44. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Why Is Hanoi Reluctant to Negotiate?
It is a commonplace observation that Hanoi has responded inadequately to our peace offensive and pause because of its confidence that time is on its side and that victory is ultimately attainable through persevering on the path of aggression. Less discussed, however, are inhibiting factors which may delay Hanoiʼs hand should it be tempted to seek through a mixed political-military strategy that which it no longer sees as attainable through military efforts alone. Because the men in Hanoi are professional military planners whose lives have been almost wholly devoted to the battlefield, we believe they must, by now, have a fair appreciation of what faces the Viet Cong even should US force levels remain at 200,000 in South Vietnam—to say nothing of what is foreshadowed by authoritative reports of planned increases to 400,000. Therefore we have turned our attention to the possible factors which inhibit Hanoiʼs willingness to embark on systematic discussions with the US or intermediaries. This query assumes, of course, that at least some weighing of this alternative has occurred in Hanoi, however limited and recent such deliberations may have been.
Negotiations: More Risk Than Gain
The advantages of making some concession to US demands, of entering into some sort of discussions, however informal, are so obvious that Hanoiʼs reluctance is puzzling. Even the most indirect and insubstantial dialogue, once begun, would raise serious obstacles to a resumption of US bombings and would have disquieting repercussions in Saigon. The North Vietnamese are not stupid; they see the possibility of these tactical gains even if they have no intention of themselves sincerely working for a negotiated settlement or do not in the least credit us with such a sincere intention. Why then do they not seize the opportunity to advance their cause? Clearly they perceive grave dangers when they analyse the negotiatory track.
The most fundamental obstacle probably lies in their understanding of the nature of “negotiations.” They look on diplomatic deals as dishonorable [Page 147] haggling or what is now called a zero-sum game: anything that A gains must be exactly what B loses. Moreover, as Marxists they are idealists (though they can be very pragmatic) and they look on every concession made to the imperialists as a derogation from the ideal course of history, a detour on the road to the perfect society. It is their duty to reject all detours unless absolutely unavoidable. Thus they are deadly serious when they say that matters of principle are not subject to bargaining; only the “details” can properly be compromised. These philosophical positions combined with the profoundly suspicious character and instrumental attitude toward “truth” which foreign observers of the Vietnamese have long remarked (most recently Professor Kissinger), make the very word “negotiations” an extremely negative one for the leaders in Hanoi as well as those in Saigon.
Past Experience: Negotiations Never Work Out
On top of this underlying distrust of diplomacy has been superposed a series of bitter experiences with negotiations. From 1945 to 1947 the Viet Minh reached a series of agreements with the French, all of which certainly worked out badly for the Viet Minh, whether or not one agrees that the French simply violated them. The subsequent military successes against the French led to Geneva where the Viet Minh were pressured by the Soviets into accepting much less than they thought they had won. And even the terms of Geneva were, they feel, openly violated in 1956 by their adversaries, notably the Americans who by then were Diemʼs principal support.
These general arguments against any negotiations are reinforced in present circumstances by a number of specific considerations. For one thing, it is at least as difficult for Hanoi to conceive of a middle course (neither victory nor defeat) as it is for the US/GVN side. Their objective has always been victory—not some modest reform of the Saigon government but its outright replacement by a regime in fundamental rapport with Hanoi. Reunification under Hanoi might not come immediately, a Front government might maneuver slowly and carefully in that direction, but the direction would not be in any doubt. With an objective framed in such terms, anything less is defeat and to accept anything less is capitulation. What then is there to negotiate? The Hawks in Hanoi are saying to the putative Doves: “If we are beaten, we simply withdraw. At least that way we do not publicly acknowledge our defeat and we have a better posture for another try later.”
We may presume, however, that not all the policymakers in Hanoi categorically rule out an “indirect” or “political” approach to their objective in the South. Some of them must be entertaining the idea that the US can be enticed or duped into withdrawing and leaving Saigon open to another, perhaps more subtle subversion effort. But even these more flexible minds show real concern over the problem of a US withdrawal. [Page 148] Can the US possibly be trusted to keep any promise to withdraw? Will not its desire for bases, its neo-colonialist impulses, make it as treacherous as the French?
