Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

287. Report Prepared by the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Washington, October 1966.

AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS

[Here follows a 2-page Summary.]

Discussion

1. The war in Southeast Asia is a single conflict against an enemy whose operations are integrated militarily, geographically and politically, and therefore cannot properly be compartmentalized in strategy or in evaluation of results. Combat operations of all types, and in all areas, contribute to the eventual achievement of US objectives in Southeast Asia. Thus, the results of the air campaign against North Vietnam and the infiltration routes through Laos, are directly and decisively related to the success or failure of US/FW/GVN operations in South Vietnam. Conversely, increasingly effective combat operations in South Vietnam have a major influence upon North Vietnamʼs capability and determination to support the insurgency. (See Appendix A).²

2. In early 1965, when the fortunes of the GVN were at their lowest ebb, two important actions were taken by the United States which have changed the course of the war in Southeast Asia: the deployment of US combat troops; and the initiation of the air campaign against North Vietnam. These two actions were integral elements of a single strategy designed to blunt the increasingly successful communist advance in South Vietnam, and to seize the initiative from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces; eventually to cause the communists to cease their aggression in South Vietnam; and finally, to assist that country in its development as a viable, independent, non-communist nation. It was understood at the time these critical actions were taken, that US objectives would not be achieved in a short time, even under optimum military conditions, and that the force build-up, as well as the accumulation of the over-all impact of this military effort upon the enemy, would take time. It became obvious also, as indications of rapidly increasing support and participation by NVN were obtained, that the successful implementation of US objectives in SEAsia could not be achieved without continued direct pressures against NVN, unless the United States was prepared to provide a major increase in the number of US ground troops already deployed or programmed for deployment. (See Appendix B).

3. There is increasing evidence that US/FW/GVN combat units have now successfully seized the initiative in SVN. Recent past and current combat results support this loss of initiative. This has been the combined results of operations in NVN, SVN, and the Laos panhandle. Increasingly effective combat operations in SVN have aggressively searched out and attacked VC/NVA main units, destroyed their bases, constantly disrupted planned schedules, and maintained continuously increasing military pressures against them. (See Appendix C). At the same time, the air campaign in NVN and the Laos panhandle has destroyed significant amounts of materials and munitions, killed numbers of troops moving south to the combat area, and disrupted NVNʼs transportation and lines of communication supporting this logistic flow. It has required the enemy to divert substantial quantities of his manpower and skills that are in short supply, and quantities of labor and materials have been diverted because of the necessity to maintain and expand his lines of communication. The lack of success thus far in enemy attempts to mount large scale offensives has been due in large part to the disruption of his main arteries of communication. (See Appendices D and E).

4. The substantial activities in US ground, air, and naval forces in SEAsia is beginning to evidence signs of positive results. Despite major military handicaps, indications of some of the cumulative effects of US/FW/GVN combat operations are now emerging. The VC/NVA force build-up has essentially leveled off, despite major attempts to infiltrate and recruit larger numbers of military personnel; VC/NVA organized large scale military initiatives have dropped to a low level; shortages of critical military supplies and morale problems among VC/NVA units in SVN are beginning to surface; VC control of population and area in SVN is decreasing; NVN support of combat operations in SVN in terms of men and resources has been degraded; NVN has been denied a total sanctuary from which to export insurgency; the life and economy of NVN has been disrupted; morale in NVN has suffered; national aspirations are being frustrated; large portions of NVNʼs population have been displaced; NVNʼs demands upon communist nations for war-supporting equipment and materials has increased substantially, and at the same time, its ability to provide reimbursement has decreased; doubts are now emerging among NVN leaders as to their ability to succeed in SVN; major drains on manpower resources have occurred; and a massive, well-coordinated worldwide communist diplomatic and propaganda effort to pressure the United States to cease bombings, whose scope and intensity testify to the growing impact of the US combat operations, is in full operation. (See Appendix F).

5. To decrease the current level of coordinated military pressures against the enemy at the very time evidence of progress is beginning to appear, would at a minimum, prolong the war significantly, require substantial increases in US ground troops, and result in greatly increased loss of US lives. It would also provide the communists with new hope and new opportunities, postponing or completely removing the necessity for any major strategy changes on their part. It would forfeit the hard fought gains which have already been achieved at significant cost in US lives and equipment, and in the long run, could result in failure by the United States to achieve its objectives in all of SEAsia. (See Appendix G).

6. It has been recent practice to attempt to evaluate the progress of operations in SEAsia by analyzing known statistical results. The problems which are associated with this approach are numerous and serious. It tends to separate the war into separate compartments, ignoring the interrelationship of all operations in support of a single strategy. Statistics on combat results are unreliable at best, and in general, focus on small segments of the over-all operations while overlooking the major trends on which little or no data are available. In SEAsia good intelligence information on the results of combat operations, particularly relative to their overall impact upon the enemy is minimal; and yet, this is the only kind of information which really measures the true pulse of the enemy. Recognizable indications of this kind of effect may not appear for months, or perhaps years, after a military campaign has been initiated. The history of past wars has repeatedly borne this out. Thus, the current statistical analyses by which progress is judged have not touched upon such matters as the depth of erosion of communist stockpiles in NVN and SVN, or the extent and nature of major deficiencies in NVNʼs war-supporting capability. They do not indicate the extent of disruption and upheaval within NVN, nor the real state of the morale of the North Vietnamese people. These analyses have therefore not indicated the true value of the investment in aircraft, munitions, and US lives that has been made to date.

1. Source: Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (29 Oct 66). Top Secret. Prepared by J–3, Directorate for Operations. Forwarded to Wheeler by Goodpaster under cover of an October 31 memorandum, noting that the report was prepared in response to Wheelerʼs request. A copy of the report is also at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 193, Evaluation of the Effects of the Air Campaign.

   In a November 7 memorandum to Goodpaster, signed by General Robert Taylor for the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA commented on the report, noting that its judgments and statements “could be challenged by someone unwilling to depart from the relatively confined area of solid intelligence evidence,” but that, on the whole, DIA was “inclined to accept the J–3 report as a reasonable analysis of the situation.” (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3/3200 (CY 1966))

2. Appendices A–G are attached but not printed.