Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

76. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, July 22, 1965, noon-2:15 p.m.

PRESENT

• President
• McNamara
• Vance
• Gen. Wheeler
• Gen. Johnson
• Secy. Resor
• Gen. McConnell
• Gen. Greene
• Adm. McDonald
• Clifford²
• Secy. Nitze
• Secy. Zuckert
• Secy. Brown
• Bundy

President: I asked McNamara to invite you here to counsel with you on these problems and the ways to meet them.

Hear from the Chiefs the alternatives open to you and then recommendations on those alternatives from a military point.

Options open to us

1. Leave the country—with as little loss as possible—the “bugging out” approach.

2. Maintain present force and lose slowly.

3. Add 100,000 men—recognizing that may not be enough—and adding more next year.

Disadvantages of #3—risk of escalation, casualties will be high—may be a long war without victory.

President: I would like you to start out by stating our present position and where we can go.

Adm. McDonald: Sending Marines has improved situation. I agree with McNamara that we are committed to extent that we can’t move out. If we continue the way we are it will be a slow, sure victory for the other side. By putting more men in it will turn the tide and let us know what further we need to do. I wish we had done this long before.

President: But you don’t know if 100,000 will be enough. What makes you conclude that if you don’t know where we are going—and what will happen—we shouldn’t pause and find this out?

McDonald: Sooner or later we’ll force them to the conference table. We [They?]can’t win an all out war.

President: If we put in 100,000 won’t they put in an equal number?

McDonald: No. If we step up our bombing—

President: Is this a chance we want to take?

McDonald: Yes, when I view the alternatives. Get out now or pour in more men.

President: Is that all?

McDonald: I think our allies will lose faith in us.

President: We have few allies really helping us.

McDonald: Thailand, for example. If we walk out of Vietnam, the whole world will question our word. We don’t have much choice.

President: Paul, what is your view?

Nitze: In that area not occupied by US forces, it is worse, as I observed on my trip out there.

We have two alternatives—support VN all over this country—or fall out from secure position we do have. Make it clear to populace that we are on their side. Gradually turn the tide of losses by aiding VN at certain points.

If we just maintained what we have—more the Pres. problem than ours—to acknowledge that we couldn’t beat the VC, the shape of the world will change.

President: What are our chances of success?

Nitze: If we want to turn the tide, by putting in more men, it would be about 60/40.

President: If we gave Westmoreland all he asked for what are our chances? I don’t agree that NVN and China won’t come in.

Nitze: Expand the area we could maintain. In the Philippines and Greece it was shown that guerrillas lost.

President: Would you send in more forces than Westmoreland requests?

Nitze: Yes. Depends on how quickly they—

President: How many? 200 instead of 100?

Nitze: Need another 100 in January.

President: Can you do that?

Nitze: Yes.

McNamara: The current plan is to introduce 100,000—with possibility of a second 100,000 by first of the year.

President: What reaction is this going to produce?

Wheeler: Since we are not proposing an invasion of NVN, Soviets will step up material and propaganda—same with Chicoms. Might have NVN introduce more regular troops.

President: Why wouldn’t NVN pour in more men? Also, call on volunteers from China and Russia.

Wheeler: First, they may decide they can’t win by putting in forces they can’t afford. At most would put in two more divisions. Beyond that they strip their country and invite a counter move on our part.

Secondly, on volunteers—the one thing all NVN fear is Chinese. For them to invite Chinese volunteers is to invite China’s taking over NVN.

Weight of judgment is that NVN may re-inforce their forces, they can’t match us on a build-up.

From military view, we can handle, if we are determined to do so, China and NVN.

President: Anticipate retaliation by Soviets in Berlin area?

Wheeler: You may have some flare-up but lines are so tightly drawn in Berlin that it raises risks of escalation too quickly. Lemnitzer thinks no flare-up in Berlin. In Korea, if Soviets undertook operations, it would be dangerous.

President: Admiral, would you summarize what you think we ought to do?

McDonald: 1. Supply forces Westmoreland has asked for.

2. Prepare to furnish more (100,000) in 1966.

3. Commensurate building in air and naval forces, step up of air attacks on NVN.

4. Bring in needed reserves and draft calls.

President: Any ideas on cost of what this would be?

McNamara: Yes—$12 billion—1966.

President: Any idea what effect this will have on our economy?

McNamara: It would not require wage and price controls in my judgment. Price index ought not go up more than one point or two.

