Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

230. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹

Washington, September 14, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Comments on Vietnamese Election Results

1. The unexpectedly high vote in the 11 September elections represents a resounding success for the GVNʼs efforts to turn out the vote in the face of Viet Cong intimidation and a threatened boycott by Buddhist extremists. It cannot be construed, however, as a ringing endorsement of the GVN as presently constituted, nor as a political repudiation of the Viet Cong though the Communists have lost considerable face and the lie has been given to their exaggerated claims of “control”. While the election does mark a significant step forward in the establishment of representative governmental institutions, it is only the first of many steps required in the evolution toward the viable political base which is essential to the success of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam.

2. The official returns reported by the GVN probably are generally reliable, although they may have been padded in some cases by local officials. In retrospect, several factors operated to bring about a higher turnout than that recorded, for example, in the 1965 elections. The most important of these was the unprecedented GVN program aimed at registering the electorate and publicizing the election. Bolstering this was the “command interest” in the elections throughout the Vietnamese civil and military structure which was demonstrated in terms of briefings and inspections of local preparations, and emphasis at all echelons on the need to turn out the vote. As a result, the electorate was probably more aware of its “responsibility” than in most previous Vietnamese elections.

3. The turnout does not necessarily reflect support for the GVN nor opposition to the Viet Cong, because these were not issues confronting the voter. In effect, his participation was not merely solicited, but actively arranged by the full energies of the GVN administrative and security apparatus in a demonstration of what that apparatus can do when directed toward accomplishing a single, uncomplicated task. This, in itself, is encouraging when measured against the normal inadequacies and relatively ineffectual performance of that apparatus.

4. The failure of Viet Cong efforts to sabotage the elections can be described as a case of their once again biting off more than they could chew in the political-psychological field. Given the GVNʼs massive effort to turn out the vote in essentially government-controlled areas, the improved effectiveness of GVN intelligence, and the elaborate and extensive security arrangements to protect the balloting, the Communist efforts were bound to be largely ineffectual. Viet Cong plans, intentions and techniques for disrupting the elections were known in advance by GVN authorities in some detail, and appropriate countermeasures were taken. Although most voters probably were aware of Viet Cong threats, their sense of “responsibility” and awareness of government security measures probably led them to minimize their individual vulnerability at the polls. In any event, although the Viet Cong capped the week-end buildup of anti-election terrorism with a widespread display of harassments and terror incidents, including mortar fire on at least four provincial capitals and eight district towns on election day, the voters were not dissuaded from going to the polls. The Communists lost considerable face because of their inability to enforce much-proclaimed opposition.

5. The virtual collapse of the Buddhist boycott was telegraphed well before election day by the evident confusion and dissension within their hierarchy in Saigon and in the provinces. These factors are a carry-over from the ill-fated struggle movement earlier this year, which clearly demonstrated the political bankruptcy and increasing isolation of the Buddhist extremist elements, who seem to have lost their ability to either guide or reflect the desires of the masses. To many Vietnamese, the opposition of the radical Buddhist leaders was irrational, since the elections had been the direct result of Buddhist demands. Although the Buddhists still have some potential for mass political action if they can heal the differences within their hierarchy, they are not now the dominant force in Vietnamese politics they once were.

6. The elections have produced a body which is charged with drafting a constitution which will establish the institutional framework of a future Vietnamese Government. But many potential obstacles remain before any new governmental institutions take shape and a viable political base is attained. There are many ways in which this new body may make mischief for the GVN, and vice versa, as the Vietnamese grope for an acceptable political formula. Even when new legal institutions are established, ways must be found to ensure their stability and continuity under conditions of civil war, increasing U.S. involvement in that war, and the latent war-weariness and cynicism of the populace. In short, the elections represent only the initial—and perhaps the easiest—step in the long and difficult but essential process of creating a political base sufficiently strong, dynamic, and appealing to undergird the pacification effort and contest the Viet Cong apparatus for political control in the countryside.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 78–05505A, Area Activity-Far East-Memos Re Agency Planning. Secret. The memorandum was produced by the Vietnamese Affairs Staff of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and was drafted by George W. Allen.