Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

45. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 26, 1966, 10:40 a.m.

I think you will want to read this important cable from Bangkok before our luncheon meeting²—it represents the summary of the view of Lodge and Westmoreland, Sharp and Bill Sullivan, General Stilwell and Ambassador Graham Martin, as they survey the prospects for 1966.

Bob McNamara is very annoyed by the reference to the shortage of iron bombs.³ He says there is no shortage except in the context of a perfectly fantastic rate of B–52 drops.

But this is not the main point. The point is rather that this cable gives the best summary we have had from the field of the plans for the next year as the men in the field see it.

Paragraphs 6 and 7 are of particular interest in the context of the decisions immediately ahead, but the whole telegram is worth reading.

McG. B.

Attachment⁴

(Text of cable from Embassy Bangkok 1470)

1. During the course of a restricted session of the Southeast Asia Coordination Meeting we examined the limitations facing both the U.S. and North Vietnam in prosecuting the Vietnam war. As far as the U.S. is concerned, we defined our limitations as those imposed by:

A. The current mobilization base;

B. Current and foreseeable weapons shortage (e.g., iron bombs);

C. The marginal capacity for logistical and air bases in Southeast Asia;

D. U.S. public opinion;

E. Free world attitude;

F. Political and military considerations affecting Vietnamʼs neighbor countries, and

G. The fact that, although improving, the Government of Vietnam is still ineffective by western standards.

As far as North Vietnam is concerned, we defined the limitations as:

A. Logistical;

B. The requirement for clandestinity;

C. Consideration of Sino-Soviet differences; and

D. Morale.

2. In light of these evaluations, we attempted to project our view of the manner in which we expect the war to develop over the next year. As far as enemy action is concerned, we expect we may see a shift in his strategy. Rather than attempting to pursue his earlier campaign to seize control of the highlands from Pleiku to Qui Nhon, we may find him instead concentrating on Quang Tri and Thua Thien in the First Corps Zone, attempting to bite off the consolidated piece of territory immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone.

3. We feel that the enemy may have been impelled to move to this strategy as a result of several factors:

A. Difficulty of maintaining forces in the Kontum-Pleiku complex against increasing concentrations of U.S. forces;

B. Difficulties encountered in operating a long Line of Communication through Southeast Laos in the face of increasing air attack;

C. Relative sparsity of U.S. and South Vietnam units in the northernmost regions of South Vietnam;

D. Relatively simple logistic lines across western regions of the Demilitarized Zone and the adjacent territory of Eastern Laos;

E. The need for some demonstrable military success to give a political stimulus both to Hanoi and to Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam.

4. Consequently we would expect to see the enemy concentrating infiltration effort on a rather limited area of terrain, partly within the Demilitarized Zone and partly in a shallow sector of Eastern Laos. While other more traditional elements of the Ho Chi Minh trail will continue to be used, we have evidence which suggests that an immediate concentration of effort will be in this strip of territory contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone. The enemyʼs motivation in this concentration is largely political, in his hope to precipitate an equivalent of Dien Bien Phu by taking significant territory, which we would have great difficulty in wresting back. The enemy would hope that this development would deliver such a blow to our public opinion and to our will to continue that we would be prepared to accept North Vietnam peace terms.

5. As for ourselves, we believe that the limitations imposed on us do not permit many imaginative options beyond those which already govern our current operations. With troops on hand or deployable, we cannot contemplate large scale ground operations outside South Vietnam territory, even if political considerations should permit. In any event we do not foresee any changes in those political considerations.

6. As far as air actions are concerned, we recognize that the sortie rate may have to be curtailed because of existing and foreseeable shortages in the supply of iron bombs. Although these sorties are not concentrated within South Vietnam and Laos, we assume their pattern will have to be realigned again when and as Rolling Thunder operations are resumed. In the resumption of Rolling Thunder, we expect that there will be a removal of previous restrictions and an expansion of allowable targets to include a number of North Vietnam installations directly affecting the enemyʼs ability to sustain the infiltration effort. Among these are the Port of Haiphong, petroleum facilities, power plants, etc. While we do not believe that hitting these targets will have an immediate dramatic effect upon that enemyʼs ability to continue the war in the South, we nevertheless feel that the cumulative effect will be significant. Therefore, in moving to these new targets we should avoid giving the public impression that this is a panacea, but merely indicate that it is part of the bombing pattern required to reduce infiltration effectively.

7. Given these assumptions, we foresee the war in 1966 as a mutual effort to make the most of the resources at hand within the known limitations of both sides. For the U.S. this means three general features:

A. A more effective bombing campaign in North Vietnam and in Laos. Less resort to random sorties, especially in Laos. We must make the maximum use of intelligence assets in target acquisition and selectively control air strikes through the greater use of forward air controllers.

B. We must continue to destroy enemy forces wherever they can be found, attempting to make his casualty rate greater than his ability to replace casualties by infiltration and recruitment.

C. We must press forward actively with pacification and rural reconstruction efforts in expanding areas of South Vietnam.

8. We believe that if we can demonstrably increase enemy casualties well over and above his abilities to replace them, if we can significantly hamper his logistics system, and if we can prevent his seizure of any major new territorial gains, then we may effectively break his will to continue. If such a development could be combined with genuine pacification progress we might expect a rather rapid disintegration of the enemyʼs campaign in 1967.

9. At the same time we must expect, if and when the North Vietnam campaign begins to falter, that the ChiComs will turn to other fronts in order to occupy our attention and dissipate our strength. Their ability to stir up trouble in Thailand is not yet fully exploited and they can seriously harass Laos through direct support to Pathet Lao elements there. These areas therefore will require constant attention as we move through 1966.

10. The eventual cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam is unlikely to diminish the need for a U.S. presence in Thailand. On the contrary, for an indeterminate period there may be a reaction from Thailand that diminution would be evidence of U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, which would in turn permit renewal of Chinese Communist pressures. U.S. planning should, therefore, assure the need for a continuing military investment in Thailand, as a premium for maintaining the U.S./Free World position in Southeast Asia. In this connection it was emphasized that whatever future arrangements or official statements may be made by the U.S. regarding its willingness to withdraw from military bases, should be strictly limited to those in South Vietnam and the formulation “Southeast Asia” should be avoided. Care should be taken to avoid the implication that we would not continue to fulfill our SEATO commitment to Thailand.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. No classification marking. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
2. Following a meeting in the Cabinet Room (see Document 46), the President met for lunch at 2:01 p.m. in the family dining room with Rusk, Ball, Raborn, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers. No record of the discussion has been found. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary)
3. Iron bombs are unguided high explosive bombs.
4. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, vol. IV. Top Secret. The telegram was transmitted from Bangkok at 5:36 a.m. on January 25 and retyped in the White House on January 26 especially for the President. The Department of State copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.