McConnell: If you put in these requested forces and increase air and sea effort—we can at least turn the tide where we are not losing anymore. We need to be sure we get the best we can out of SVN—need to bomb all military targets available to us in NVN. As to whether we can come to satisfactory solution with these forces, I don’t know. With these forces properly employed, and cutting off their supplies, we can do better than we’re doing.

President: Have results of bombing actions been as fruitful and productive as we anticipated?

McConnell: No sir, they haven’t been. Productive in SVN, but not as productive in NVN because we are not striking the targets that hurt them.

President: Are you seriously concerned when we change targets we escalate the war?

They might send more fighters down. Can’t be certain if it will escalate their efforts on the ground.

Would it hurt our chances at a conference if we started killing civilians?

McConnell: We need to minimize civilian killings.

President: Would you go beyond Westmoreland’s recommendations?

McConnell: No sir.

President: How many planes lost?

McConnell: 106 all types—small percentage of total.

President: How many out there?

McConnell: 146 combat. We have lost 54 combat.

President: How many Navy planes?

McConnell: In the 30’s—about 125 combat.

Zuckert: It’s worth taking a major step to avoid long run consequences of walking away from it.

President: Doesn’t it really mean if we follow Westmoreland’s requests we are in a new war—this is going off the diving board.

McNamara: This is a major change in US policy. We have relied on SVN to carry the brunt. Now we would be responsible for satisfactory military outcome.

President: Are we in agreement we would rather be out of there and make our stand somewhere else?

Johnson: Least desirable alternative is getting out. Second least is doing what we are doing. Best is to get in and get the job done.

President: But I don’t know how we are going to get that job done. There are millions of Chinese. I think they are going to put their stack in. Is this the best place to do this? We don’t have the allies we had in Korea. Can we get our allies to cut off supplying the NVN?

McNamara: No, we can’t prevent Japan, Britain, etc. to charter ships to Haifong.

President: Have we done anything to get them to stop?

McNamara: We haven’t put the pressure on them as we did in Cuba but even if we did, it wouldn’t stop the shipping.

Brown: It seems that all of our alternatives are dark. I find myself in agreement with the others.

President: Is there anything to the argument this government is likely to fail, and we will be asked to leave? If we try to match the enemy, we will be bogged down in protracted war and have the government ask us to leave.

Brown: Our lines of communication are long.

President: How long?

Brown: 7000 miles from the West Coast, but not too much greater than China’s. Biggest weakness of political base is lack of security they can offer their people.

President: Are we starting something that in 2-3 years we can’t finish?

Brown: It is costly to us to strangle slowly, but chances of losing are less if we move in.

President: Suppose we told Ky of requirements we need—he turns them down—and we have to get out and make our stand in Thailand.

Brown: The Thais will go with the winner.

President: If we didn’t stop in Thailand where would we stop?

McNamara: Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, surely affect Malaysia. In 2-3 years Communist domination would stop there, but ripple effect would be great—Japan, India. We would have to give up some bases. Ayub would move closer to China. Greece, Turkey would move to neutralist position. Communist agitation would increase in Africa.

Greene: Situation is as tough as when it started. But not as bad as it could be. Marines in 1st Corps area is example of benefits.

Stakes:

1. National security stake. Matter of time before we go in some place else.

2. Pledge we made.

3. Prestige before the rest of the world.

If you accept these stakes, there are two courses of action:

1. Get out

2. Stay in and win.

How to win:

1. South—

2. North

The enclave concept will work. Would like to introduce enough Marines to do this. Two Marine divisions and one air wing. Extend.

28,000 there now—additional 72,000.

McNamara: Greene suggests these men over and above the Westmoreland request.

President: Then you will need 80,000 more Marines to carry this out.

Greene: Yes. I am convinced we are making progress with the SVN—in food and construction. We are getting evidence of intelligence from SVN.

In the North—we haven’t been hitting the right targets. We should hit POL storage—essential to their transportation. Also airfields destroyed, MIGs and IL28’s. As soon as SAM installations are operable.

President: What would they do?

Greene: Nothing. We can test it by attacking POL storage.

Then we should attack industrial complex in NVN. Also, they can be told by pamphlet drop why we are doing this. Then we ought to blockade Cambodia—and stop supplies from coming down.

How long will it take? 5 years—plus 500,000 troops. I think the US people will back you.

President: How would you tell the American people what the stakes are?

Greene: The place where they will stick by you is the national security stake.

Johnson: We are in a face-down. The solution, unfortunately, is long-term. Once the military solution is solved, the problem of political solution will be more difficult.

