Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, August 3, 1966, 1:21 p.m.

20533. For Ambassador Lodge.

1. Your recent comments that pacification seems to be moving too slowly,² plus other reports to this effect,³ have been subject highest level discussion here.⁴ We generally share your views, including your beliefthat GVN is not fully employing its military assets (ARVN, RF and PF) either offensively or in support of pacification. Clear to us they ought to put more effort into pacification. No one here believes that GVN military forces are contributing to offensive operations of pacification programs in a measure anywhere near what should be expected from a 600,000 man force. We also note that Ky himself is becoming much more concerned about pacification, for example in his 22 July talk with you.

2. Highest authority requests that you personally address the question of best means of accelerating and giving direction to the pacification effort—by pinpointing responsibility of both GVN and US officials at Saigon level as well as in provinces and districts, by clear-cut directives to both GVN and US officials, by appropriate assignment of GVN resources, by full and fast reporting, by vigorous follow-up, and so on—as a preliminary to discussing these matters with the GVN. Top levels here are most interested in your suggestions as to action needed to galvanize the lagging effort in this essential field.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, cleared in substance by Rusk and McNamara, and approved by Rusk.
2. See Document 193.
3. In an August 2 memorandum to the President, in anticipation of Johnsonʼs lunch-eon meeting that day, Komer stated that pacification of the countryside, one of the “four chief components of our Vietnam strategy,” was the “area where weʼve made least progress.” He saw “Problem No 1 in Vietnam as increasingly that of redirecting the ARVN to the pacification task, with US logistic support.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Ko-mer Files, Memos to the President)
4. After the Presidentʼs lunch meeting on August 2, Rostow telephoned the following instruction to Read: “Go to Westmoreland and Lodge on weaknesses of pacification and ask Westmoreland and Lodge to do a cable asking for a plan to improve the whole pacification effort and to see in general how in that context can use ARVN more effectively.” (Notes re Lunch Meeting by Rostow, August 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Moyers attended the Presidentʼs lunch meeting on August 2, which lasted from 1:24 to 3:10 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary). No record of the discussion has been found.
5. Lodge replied in telegram 2675, August 4, noting that Westmoreland had a team studying Vietnamese military, paramilitary, and police forces and that once Westmoreland submitted his proposals, Lodge hoped to develop a unified U.S. position to take up with the GVN. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)