Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

263. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 24, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Conversations With United States Delegation to the Paris Talks

1. En route to Christmas leave in Washington, I stopped in Paris for discussions [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] primarily on the question of organizing Agency support for the United States Delegation to the Vietnam Peace negotiations. During the stopover on 16 December 1968, I briefed and was debriefed by Mr. Philip Habib, Governor Harriman and Ambassador Vance in three separate sessions involving a total of four hours. The focus of the discussions was the political and psychological situation in South Vietnam and its relationship to events in Paris and Washington.

2. Principal Political and Psychological Factors in Vietnam Today:

A. There is discernible and significant momentum in a forward direction on virtually all fronts. (I described some of this progress in detail including such items as GVN efficiency, Phoenix, ARVN performance, political institutions., etc.) A clear cut military and political victory is not in sight, but there is a sense of accomplishment at having prevented an enemy takeover. There is a gathering confidence on the part of the South Vietnamese in their own capacity to govern, to fight, to talk, and ultimately to deal politically with the residual communist organization in their midst.

B. The gathering sense of confidence should not be exaggerated. There is also an evident fragility between this “strong side” and the “weak side” of anxiety about American intentions. Decreasing confidence in the willingness of the United States to stay the negotiations course puts South Vietnam on a kind of tight rope. It is obvious that the prospect of precipitous massive withdrawal of American troops (real or imagined) without verified and guaranteed reciprocity from North Vietnam, will move many Vietnamese to reinsure with the Viet Cong. Acceptance of cease fire conditions which dilute GVN sovereignty, talk of amending the Constitution and other possible concessions which suggest eventual communist ascendancy all tend to reinforce this movement. Disdainful and critical public statements by American officials can aggravate this fragility.

C. Actually both sides have this tight rope to walk and are trying to push the other off. The enemy line is: The Americans are pulling out and quickly. The GVN is nothing without the Americans. We are strong in the country. We will take over, rewarding friends and punishing enemies. It is not too late to make your deal with us. Do it now. And why get killed when peace is coming. The US/GVN line is the converse, to wit: The NVA is pulling out, leaving you to the mercy of the GVN. Come over now, etc. It is not clear which side is enjoying greater success but it is clear that the balance of advantage is a delicate one and is affected by signs of United States intentions.

D. The essential thrust of the NLF/VC/DRV in the political and psychological war is advocacy of a “peace cabinet” wherein elements more amenable to a compromise with the communists would exert decisive influence on the GVN side. The ideal arrangement for the communists would, of course, involve the removal of Thieu and Ky. This is often, but not always stated as essential. Addition of more “peace minded” individuals is, however, definitely desired.

E. The burden of this ploy is being carried by the new Movement to Struggle for Peace, a coalition of Buddhist, Student, Intellectual, and non-CVT labor forces. As an organization it does not yet demonstrate real muscle. It must be watched however since this kind of amalgam could make serious trouble especially if active enemy proselytizing in the armed forces produced resonance there.

F. A crucial point for the United States Government is the gathering consensus in the GVN and among key political leaders in South Vietnam that there must be a political settlement, that it will be sooner rather than later, that it will involve some form of negotiations with and recognition of the NLF as a political entity, that elections will be held with communist participation, that real risks will have to be accepted by the GVN. (This was born out in a sense by the [name not declassified]-Ky conversation and Ky’s CBS interview.)²

G. Properly handled, the GVN, given the above development, can be brought to a truly joint position with the United States on all key negotiation issues. The GVN must be made to feel, however, that we have not in fact abandoned our original purpose in the Vietnam intervention, namely, the denial of communist domination of the South. If so reassured, the GVN leadership will and can bring its own citizens around to acceptance of considerable political risk.

H. Whether the South will succeed in its political confrontation is another matter. Thieu is more successful and impressive as a president than as a politician. He has not yet been able to bring unity out of traditional political diversity. He must exert himself more strenuously and creatively to this end. There are signs that many Saigon and provincial political leaders are more susceptible than ever to a major effort by Thieu to unite nationalist political forces in a grand coalition to face the communists under post-hostilities conditions.

The following opinions, advanced partly in response to questions, were presented as the personal views of the undersigned:

I. The proper “mix” for United States/GVN policy (strategy and tactics) would involve (among other things) the following:

1. Crystallization of concrete American views on the shape of the political settlement and discussion thereof with the GVN. The GVN NEEDS to KNOW what we have in mind.

2. Application of necessary pressures on the GVN in a private, rational, and diplomatic manner, one which reflects appreciation of the Vietnamese character and style. This kind of pressure can be effective.

3. Conversely, the avoidance of blatant public pressure which is bound to be counter-productive and provides “contradictions” for enemy propaganda and political exploitation.

