Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

124. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington April 18, 1966, 8:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam

1. Force ceilings.

Secretary McNamara will wish to ask that you raise our force ceiling in Vietnam from 260,000 to 325,000 men. That would take us to September on the present schedule. Although he could raise the ceiling less at this time and meet requirements, this would mean his coming back to you again before September.

2. Your decision on force levels in Vietnam relates to the policy you wish to pursue over coming months. We have a good appraisal from Lodge in Saigonʼs 4033.² Briefly, the situation is much better; although the Danang/Hue problem is not solved, we are working to bring Thi and Ky together.

3. By Thursday³ the special group under George Ball will be prepared to present to you the alternatives open to us as they see them.⁴

4. Briefly, what will emerge is roughly this: in the months ahead, as the political transition takes place, we face, say, a 10 to 15% chance of chaos and total paralysis; a lower percentage possibility that a government might emerge that would seek to end the war on almost any terms and that would ask us to leave; a 50% probability that the government continues somewhat weakened and in no position to prosecute with full vigor the non-military programs; and a modest, perhaps 25% possibility, that with the political process going forward quietly and the First Corps brought back into the game, we will have an even better situation than in the past.

5. On these possibilities, you should know that there are relative optimists and relative pessimists. George Ball and John McNaughton, for example, are relatively pessimistic. George Carver is relatively optimistic; Bill Bundy and Len Unger fall somewhere in between.

6. The question is what shall our policy be in the face of this situation where there is a possibility of moving toward constitutional government, which has many attractions in Vietnam and abroad, but considerable dangers as well.

7. Into this situation must be introduced the assessment that we are likely to have a Viet Cong offensive in May, when the monsoon takes hold, and they bring to bear the supplies and forces they have been accumulating down the trails in Laos.

8. The Ball group paper will examine several options:

Option A would continue along present lines; protect the political transition with vigorous military action; and look relatively hopefully to the future. It might involve measures that would increase our forces in Vietnam; increase the weight of our attack on North Vietnam, including oil; and increase our effort to limit supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail, including the further use of B52ʼs. Economically, we would move forward as far as we can, exploiting the fact that we can work in the provinces quite well even if the central government is weak. Politically, we would do everything we could to maximize the cohesion of the moderates in South Vietnam and help them emerge with a good constitution and a sensible party structure. A part of this track would be to convey the message to all political groups that the maintenance of this track requires that they conduct their political differences without disorder and while permitting the transitional government to operate.

Option B would consist of Option A plus a purposeful effort to encourage the South Vietnamese to explore the possibilities of opening negotiations on a settlement with the Viet Cong.

There are several versions of this option. Secretary McNamara, for example, believes that while putting maximum military pressure on the Viet Cong and on the North, we should try to start a Viet Cong/Saigon dialogue while not committing ourselves to exactly how tough or hard our terms would be until we see if that track could be opened up. Others would recommend our pressing Saigon to open a dialogue even if there were some risk that our pressure might fragment and weaken the non-Communist South Vietnamese political groups. All groups recognize the danger that a negotiation and a negotiated settlement between Saigon and the Viet Cong may not pass successfully between the upper millstone of excessively dangerous concessions to the Viet Cong (NLF) and the nether millstone of being insufficiently attractive to make the Viet Cong consider it worthwhile to negotiate.

Option C, which George Ball will draft, would begin by deciding that the chances of bringing about an independent non-Communist South Vietnam have shrunk to the point, on an overall basis, that the U.S. effort is no longer warranted. It would purposefully set about to begin setting the stage for U.S. disengagement and withdrawal irrespective of whether any negotiation would work or not.

9. Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk are, I believe, supporters of Option B, with, perhaps, Secretary Rusk more cautious about the possibilities of starting now a Viet Cong/Saigon dialogue that would be consistent with our stated objectives; but you will wish to hear from them directly.

W.W. Rostow⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret.
2. Document 123.
3. April 21.
4. In an April 14 memorandum, Rostow informed the President that “the contingency planning exercise you directed inside the government is now underway. With George Ball as chairman, it will examine four policy options.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI) Rusk reported the results of the exercise in an April 24 memorandum, Document 126.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.