Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

274. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)¹

Washington, October 17, 1966, 2139Z.

JCS 6339–66. 1. Reflecting on our telecon on Saturday afternoon,² I have come to the conclusion that I can and should give you a better grasp of the situation here as regards pacification. The discussion of the inadequacy of the pacification program took place in the smaller meeting which preceded the National Security Council meeting to which I referred in my message Saturday afternoon.³ Those present were the President, the Vice President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Vance and me. It came out clearly that the President views pacification as critical to the success of our effort in South Vietnam; that he is dissatisfied with the present direction and execution of the program; but that he is unwilling to override the strong objections of Secretary Rusk (in consonance with those of Ambassador Lodge) to transferring the control of the program from civilian to military hands. However, he stated flatly that he wanted action soonest. “Soonest” was established as a period of ninety days within which to produce, the implication being that he would entertain a transfer of responsibility at the expiration of that time if the pacification situation remains unsatisfactory. As I mentioned to you on the telephone, he directed Cy Vance to draft for him a memorandum which would establish this deadline.

2. During the NSC meeting pacification was referred to in more muted and general terms. However, the need for speedy strengthening of the civilian side of the program was made amply clear to all concerned.

3. Now as to the matter of personalities, my thinking along these lines is influenced by several factors:

A. The heightened Presidential interest in and dissatisfaction with our pacification efforts is going to increase the boiler pressure substantially with every passing day.

B. You and Heintges are both extremely busy and, in my judgment, can devote only a fraction of your time to pacification activities. Someone on your staff should devote full time his attention to pacification in its many ramifications.

C. Fred Weyand would no doubt make an admirable choice for this job.

D. Bruce Palmer would be equally good, I think, once he got his feet wet.

E. No one here is optimistic that a civilian-type operation can be gummed together to perform the pacification function effectively except at the cost of considerable delay. Many of us, and I am one, doubt that an effective civilian-type organization can be put together at all. Therefore, your effort should be designed, first, to plug in a pacification channel between the Embassy and your headquarters; and, second, to permit a transfer of authority and direction of the whole operation to you at some future time.

If the above factors are valid, I come down on the side of establishing in your headquarters now a deputy charged with pacification; of course, his title is immaterial, it is the functions performed that are important. Apropos of this, I have learned that Porter may be furnished an officer, in civilian clothes, to assist him. Rest assured there is no intent to take any of your forces from you.

4. New subject. As I mentioned in my message of Saturday, the President is receptive to striking a few targets of greater worth in North Vietnam despite advice he has had from some quarters to forego expanding the target system or increasing the weight of effort in the North. Specifically, he told me on Saturday that he was opposed to reducing the sanctuary areas around Hanoi and Haipong. As we know, there are many targets in these two areas which should be struck; a fine example is the motor repair facility, a picture of which your J–2 showed us during our meetings in your headquarters. I surmise that this subject may be discussed with you during the Manila Conference. I suggest that you be prepared to discuss the air campaign against North Vietnam in a broad way. I think you agree that the air campaign against North Vietnam is an integral and indispensable part of our overall military effort in Southeast Asia. Since we are committed to a program of increasing pressures, we should continue to increase pressures rather than staying on a level of decreasing effort.In this regard, I think it would be good for you to mention also the need to apply Naval pressures against ground LOCʼs and other high-value coastal targets in North Vietnam such as radar and air defense sites.

5. Mr. McNamara informed me one hour ago he finally got the President to agree that he will not attend Manila Conference. Neither will I. Best regards to you both.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.
2. October 16. No record of the telecon has been found.
3. In JCS telegram 6313–66, October 16, Wheeler reported that at the “smaller” meeting “the President was quite receptive to certain proposals I presented regarding Rolling Thunder 52. Specifically, he indicated his readiness to take out the steel plant, the cement plant and certain thermal power plants. Without indicating which portions he disliked, he said that certain of the items gave him great difficulties. I consider that we will get favorable action from him on his return from the Manila Conference.” (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)