Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

288. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, November 2, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Winning the War in Vietnam (U)

I believe that it is possible to win the war in Vietnam within the next 12 to 24 months.

By winning the war I mean the elimination of infiltration of arms and men and the reduction in in-country insurgency to proportions generally manageable by the Vietnamese but without precluding U.S. troop and material assistance.

I believe this outcome is possible without greatly increasing the risks of expanded CHICOM or Soviet participation in the war.

Obviously, it is in the U.S. interest to win this war as soon as possible if it does not involve great risk, because any prolongation of the war causes U.S. casualties and diverts our energies and resources from pursuing the Great Society at home and abroad. Perhaps less obvious is the fact that prolongation of this war will probably encourage the communists to resort to other low-cost (to them) wars of adventure.

I believe that it is especially important for us to win the war before our political conventions in the summer of 1968. If the war is still being fought in the summer of 1968, I think that the communists would have every incentive to hang on at all costs until after the fall elections in hopes of a change in U.S. policy.

I do not believe that our present strategy is likely to end the war within the next 18 to 24 months—but it might.

a. The final conclusion of the CIA study The Will to Persist,⁷⁹⁵ stated:

“If on the other hand, pressures on them (the communists) are maintained and the course of events gives them no grounds for encouragement, by late spring of 1967 they will probably feel compelled to take stock and consider a change in their strategy.”

b. The continuing efforts to get the U.S. to stop bombing the north give a possible indication that the other side is genuinely interested in stopping the war. Until Hanoiʼs responses are more forthcoming, however, it is prudent to consider that the anti-bombing campaign may be simply part of their psychological warfare efforts to gain a respite to improve their chances of holding out until after the 1968 elections.

The prolongation of the war by the other side involves a complicated interaction of will and capability. At the present rate of attrition, the communists would have the theoretical capability to fight on for at least 15 years. But the history of warfare shows that the will to resist collapses long before the absolute capability is destroyed. Thus, my analysis—which as you know is not shared by the intelligence community—indicates that the communist calculation of profit and loss applied to their manpower drain would bring about the end of the war within three to six years.

It seems to me that this three- to six-year period will most probably be shortened by the U.S. elections in 1968. Regardless of the outcome of our elections (barring Senator Fulbrightʼs becoming President), I believe the war would most likely end between January and June 1969.

If the above analysis is correct—and it is a big if—the policy question facing the President now is: What might reasonably be done now to shorten the war by 6 to 12 months? This is a question which should be faced now because of the time involved for decision, for implementation, and for the actions to take effect.

Although it could be argued that we should wait until the spring of 1967 to see whether the communists will in fact change their strategy, this possibility does not seem sufficiently likely to base major decisions upon it. Furthermore, action taken now will have more impact than the same actions taken six months from now because of:

a. The cumulative impact of an additional six months of pressure.

b. The longer time that the communists would have to hang on before the 1968 elections.

c. The apparent expectation by the communists of increased pressure after the Manila Conference which if not forthcoming will give them a psychological boost.

There are five interrelated major elements of our strategy that need to be addressed:

1. National development. After many months of your urging, I believe that there is a general recognition of the need for developing national political and economic institutions. Some progress in both areas is being made.

We need to get on with the job of developing (a) national political parties and (b) a long range economic development plan.

2. Pacification. In many respects, this element of our strategy has shown the least satisfactory progress but it is the single most important element. It is not only essential to our success within SVN but progress within SVN must greatly affect NVN calculations of gains and costs. With due regard to South Vietnamese sensitivities and interests, it is important to unify all pacification efforts as quickly and effectively as possible.

Eventually, we should look toward the appointment of a U.S. “proconsul.” In the meantime, the U.S. effort in SVN should be unified—whether under civil or military leadership—and supported by a unified effort in Washington. This effort should be given equal priority with the military effort.

3. The war in the south. Perhaps the most satisfactory element of our strategy has been our search and destroy operations in SVN.

While continuing an appropriate level of search and destroy operations, we must divert as much of the U.S. and Vietnamese effort as seems militarily sound to the clear- and hold-type operation essential to progress in pacification.

