Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

126. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, April 24, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Basic Choices in Viet-Nam

At your direction, an informal working group chaired by Mr. Ball has analyzed our basic choices in Viet-Nam and has prepared the enclosed report.

Three principal choices are discussed.

(A) To continue roughly along present lines;

(B) To continue along present lines but possibly reducing the rate of entry of United States troops and stimulating contact between the Saigon Government and the Viet Cong, and

(C) To cut our losses.

I should point out that option C is based upon the possible emergence of a factual situation outlined in the statement on the basic assumption. I do not believe that we are faced with that factual situation and neither Secretary McNamara nor I recommend option C.

I do believe that we should discuss with Lodge upon his return the possibility of probing individuals or groups in the Viet Cong in an effort to create divisions among them. Such efforts have been attempted in the past but have not produced results. Otherwise, my recommendation would be that we stay on option A.

We see some advantage in broadening the international base for what may be difficult decisions lying ahead. I believe we should consider a Ministerial meeting of those having combat troops in Korea soon after the Philippine Senate concludes action on the Philippine contribution. Such a meeting would include South Viet-Nam, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United States. The purpose of such a meeting would be to make four points clear:

(1) The reaffirmation of the commitment to fend off aggression;

(2) The continued interest in moving the problem from the battlefield to the conference table;

(3) A clear signal to the South Vietnamese that we expect them to show maximum solidarity in resisting the Viet Cong, and

(4) To stimulate and emphasize once again the non-military programs.

We can discuss these matters further at our meeting on Monday.²

Dean Rusk

Attachment³

Washington, April 25, 1966.

BASIC CHOICES IN VIET-NAM

Assessment of the Situation

The political crisis in South Viet-Nam has avoided outright disaster up to this point, but the temporary equilibrium appears to be uneasy and the crisis has meant a setback to the essential non-military programs. The Embassyʼs cable of April 16, Saigon 4033,⁴ is a highly competent summary of the present situation and of the more immediate problems we face.

Most basically, the mere fact that such crisis could come as close as it already has (and may again) to disastrous civil strife and chaos or could raise, as it also has, the spectre of a governmentʼs coming to power which would ask us to leave forces us to look hard at our basic position and policy in South Viet-Nam. We must now recognize that three contingencies of the utmost gravity are, in some degree, more likely than our previous planning has recognized:

1. There may be a state of chaos and total paralysis. This is what was threatened if the GVN had moved forcibly in Da Nang. It might still come about if the political Buddhists push in an extreme fashion, which in turn would probably trigger counteraction by Catholic and other groups. Even without continued extreme “Buddhist” pressures (i.e., Tri Quang), the vehement elements in the Vietnamese armed forces—the so-called baby Turks—could attempt a military coup against a continuing situation of moderate political unrest and confusion. In short, the situation is still precarious, and there is a chance of some action that would produce chaos and total paralysis at some time in the next several months.

2. There could emerge a government that would seek to end the war on almost any terms and that would ask us to leave, with such broadly based support that we would virtually have to accept or take what seems to most of us the practically impossible alternative of continuing the struggle on our own. This nightmare appeared quite vivid in the early April activity of the struggle movement in Hue and Da Nang. Subsequently, the anti-American element appeared to die down, partly in response to the sobering effect of the withdrawal of our people from Da Nang. Our present assessment here (which we should check out with the Embassy) is that even a Buddhist (i.e., Tri Quang dominated) government would probably acknowledge the need for continued US cooperation and support. We believe this is Tri Quangʼs personal position; but even if it is not, the center of gravity of the broader groups whose support he would need to hold (if not obtain) true power does not now advocate ending the war or asking us to leave. However, the inevitable continued frictions of a major US presence, the continued moderate political unrest and confusion which must be expected in any event, and the possibility that there may be specific military or other setbacks and reverses—all these mean that the nightmare cannot now be excluded to the degree that we would have done six weeks ago.

The members of the working group generally believe that the chances of the first contingency are not high but cannot be disregarded (i.e., perhaps 10–15%), and that the chances of the second contingency are less. Mr. Ball would place the chances of the first contingency substantially higher than the percentage indicated. All members of the group agree that if either of these contingencies should materialize, we would have virtually no choice but to start withdrawing, and that in these circumstances we would have little bargaining leverage in connection with our presence or withdrawal.

3. The government continues weak and ineffective, especially in its prosecution of the non-military programs that are crucial to eventual success. The present crisis has somewhat weakened the already inadequate cohesion and drive of the GVN in carrying out these programs. While the III and IV Corps areas have been only slightly affected, there has been a real setback in I Corps. Even if the Directory government stays in power it will take some time to get the machinery in I Corps properly cranked up again. If the present Directory government should be replaced the dislocation could last longer. In any event the accelerated timetable for elections will almost necessarily mean a continued state of moderate political unrest and confusion. Thus, even in the absence of the first and second contingencies described above, we face a high probability that the GVN will be less effective than we had hoped for many months to come, particularly in programs that depend heavily on central government leadership, such as the taking of essential measures to meet inflation. And we face a significant chance, perhaps 50 percent, that this state of weakness will persist for a longer time even if the political process is carried on without disruption. A countervailing possibility—that the political process will produce greater maturity, a more broadly based government and wider popular appeal—does exist, and we should do all we can to further it. But it is unlikely that this countervailing trend could begin to take major effect within the next six months.

