Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 16, 1966.

8583. 1. This is in reply to your 66655.²

2. On Saturday I asked DʼOrlandi this question:

“Does Lewandowskiʼs strong position against what he calls any form of ‘barter’ i. e., ‘We stop doing this and you stop doing that’ reflect his own appraisal of Hanoiʼs position or is it based explicitly on what he has been told by North Vietnamese?”

3. DʼOrlandiʼs reply: This question is not phrased so as to reflect the realities. Lewandowskiʼs views reflect Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap who are the only two North Vietnamese with whom Lewandowski has been in contact. Are or are these not the real power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not know. DʼOrlandi believes you know more than we do about that.

4. Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any variation on Goldbergʼs September 22nd bombing-infiltration formula which would be compatible both with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with Hanoiʼs apparent determination to avoid actions which would be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure?

5. Answer: DʼOrlandi says: I donʼt think he would answer that question. It would be going back on what he has said he refused to do. He wants an overall agreement—not a truce which would allow conversations. He wants a “package deal” which covers everything and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity. Hanoi will buy something that is “final.”

6. When I asked DʼOrlandi what would be the elements of a package deal he said for illustration: After one or two years, elections internationally controlled; a Vietnamese government which would abide by a policy of neutrality; the United States to leave “eventually” (this word was stressed); a coalition government (which he said was not a “must”) which would contain representatives of so-called “extremists” having nominal ministries. By “extremists” he meant the Ky regime on the one hand and the Viet Cong on the other. DʼOrlandi was sure there would never be an answer to the question “What will you do if the bombing stops?” But a “real package deal” would get “very serious” consideration and it would get it “immediately”.

7. This is also an answer to the last question in your paragraph 1.³

8. As far as the question in your paragraph 2⁴ is concerned I think it is answered effectively by Lewandowskiʼs intention to go to Hanoi immediately after the U.S. elections. Lewandowski says he “attaches special importance” to these elections. Even though he says he does not understand our national politics, he knows that the fact that the elections have been held will “clear the air, whatever the results may be.” It will mean that the electoral question will have been removed and he will know that the United States “can deal if it wants to.”

9. Comment: I find this interesting since it confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long time that they must at all costs avoid publicity and consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace talks are very dangerous for us. It appears now that they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are utterly unacceptable for them. End comment.

10. DʼOrlandiʼs illness has been diagnosed as a type of slow moving leukemia. He is very pleased with the care he is getting here from Dr. Richard Cohen, Captain, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, who has had tests made, the results of which DʼOrlandi can take with him to Rome. Would you tell Dr. Shirley Fisk, the special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for medical matters, about DʼOrlandi so that he will have it in mind should there ever be an opportunity for a doctor who is a specialist in such diseases to come to Saigon and then take a look at him?

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:59 a.m.
2. In telegram 66655, October 14, the Department of State posed four questions that Lodge should put to DʼOrlandi and that are answered in this telegram. (Ibid.)
3. The last question in paragraph 1 was: “Are there in Lewandowskiʼs view other elements which might be included in formula which would cause Hanoi to give it serious consideration?”
4. The question in paragraph 2 was: “Did Lewandowski have a particular reason to attach importance to the November 15 date, after which, according to him, there would be ‘much to do.’”