4. Adherence to a basic, clear, militant, yet flexible line in the negotiations which manifests both our absolute determination to arrange a settlement through negotiations and our refusal to hand the enemy a victory at the table which they failed to win on the ground. This also involves, and here we move closer to the American domestic political problem, avoidance of any suggestion that we have a timetable for withdrawal and settlement. To do so will surely convince the communists that we will meet their positions eventually, that they need only hang on in obstinate certainty of this while our political pressure clock ticks away. It is important to understand that the enemy also desires a negotiated settlement and is willing to accept some risks in connection with same.

J. The above suggestions were made in the context of what kind of posture will permit the GVN to continue to build its own administrative and political strength in Vietnam during the “fight and talk” stage. They are based on an assessment of the underlying psychological climate in the country.

3. There was no diametric disagreement with any of the above points. However, it may be useful to note a few of the observations made by Messrs. Habib, Harriman, and Vance during the discussions.

A. There is a feeling that the GVN is stalling for time through its insistence on procedural niceties. The GVN probably still hopes that the Nixon Vietnam team will change both the substance and the style of the approach in Vietnam and Paris, to wit: will be tougher with the enemy on all counts, less in a hurry to settle the affair.

B. This is probably erroneous as the new Nixon team will be under the same instructions to get on with the talks and on to a settlement involving prompt American troop withdrawal without delay.

C. If the GVN had any sense, it would understand that the only hope for gaining the time needed to prepare for the political confrontation lies in moving into serious negotiations quickly and in an early significant United States troop reduction. Under these circumstances, it is possible that the American public opinion would permit a more deliberate playing out of the negotiating process. The amount of time which might be gained under these circumstances is one year more or less.

D. Since the GVN still seems not to grasp completely the imperatives of the American intention, some kind of pressure is essential. We cannot be held back by our allies. Perhaps public pressure is to be avoided, but the essence of Mr. Clifford’s position is correct.

E. Governor Harriman acknowledged that we had never really described to the South Vietnamese our views on the shape of the future, what we might find acceptable as conditions for withdrawal and for a political settlement. While we say that the Vietnamese must work this out for themselves, the issues are clearly interrelated. The DRV is unlikely to withdraw its troops and keep them out of the South unless and until it has some idea of the kind of political deal which is in the offing. Governor Harriman believes that we should be more candid with the GVN on this score.

F. The North will never abide by any settlement unless they feel it in their interest to do so. They broke the Laos agreement immediately. They will break any Vietnam agreement unless they find it in their interest not to do so. Governor Harriman was not explicit on the kind of agreement which they might respect. He stressed his view that we are dealing with an aggressive nationalist form of communism out of the North. Thus, he believes that a key point in common among the USA, the USSR, and the DRV is the wish to avoid Communist Chinese domination of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. A sound settlement should play on this common ground. If this is true, some fraction of the United States troop presence could perhaps remain in South Vietnam after the major withdrawals have occurred.

G. Governor Harriman believes that we should try to negotiate a prompt reduction of the “violence” in South Vietnam, e.g., stop B-52 strikes if the Viet Cong will desist from all acts of “terror”. He saw little point in further attempts at pacification and in “killing a few more communists”.

4. Governor Harriman asked that I convey the following additional observations to the DCI:

A. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] efforts to strengthen its capacity to support the Delegation are commendable. He hopes the DCI will endorse the Station’s requests for additional manpower. He believes that the principal need, however, is for better intelligence on NLF/DRV plans in the negotiations. He regrets the paucity of intelligence on the enemy negotiating positions. The Governor was not critical, as he so stated several times, since he fully appreciated the operational difficulties. It was clear that he greatly appreciated the existing support rendered. His regard for [name not declassified] of the DDI was very evident.

B. A related problem and possibly not immediately susceptible to covert action is the role of the French in influencing the negotiations. The communist side has continuing contact with French officials who have already been asked for their views on the shape of the future political settlement. It is possible that French influence could be used either for good or evil in this context. Governor Harriman did not express concrete ideas on the implications of this phenomenon either diplomatically or covertly.

C. I had the distinct impression that Governor Harriman felt frustrated and disappointed at the prospect of leaving the Paris talks in such an inconclusive state. He has told the new President that he was ready to help in any way after returning to Washington on or about January 20th and asked that this be reported to the DCI.

D. The Governor asked that his views not be repeated outside the Agency, but that he planned to speak “totally frankly” now that he was about to leave his present post. It is clear that he is deeply disillusioned with the United States military failure to understand the nature and true purpose of the Vietnam conflict and its constant ill-based optimism both of which he considers largely responsible for the over commitment of United States resources to this ill-fated enterprise.

[name not declassified]
Chief
Political Operations Division
Saigon Station

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 72-207A, DDO/IMS Files, AA-3 FE Division, 1968. Secret.
2. The conversation between [name not declassified], who had previously been the Saigon Station’s primary contact with Ky, and Ky has not been identified. Regarding Ky’s TV interview, see footnote 6, Document 258.