Basic Policy Alternatives

Faced with these prospects, we have tried in this exercise to assess three possible lines of action:

• Option A: To continue roughly along present lines, in the hope that the setback is temporary.
• Option B: To continue roughly along present lines, perhaps with a decrease in the rate of entry of US troops, but moving more actively to stimulate contact between the Saigon government and elements in the Viet Cong. Such contact could either begin with a public call for negotiations by the GVN or with covert tentative feelers. After the rough outlines of the VC position had been determined, the US would then decide on whether to press the GVN to continue negotiations or to support the GVN in its reluctance to accept difficult terms.
• Option C: To decide now that the chances of bringing about an independent and non-Communist South Viet-Nam have shrunk to the point where, on an over-all basis, the US effort is no longer warranted. This would mean setting the stage where, at the proper moment, steps can be taken that would probably lead to a disengagement and withdrawal.

The specific elements of Option A, Option B, and Option C have now been spelled out in supporting papers attached to this paper.⁵

It should be noted that in varying degrees all Options include indicating more clearly than in the past that our continued support is contingent upon adequate unity and effectiveness on the part of the Vietnamese.

Broader Factors

In approaching a decision on which line of action to follow, the framework for decision plainly includes broader elements that would have been present in the situation with or without the political difficulties that have now produced an increased likelihood of the conditions described earlier in this paper. These broader elements cut, as they always have, in deeply contradictory directions. Nonetheless, it may assist to have at least a checklist of them as follows:

1. Within the US popular and Congressional support for the conflict had been at adequate levels prior to the recent difficulties. This support has certainly been shaken, how much we cannot yet tell. The contingencies of “chaos” and “being asked to leave” would certainly reduce domestic support to the unacceptable level. Moreover, the contingency of continued GVN weakness and moderate political unrest is itself bound to cut down support. As we look a year or two ahead, with a military program that would require major further budget costs—with all their implications for taxes and domestic programs—and with steady or probably rising casualties, the war could well become an albatross around the Administrationʼs neck, at least equal to what Korea was for President Truman in 1952. It does not seem likely that the American people will wish to quit under pressure, as the French did, but the scars of a war conducted in an atmosphere of growing malaise and backbiting could be very serious indeed.

2. Among our key allies—notably Britain and Japan—the present general level of acceptance could degenerate into a predominantly critical attitude that could seriously affect our ability to work with these countries in wider projects.

3. vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, we would face a continuation of the present inhibiting effect of Viet-Nam on any move toward agreements in the disarmament area and in other fields. However, this consequence probably attaches to any continuation of the war, and is not materially affected by the internal contingencies that may make the war much harder to handle.

4. vis-à-vis Hanoi and Peiping the continuing political difficulties will almost certainly prevent any moderating influences from becoming effective in Hanoi. However, this is inherent in the over-all assessment that these political difficulties make an ultimate reasonably good outcome less likely. As to Communist China, the continuation of the war is the essential fact, and we could not in any event have anticipated any significant change in Communist Chinese attitudes in the next few years. As to the question of Chinese representation in the UN, it is hard to see that continuing the war under more difficult circumstances would have an impact, one way or the other, that would materially differ from the consequences of continuing the war in the circumstances we had hoped were developing. If we were to end the war on some basis, or withdraw, there might well be an immediate rush to admit Communist China to the UN.

5. vis-à-vis the threatened nations of Asia, we must ask ourselves whether failure in Viet-Nam because of clearly visible political difficulties not under our control would be any less serious than failure without this factor. The question comes down, as it always has, to whether there is any tenable line of defense in Southeast Asia if Viet-Nam falls. Here we must recognize that the anti-Communist regime in Indonesia has been a tremendous “break” for us, both in removing the possibility of a Communist pincer movement, which appeared almost certain a year ago, and in opening up the possibility that over a period of some years Indonesia may become a constructive force. But for the next year or two any chance of holding the rest of Southeast Asia hinges on the same factors assessed a year ago, whether Thailand and Laos in the first instance and Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma close behind, would—in the face of a US failure for any reason in Viet-Nam—have any significant remaining will to resist the Chinese Communist pressures that would probably then be applied. Taking the case of Thailand as the next key point, it must be our present conclusion that—even if sophisticated leaders understood the Vietnamese political weaknesses and our inability to control them—to the mass of the Thai people the failure would remain a US failure and a proof that Communism from the north was the decisive force in the area. Faced with this reaction, we must still conclude that Thailand simply could not be held in these circumstances, and that the rest of Southeast Asia would probably follow in due course. In other words, the strategic stakes in Southeast Asia are fundamentally unchanged by the political nature of the causes for failure in Viet-Nam. The same is almost certainly true of the shockwaves that would arise against other free nations—Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines—in the wider area of East Asia. Perhaps these shockwaves can be countered, but they would not be mitigated by the fact that the failure arose from internal political causes rather than any US major error or omission.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
2. April 25. In a memorandum for the record, April 26, Rostow noted that “at a meeting April 25, 1966, starting at 6:30 p.m. in the Cabinet Room, the President made the following decisions: 1. We shall stay on course and explore with Lodge a cautious Track B.” (Ibid.)
3. Drafted by William Bundy. His second draft, April 19, is in Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam (Reference Papers).
4. Document 123.
5. Attached but not printed.