Office of the Historian

75. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Busby) to President Johnson1

Washington, July 21, 1965, 10 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Impressions, Vietnam Discussion

The following are some impressions—and personal reactions—to the Vietnam discussions2 which may be pertinent and useful:

Personal Impressions:

—Lodge: Strikingly more impressive, far more involved and committed than on any past occasion where I have seen him close-up. His year of reflection seems to me to have enhanced his vision—and value to you.

—aRusk: Given only a degree or two more of warmth and heat, he would be imposingly persuasive as a public leader. He is too deferential, self-effacing. But his logic and impromptu articulation is devastatingly effective and clear-cut. He assesses the stakes in Vietnam more precisely and convincingly than anyone else I have heard.

[Page 208]

—Wheeler: A fortunate choice for his present post. I do wish other Joint Chiefs could hear more of these sessions.

As for the views of Secretary Ball, These are my reactions—and suggestions. Given his point of view, Ball is impressively clear-headed and well-organized in his argument. He is conscientious, not a critic. Obviously, his thinking is influenced by two factors of a decade ago: (1) concern—held-over from the Stevenson 1952 campaign—for adverse U.S. reaction to efforts to keep any Asian war limited, and (2) his other strong personal involvement, i.e., with the French during their fiasco in Indo-China. Anyone emotionally involved in those two experiences would be cautious, as Ball is cautious. Significantly, his argument is not the argument of the academic intellectuals—it is much more sane and sound, and merits respect as such.

Out of the discussions these thoughts occur:

1.
Someone mentioned the Viet Cong are “creatures of habit.” So are we. Your advisers have “the habit” of down-playing our role in Vietnam. Hence, a tendency is present to insist that whatever is done is, actually, only an extension of all we have been doing. This may be self-deceptive.
2.
What we are considering is not whether we continue a war—but whether we start (or have started) a new war. The 1954-64 premises, principles and pretexts no longer apply. This is no longer South Vietnam’s war. We are no longer advisers. The stakes are no longer South Vietnam’s. The war is ours. We are participants. The stakes are ours—and the West’s.
3.
The two great needs are self-assessment—and clearer definition of objectives.
a.
On Self-assessment: It seems dangerous to insist, passively or vocally that the U.S. has not made mistaken judgments since 1961. We must have done so. It would be constructive to insist upon critical self-analysis to determine at least the pattern of our errors.
b.
Objectives: Clearly, the acceptable objectives in Vietnam—acceptable in proportion to U.S. sacrifice required—are world-size, not country-size. It is hard to define an acceptable objective in Vietnam: To seek one there leads inevitably to Ball’s conclusion and thesis. The objectives—the acceptable objectives—must be in terms of Southeast Asia, the Pacific or even the broad East-West relationship. Rusk sees it in this dimension—and his logic prevails over Ball’s. We do need, I believe, to equate our purposes in Southeast Asia with objectives broader and greater than the one country itself. Only that will justify what lies ahead.
4.
On troop support from other nations: We may be thinking too narrowly on this. For many reasons, such support will not be forthcoming. One reason is that our oldest ally already is more involved—relative to strength—than we: i.e., Great Britain. If we can broaden the Nation’s [Page 209] perspective and information by defining regional rather than one-country objectives, it would be helpful. Our efforts in Vietnam and Britain’s efforts in Malaysia should be packaged together for public consumption. The more relevant line of action among allies would be to stop their trade with North Vietnam rather than pester them for troops.
5.
Clearly, the fixation about working with the Vietnam government is a holdover from the ten-year effort to down-play our role there. Basically, we are there not solely because of Vietnam’s invitation, but because of our obligations under SEATO. Our fidelity to a Treaty—not to a changeable government—deserves more emphasis abroad and at home. It also offers a predicate for the U.S. to run its own effort rather than stand by seeking permission from a government-that-is-not-a-government.
6.
Overall, your initiative in insisting that everyone “think” is very satisfying, useful and stimulating. Defense, as well as State, should be encouraged to re-examine its own premises and past performance—or so it seems to me.

Horace Busby3
  1. Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Horace Busby, Vietnam, Box 3. Secret.↩
  2. See Documents 71 and 72.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