4. The war in the north. I believe that the war in the south has reached the point where the continued bombing of the north is no longer essential to victory in the south—unless the cessation of bombing were to bring about a major increase in infiltration.

In any event, as long as North Vietnam pursues the war, we would pay a price for ceasing to bomb the north. If we relaxed our pressure on his lines of communication, we would need more troops in the south. No one can say precisely how many more troops would be needed but the bombing campaign must represent the equivalent of one to three divisions of troops.

Even with additional troops, a cessation of bombing would most likely prolong the war because we would no longer be exacting a price on the North Vietnamese homeland for their continuing adventurism.

Conversely, while it cannot be proven, it seems logical that at some point an increase in the intensity of the bombing ought to contribute to shortening the war.

I believe that in conjunction with the other recommendations that a renewal of the program of increasing pressures would materially improve our chances of ending the war by summer of 1968.

It must be recognized, of course, that increasing the intensity and scope of the bombing could cause a wider war. However, there are only two categories of targets—population and mining of the ports—which have not already been taken under attack. Although we have attacked a number of airfields, so far we have avoided those airfields in the vicinity of Hanoi. As long as these categories are avoided, we would not seem to risk widening the war by attacking additional targets similar to those we have already hit.

Attacks on population we can reject out of hand, both on political and military grounds.

Attacks on the remaining airfields have so far not seemed militarily essential. We can continue to take the calculated risk of avoiding attacks on these airfields without undue danger until the NVN air forces become a major interference to our bombing campaign. In the meantime, attacks on other elements of their defense network could decrease the potential effectiveness of their aircraft. In any event, a major air campaign should be undertaken against his radars, communications, and SAM facilities as soon as the appropriate weapons become available.

There remains, however, the major gap in our pressure on the north—the ports through which they import without interference the materiels necessary to sustain their war effort. We should be able to reduce substantially their imports either by attacking their port handling facilities or mining their ports. Air attacks on the ports would have the disadvantage of causing noncombatant casualties. Even so, casualties could be minimized by careful targeting and precise attacks.

Mining of the ports creates the risk of a potential confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese.

I believe this danger is overestimated.

If our mining is limited to North Vietnamese territorial waters and if everyone is forewarned that the waters are mined, the sinking of the ship would be the direct result of a positive action by the ship captain. This, it seems to me, is far different than sinking a Soviet or CHICOM ship by air or surface attack—both of which should be avoided unless we are prepared to take much greater risks.

We should, therefore, immediately renew our air campaign of gradually but constantly increasingly pressures on the North. The proposals of Rolling Thunder 52⁷⁹⁸ would be an appropriate start followed up in timely fashion by additional attacks on similar targets. In the process, we should carry the POL and electric power campaigns through to completion. As soon as appropriate weapons become available, we should mount a concentrated campaign on his air defenses—avoiding airfield attacks unless his aircraft cause major interference to our operations. Ports should be mined at times when there are no third country ships in harbor, and port facilities should be struck in such fashion as to avoid third country ships. Such a campaign should be played in low key. It should not be described as escalation. In answer to any queries, it should be described merely as implementation of U.S. determination to do whatever is reasonably necessary to cause the North Vietnamese to cease and desist.

5. Diplomatic posture. By any objective measure, I believe that the United States has been most forthcoming in a search for peace. I think we are now at the stage where any new diplomatic overtures will be counterproductive barring some kind of response from Hanoi. Further initiatives on our part can only serve to erode our negotiating position and give hope to the communists that we are looking for a way out. Our diplomatic posture should be one of simply quietly restating our position and remaining alert to any possibility of favorable response from the other side.

G

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. In his covering memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh stated: “Attached is my reaction to Secretary McNamaraʼs memo on Vietnam [Document 268]—which seemed to me exceedingly and excessively pessimistic.” (Ibid.) In a separate memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh listed the pros and cons of both a cessation and an intensification of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and also listed the major criticisms of the bombing together with opposing arguments. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam)
795. For the principal findings of the study, see Document 219.
798. See Documents 226 and 295.