Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland¹

Washington, December 23, 1966, 4:21 p.m.

107911. The following four paragraphs are intended to replace paragraph 2 of State 106358² and are transmitted for Ambassadorʼs use tomorrow after his return and to obviate his carrying sensitive message on flight.

Begin Text: In our discussions you have repeatedly stated that bombing in the vicinity of Hanoi during the first half of December has created the impression in Hanoi that we are attempting to pressure Hanoi into beginning negotiations. This suspicion on Hanoiʼs part, you have stressed, has created a serious impediment to the beginning of the projected Warsaw talks.

We have pointed out that this is not the case; that there is no basis for concluding that our pattern of bombing has been altered in any way with the intention of creating such pressure. However, we want to leave no stone unturned to get negotiations started. We are assuming that you share our interest in the early commencement of direct negotiations between the United States Government and North Vietnamese representatives.

With this in mind we have removed what you regard as the major impediment to the initiation of direct United States Government-North Vietnamese negotiations. We have issued orders to insure that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37 seconds north, 105 degrees 51 minutes 21 seconds east, for an indefinite period. If we have understood you correctly, this action by us will permit the Warsaw talks to begin promptly.

Let me add, Mr. Rapacki, that in judging as to whether Hanoi is as interested in successful negotiations as we are, we would be impressed by similar restraint on their part. This could take the form of a suspension of incidents in the area of Saigon, or a redisposition of North Vietnamese forces in the area of the DMZ, or action affecting infiltration. Perhaps other examples will occur to the other side. End Text.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted and approved by Read. In a telephone conversation with the President at 1:01 p.m. on December 23, McNamara informed Johnson that Wheeler had agreed to the action authorized in this telegram. Johnson then asked McNamara, “Would it give you any problem, do you think, before the hawks later on in your testimony?” McNamara responded, “I donʼt think so. We wrote this first to try to get these things [talks] started but secondly, in the event they donʼt start and this thing all leaks, to have a reasonable position with both the hawks and doves.” Johnson then said, “All right, itʼs OK with me.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F6612.03, PNO 1) At 4:08 p.m. on December 23, the JCS notified CINCPAC in telegram 2135 that “until further notice from JCS you will not conduct air operations that involve attacks against targets within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.” (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52)
2. Paragraph 2 of telegram 106358 to Warsaw, December 21, informed Gronouski that the United States was “prepared to state that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center … for an indefinite period if talks with North Vietnamese can be gotten underway shortly.” It also stated that “reciprocal action with respect to bombs, mortar and similar terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of Saigon … would be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) In telegram 1537 from Warsaw, December 22, Gronouski reported on Rapackiʼs reaction to the U.S. proposal. Noting that it linked U.S. action to an appropriate step by Hanoi in the Saigon area and appeared to make U.S. action dependent on a signal from Hanoi that contact would be established, Rapacki stated that he preferred to delay a day or two before transmitting the proposal to Hanoi. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 313–314)