Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

262. Personal Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to Henry A. Kissinger¹

Washington, December 23, 1968.

These should be understood, Henry, as wholly personal notes and reflections.

I. Set out below are some critical issues that will require decision in the weeks and months ahead. But I should perhaps begin by saying simply that if the new Administration is patient and steady, the following are objectives within its grasp, looking ahead over the next 12-18 months. [Omitted here is a list of other recommended U.S. policy objectives, including regional security in Asia, normalization with China, peace and development in the Middle East, measures for European unity, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, arms control, Latin American integration, and revamping of the international monetary system.]

II. The Vietnam Settlement. Here are things to watch:

• —An early reaffirmation by President Nixon of President Johnson’s instruction to General Abrams is required. President Johnson gave an instruction to go with the ARVN absolutely flat out in a pacification offensive. Without momentum inside South Vietnam, our leverage for a settlement in Paris or elsewhere is minimal. Vague talk of “de-escalation” could easily take the heart out of the ARVN and, indeed, adversely affect the morale of U.S. forces.
• —Clarity about general shape of a political settlement inside SVN. Only those who have lived with a succession of SVN governments can understand how precious [precarious] the present government is, notably with its constitutional basis rooted in the election process. The understanding with Thieu-Ky is that they will have to face a popular front party running against them at some time. That is why they are working to build a big national political party.² That is why at Honolulu Thieu said that those who give up violence can “run for office as well as vote.” There are all sorts of complexities that lie ahead in negotiating this outcome; but, if we continue to extend population control on the ground at something like the present 3% a month rate and chew away at the infrastructure, such a settlement is, I believe, within our grasp. We achieved a reasonably good understanding with Thieu at Honolulu. One of the most essential first tasks of the new Administration will be to reaffirm this basic understanding so that the struggle in Paris and elsewhere will not pull us apart and set in motion a disintegration of the political process in Saigon. Although we must leave the details of the negotiations to the South Vietnamese, a fundamental understanding on where we both wish to come out inside South Vietnam is essential.
• —Keep your eye on Laos. It is almost certain that Hanoi will try to negotiate its position on the ground in Laos to the maximum. There must be a contingency plan if they try to extend their situation in Laos down to the Mekong. (You should know that the only rational military riposte that any of us can think of is to seize some ground north of the 17th parallel and hold it until they get out of Laos—if they, in fact, should play this card.) In any case, a Vietnam settlement without a Laos settlement would bring no peace to Southeast Asia. Another anxiety is the road building by Communist China in Northern Laos. Some of us have feared for years that the Chinese might make a land grab in Northern Laos in the context of a Vietnam settlement. The truth is we do not have a good feel for Communist Chinese intentions toward a Vietnam settlement. I suspect there will be a test of will over Laos before we’re finished. The Russians may be helpful, if they are sure we’ll be tough.
• —Monitoring the settlement. You should bear in mind that the only new policy made in Paris was on the first day when Harriman was instructed that in a Vietnam settlement the governments of Southeast Asia should play a part, in monitoring terms. We have stimulated the Thais, Japanese, Indonesians, and others to think about their role in a settlement. Specifically, some of us feel we need an Asian force (using the new sensors, helicopters, etc.) to monitor against renewed infiltration. We would like to get the Japanese and Indonesians into this role since, unlike the Indians, Canadians, and Poles, they would have an abiding interest in the stability of a settlement. The optimum is to bring the Japanese out of the islands into a security role in Asia as part of a multilateral peacekeeping exercise.
• — U.S. troop withdrawals. Don’t be too surprised at some stage if Hanoi and Moscow indicate they do not want total U.S. troop withdrawals from SVN. There is some body of intelligence which suggests they may want a U.S. military presence in South Vietnam (as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia) as a counter to Chinese Communist pressure on Hanoi.

[Omitted here is discussion of the other issues facing the incoming administration.]

W.W. Rostow ³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Nixon & Transition. Secret; Personal. In an attached note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to the President, December 23, 7:40 a.m., Rostow wrote: “Henry Kissinger has asked me for my view of the key problems and possibilities ahead. I have done the attached memorandum on a wholly personal basis. He is coming in today and I should like to give it to him. But I do not wish to pass even such a personal document to him on a personal basis without your knowledge and assent.” At the bottom of the note, Rostow provided the President with options to check, including “No” and “See me.” The President checked “You may give it to Kissinger.” On December 2 President-elect Nixon had named Kissinger to be Assistant to President for National Security Affairs in the new administration.
2. See me. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.