Office of the Historian

265. Memorandum for the Record1

CM-3549-68
Washington, August 5, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin
1.
On the evening of 5 August, I attended a dinner at the residence of the Netherlands Ambassador in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Walter Stoessel, [Page 662] Ambassador-designate to Poland. Among the guests were Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin. After dinner, when we were joining the ladies, Ambassador Dobrynin took the opportunity to engage me in conversation in company with our former Ambassador to Poland, Mr. Gronouski. Mr. Gronouski moved away after a few moments, leaving Ambassador Dobrynin and me alone until the gathering broke up more than 30 minutes later.
2.
The early part of Ambassador Dobrynin’s remarks were of a general nature. He commented on the differences in the roles of the top military in the Soviet Union and the United States, citing the fact that I regularly attend the Tuesday White House luncheons while the Soviet military never appear at the weekly meetings of the seven-man top ruling group of the Soviet Union and only attend the Politburo meetings when a specific item of a military nature is on the agenda. He commented also on the composition of the classes at our National War College and said they had nothing of a similar nature in the Soviet Union. After about ten minutes, he switched to the subject of the upcoming talks on limitations of strategic missiles which, because he repeated each point several times during the ensuing 25 minutes or so, I presume was the real purpose of his conversation with me.
3.
Ambassador Dobrynin made, several times over, the following points:
a.
In a sense the United States has established goals which the Russians are determined to reach or even surpass. (In the context of his remarks, I was persuaded that he was speaking in this instance of non-military matters.)
b.
The upcoming Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) could be extremely important because they could lead to further improvements in relations and unspecified benefits to all.
c.
The Soviets are unsure as to exactly what we want to achieve. Is it a freeze? This doubt has been fertilized by statements by United States officials as to our military superiority in the strategic area. These statements lead to demands for more forces (missile, I assume)—100, 200, 300 more.
d.
The United States and the Soviet Union are both great nations. If we approach the talks on the basis of equality, results can be achieved. (By inference, Ambassador Dobrynin conveyed the impression that any other approach would negate achievement.)
4.
Comment: Ambassador Dobrynin’s manner throughout our conversation was very friendly and sincere. Obviously he was determined to make his points with me because he twice refused to be persuaded by our hostess from taking a seat with a group of ladies. He emphasized the importance of us approaching the talks on the basis of “equality.” From the way in which he used this word, I gained the impression that he meant two things: First, the recognition on our part that we would be dealing with a militarily equal nation. (Of interest is the fact that the [Page 663] Ambassador said they believed themselves to be ahead of us in certain military areas while recognizing that we were ahead of them in others.) The other meaning which I think he conveyed by his use of the word “equality” was parity of forces; however, he did not at that time elaborate on this aspect nor did he use the word “parity” at any time.
5.
As the dinner party broke up, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had enjoyed very much talking to me and hoped to be able to renew our conversation at an early date.
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by General Wheeler on August 6.↩