th. When Secretary Clifford re-entered the room, Foster asked him whether he thought it was wise for him (Clifford) to hold a press conference announcing the MIRV test program. Foster asked whether it wouldn’t be better to have a DOD press officer, such as Phil Goulding, announce it. Rusk suggested that another alternative would be just to issue a written statement. He said there was some belief, for example in the recent Times article, that starting the testing of MIRVs forecloses the possibility of ever prohibiting them.

I said it should be remembered that the AEC has an accelerated, or crash program, for the construction of the nuclear warheads for the MIRVs, for Poseidon and for Minuteman III, and that authorization and commitment has already been undertaken for hundreds of millions of dollars worth of construction for this purpose, which is already underway. Rusk summarized the discussion by asking whether anyone was suggesting a postponement of the MIRV tests, and it was apparent that no one was suggesting such a postponement. Rusk indicated that McCarthy might make an issue in the election of suggesting a postponement. On the other hand, if the MIRV tests were postponed, Nixon would make an issue of it. Rusk suggested that DOD try to issue the most unexciting press announcement possible, and as soon as possible. He asked whether the press is always present at the MIRV test launchings, and Nitze said, “Yes, this has been the best policy.” Rusk closed the meeting by indicating that the Principals would meet again a week from today, at the same time.

I met with Secretary Rusk at 12 noon, at his request, following the Meeting of the Principals. [Here follows discussion of visas for an Israeli and South African to a Soviet conference. At the conclusion of this private meeting, Seaborg noted:] I indicated to Rusk that I have the impression the U.S. is depending very much on the MIRVs for its strategic offensive and deterrent capability and that it would be difficult to get agreement for any treaty which included as a provision the prohibition of MIRVs.

[Here follow telephone conversations on the AEC General Advisory Committee and a proposed conference on nuclear power.]

1. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 128, and 132-133. No classification marking.
2. See footnote 1, Document 264.
3. Not further identified.