Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

350. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

Washington, December 24, 1966, 2142Z.

A. JCS 2135/232114Z Dec 66.²

1. We were just starting to put some real pressure on Hanoi. Our air strikes on the rail yard and the vehicle depot were hitting the enemy where it was beginning to hurt. Then, Hanoi complains that we have killed a few civilians, hoping that they would get a favorable reaction. And they did, more than they could have hoped for.

Not only did we say we regretted it if any civilians were killed but we also stopped our pilots from striking within ten miles of Hanoi. Hanoi has been successful once again in getting the pressure removed. They will be encouraged to continue their aggression, hoping to outlast us.

2. With nearly 400,000 U.S. fighting men in RVN it must be apparent to Hanoi that they canʼt take over the country by force. But they can fight a protracted guerrilla war, terrorize the countryside, make revolutionary development very difficult, and kill a lot of people, including Americans. This kind of war can go on for a long time if we let them get away with it.

3. My limited sounding of public opinion, including the thoughts of quite a few members of Congress, leads me to believe that we had better do what we can to bring this war to a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible. The American people can become aroused either for or against this war. At the moment, with no end in sight, they are more apt to become aroused against it. Itʼs up to us to convince our people and Hanoi that there is an end in sight and that it is clearly defeat for Hanoi. However, our actions these last few days can only encourage the enemy to continue.

4. When Hanoi complains about civilians being killed, is it not possible to say, “Perhaps some were killed, we try to avoid that, but this is a war and some civilians are bound to get killed. Hanoi can prevent it by calling off the aggression in SVN.”

5. If the enemy avoids major engagements in SVN and gets back to Phase II of their plan, the guerrilla phase, then it becomes urgently important to step up the pressure in the North by hitting targets that hurt them. And if some civilians get killed in the course of these stepped up air attacks, we should recognize it as part of the increased pressure. This war is a dirty business, like all wars. We need to get hard-headed about it. That is the only kind of action that these tough Communists will respect. That is the way to get this war over soonest.

6. Letʼs roll up our sleeves and get on with this war. We have the power. I would like authority to use it. We should be authorized to hit all RT 52 targets. The restrictions of Ref A should be removed. And then when Hanoi screams in anguish, we should hit them again.

7. I realize that there are other considerations which are important in Washington. It is my duty, however, to report to you my strong belief that we need to change some aspects of our current posture as the enemy must view it. This I have done. Warm regards.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Repeated to General Westmoreland.
2. See footnote 1, Document 349.