Hostages Against Negotiations: The NFL/VC
Still another very practical concern in the minds of the Vietnamese communist leaders is the hostility toward negotiations among those most directly involved in the insurgency in the South: the military and political cadres who have been the backbone of the effort. These are the officials whose policies would be most sharply repudiated if Hanoi shifts to negotiations. It is they who miscalculated in 1964 that the Saigon government was in its death throes, who urged the introduction of PAVN forces to give the VC more punch, who then advocated a PAVN escalation to meet the increased American presence, and who have insisted that the Ia Drang Valley battles were a communist victory. An eloquent statement of their position by General Nguyen Chi Thanh was made public just before Christmas. (Thanh is reputed to be Hanoiʼs commander in the South.) To what extent the policymakers in Hanoi have their freedom of action constrained by these Hawks is not clear—there is no evidence at all on which to identify the leaders of this group or to gauge their strength—but at least the Politburo must move circumspectly and avoid impairing its authority and control.
Military morale and the esprit of all elements of the Viet Cong operation are still another factor to be carefully weighed by Hanoi. Forward momentum and the conviction that victory will come—and will come within a year or two—are important, probably vital elements in such a movement. Already there are intelligence reports that the expressed determination to “fight 10 or 20 years” has impaired VC morale. A switch to a radically different, possibly very extended political effort could not fail to have grave repercussions among the VC. Yet even after entering on a political track, Hanoi would want to retain as long as possible its option of reviving the insurgency—certainly until a considerable measure of American compliance with the terms of any accord had been registered. A very careful preparation of its cadres for any such shift in strategy is thus of primary importance for Hanoi. Hanoi must be able to present whatever it agrees to as a “victory” when it explains its shift to its supporters. This concern for VC morale is at least part of the explanation for the extremely rapid and vigorous denials which all DRV and Front representatives automatically issue whenever the press attributes some softening to one of them.
China: Anchor to Windward
Finally there is China. The DRV is no doubt capable of deciding unilaterally whether or not it wants to begin negotiations; but does it want to assert its independence so bluntly? Peking is Hanoiʼs nearest neighbor, a [Page 149] gigantic power which has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to dominate the Red River valley. It is thus something to be feared. But it is also something to be loved: the Vietnamese communists have clearly shown that ideologically (one could almost say spiritually) they are closest to the Chinese. Many of them spent years in China, generally in the heroic Yenan period. The essential aid that defeated the French came from China. And it is Peking with its massive armies which, far more than it threatens, ultimately guarantees the survival of the North Vietnamese regime against even the most total US ground invasion. Compared to China the USSR is very remote indeed. It is therefore only common sense for Hanoi to make every effort to keep its position in line with that of Peking. There is no doubt, of course, where Peking stands on negotiations, and we should perhaps be surprised at the gap that has developed between the positions of Hanoi and Peking, rather than disappointed that there has not been an outright break.
As the US knows very well, junior partners also have their leverage against their more powerful allies and in the end Peking must accommodate to Hanoiʼs decisions on matters which directly involve Hanoi; there remains a question of how Peking is to accommodate and when. Moreover, the discrepancy between Hanoi and Peking has even a certain tactical utility to the former. Having decided (if it does) to negotiate, Hanoi might want Peking to drag its heels, to play the reluctant dragon, to extract whatever additional concessions the US might have held back from Hanoi. Then with the bird in its hand, Hanoi would signal to Peking that the moment had come to change to a new strategy.
This complex of problems—their conditioned reflex against “negotiations,” their inability to envisage any acceptable compromise, their problems with their hard-liners and with VC morale, and the question of the Chinese—is complex indeed, so tangled that a decision to negotiate may be impossible for Hanoi. Yet such a decision is clearly under consideration: there has been no acceptance of our invitation to negotiate, no unambiguous signal has come through any of the many channels available, and at the same time there has been no rejection of our invitation, either. It would have been very easy for Hanoi in the early stages of the pause or at any time since to slam the door even more resoundingly than last May. And if a negative diplomatic response proved inconvenient, there have been other channels available: a vigorous offensive in South Vietnam by PAVN forces, for example. (We do not look on the inaction of the PAVN as a positive “signal” that negotiations and de-escalation have been chosen, but rather consider the inaction as a negative indication, a sign that Hanoi does not yet want to close the door to negotiation.) While Hanoi wrestles with these problems, we can expect a certain amount of confusion, inconclusive, even contradictory evidence as to what course they are selecting. In fact, they may try to have their [Page 150] cake and eat it—for example, to engage us in negotiations while they go on the offensive in the South. Until a clear decision is made—if indeed one ever is—we can only be sure that their irresolution is producing strains in Hanoi, and particularly acute problems with the VC and Peking.
- Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.↩