President: If we come in with hundreds of thousands of men and billions of dollars, won’t this cause them to come in (China and Russia)?

Johnson: No. I don’t think they will.

President: MacArthur didn’t think they would come in either.

Johnson: Yes, but this is not comparable to Korea. Same situation—China bases and communications—

President: But China has plenty of divisions to move in, don’t they?

Johnson: Yes, they do.

President: Then what would we do?

Johnson: (long silence) If so, we have another ball game.

President: But I have to take into account they will.

Johnson: I would increase the build-up near NVN—and increase action in Korea.

President: If they move in 31 divisions, what does it take on our part?

McNamara: Under favorable conditions they could sustain 31 divisions and assuming Thais contributed forces, it would take 300,000 plus what we need to combat VC.

Resor: I’m a newcomer—(interrupted by President)

President: But remember they’re going to write stories about this like they did the Bay of Pigs—and about my advisors. That’s why I want you to think very carefully about alternatives and plans.

Looking back on the Dominican Republic would you have done anything any differently, General?

Johnson: I would have cleaned out part of the city and gone in—and with same numbers.

President: Are you concerned about Chinese forces moving into NVN?

Johnson: There is no evidence of forces—only teams involved in logistics. Could be investigating areas which they could control later.

President: What is your reaction to Ho’s statement he is ready to fight for 20 years?

Johnson: I believe it.

President: What are Ho’s problems?

Johnson: His biggest problem is doubt about what our next move will be. He’s walking a tightrope between the Reds & Chicoms. Also, he’s worrying about the loss of caches of arms in SVN.

President: Are we killing civilians along with VC?

Wheeler: Certain civilians accompanying the VC are being killed. It can’t be helped.

President: The VC dead is running at a rate of 25,000 a year. At least 15,000 have been killed by air—half of these are not a part of what we call VC. Since 1961 a total of 89,000 have been killed. SVN are being killed at a rate of 12,000 per year.

Resor: Of the three courses the one we should follow is the McNamara plan. We can’t go back on our commitment. Our allies are watching carefully.

President: Do all of you think the Congress and the people will go along with 600,000 people and billions of dollars 10,000 miles away?

Resor: Gallup Poll shows people are basically behind our commitment.

President: But if you make a commitment to jump off a building, and you find out how high it is, you may withdraw the commitment.

President: I judge though that the big problem is one of national security. Is that right?

(murmured assent)

President: What about our intelligence? How do they know what we are doing before we do it? What about the B-52 raid—weren’t they gone before we got there?

McNamara: They get it from infiltration in SVN forces.

President: Are we getting good intelligence out of NVN?

McNamara: Only reconnaissance and technical soundings. None from combat intelligence.

President: Some Congressmen and Senators think we are going to be the most discredited people in the world. What Bundy will now tell you is not his opinion nor mine (I haven’t taken a position yet) but what we hear.

Bundy: Argument we will face:

For 10 years every step we have taken has been based on a previous failure. All we have done has failed and caused us to take another step which failed. As we get further into the bag, we get deeply bruised. Also, we have made excessive claims we haven’t been able to realize.

Also, after 20 years of warnings about war in Asia, we are now doing what MacArthur and others have warned against.

We are about to fight a war we can’t fight and win, as the country we are trying to help is quitting.

The failure on our own to fully realize what guerrilla war is like. We are sending conventional troops to do an unconventional job.

How long—how much. Can we take casualties over five years—aren’t we talking about a military solution when the solution is political. Why can’t we interdict better—why are our bombings so fruitless—why can’t we blockade the coast—why can’t we improve our intelligence—why can’t we find the VC?

President: Gerald Ford has demanded the President testify before the Congress and tell why we are compelled to up the reserves. Indications are that he will oppose calling up the reserves.

McNamara: I think we can answer most of the questions posed.

Clifford: If the military plan is carried out, what is the ultimate result if it is successful?

Wheeler: Political objective is to maintain SVN as free and independent. If we follow the course of action, we can carry out this objective.

Wheeler: Probably after success, we would withdraw most of our forces; [some?] international or otherwise, would have to stay on.

If we can secure the military situation, it seems likely that we can get some kind of stable government.

Meeting adjourned at 2:15 pm

1. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. They are quoted extensively in Valenti, A Very Human President, pp. 340-352. Valenti recalled that before this meeting, President Johnson told him: “All these recommendations seem to be built on a pretty soft bottom. Everything blurs when you get almost to the gate.” (Ibid., p. 341)
2. Clark Clifford was invited to this meeting at the President’s request. (Ibid., p. 340)