Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

64. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, July 19, 1965, 8:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam Planning at Close of Business, July 19

We currently expect Bob McNamara back at 8 a.m. Wednesday.² We assume you will want to see him that morning—or possibly that afternoon after he has had time to take a reading with Rusk and Vance. The attached cable from Cooper and Unger (Tab A)³ shows where they are at half time in Saigon.

Meanwhile, Vance has gone ahead with planning for the reserve call-up, the extension of tours, and the increased draft calls which are foreshadowed in the military planning. A first draft exists of a Presidential message and of the necessary legislation.⁴ The planned reserve call-up will be one Marine Division and six Army Reserve Brigades (a total of 27 battalions). Beyond this, there would be temporary additions to the active forces of 27 battalions (nine Marine and 18 Army), plus a permanent addition of nine more Army battalions. This makes a total addition of 63 battalions. (At Tab B is a one-page statement of current planning which Cy Vance regards as very tentative and which Bob McNamara has not had a chance to approve.)

In addition, my brother has drawn up an action checklist for Congressional and diplomatic steps.⁵ We will have appropriate messages for all foreign leaders. Some should go early in the game, as soon as you know your own mind. Others should wait until after public announcement of your plans—presumably in a message to the Congress.

Indeed the timing of the message to the Congress is really the D-Day for the whole operation. If McNamara reports to you Wednesday, you probably do not wish to give an appearance of great haste in reaching a decision, and for that reason I would recommend against going to the Hill before the first of the week. But a delay beyond Monday would seem to me to create too wide a gap between McNamara’s return and the point of decision. If you agree, we might tentatively plan that you would see McNamara Wednesday, see him again with a view to decision Friday, and talk with the Congressional Leadership either Friday or Saturday to get ready for a formal message on Monday.

At the same time, it is increasingly urgent that we get ahead with planning for public support. Doug Cater is ready to go ahead with plans to provide speech materials to friendly Senators and Congressmen, and everyone is ready to go ahead with the Citizens Committee as soon as you give the signal. I continue to think that Arthur Dean would be an excellent choice for us, but he is by no means the only possibility.

I have suggested to Jack Valenti that Rusk and Vance and I have lunch with you tomorrow, or come in at any other time at your convenience to review the bidding on all these matters. You have just agreed to this, and I have told Marvin.⁶

McG. B.

Tab B⁷

PROPOSED 63 BATTALION PLAN

1. Purpose

A. Reconstitute ASAP by calling up reserves substantially all elements of US ground combat forces introduced into SVN under 34 + 10 Bn Plan.

B. Make certain temporary and permanent additions to active ground combat forces (by draft increases, volunteers and tour extensions).

2. Combat Ground Forces Involved:

A. Call-up of reserves (27 Bns):

4th Marine Div, including air elements (9 Bns): combat ready in 60 days

6 Army reserve brigades (18 Bns): combat ready in 8-12 weeks

B. Temporary additions to the active forces (27 bns):

3 Marine Brigades, w/out air elements (9 Bns): combat ready in 4-6 mos.

3 Army Brigades (9 Bns): combat ready in 6-8 months

1 Army Division (9 Bns): combat ready in 8-10 months

C. Permanent additions to the Army (9 bns):

3 Brigades (9 Bns): combat ready at end of 3d, 4th, and 5th months respectively

3. Options provided:

At end of one year, retain all, part or none of Army and/or Marine reserves on active duty, thereby reducing 63 Bns not at all or by up to 27 Bns (18 Army plus 9 Marine Bns).

4. Service end strength increases:

A. Personnel:

If Reserves deactivated	If Reserves retained
Army	250,000	350,000
Navy	56,000	56,000
Marines	86,000	131,000
Air Force	*102,000	*102,000
Total	494,000	639,000

* Includes 16,000 civilians for MATS augmentation.

B. Units:

Army—Shown above.

Navy—17 Destroyers plus 24 combat support/supply vessels (plus undetermined number of private charters).

Marines—Shown above.

Air Force—9 TFS (F-100); 6 Recce Sqdn (RF-84).

Note: Above figures and units are tentative and will be reviewed in light of actual decisions reached following Mr. McNamara’s report. In addition, these figures have not been scrubbed and are merely rough planning estimates at this time.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking.
2. July 21.
3. Document 62.
4. Not further identified.
5. Checklist of Actions, July 17. (Johnson Library, National Security File,NSC History, Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam)
6. The final sentence initially read: “I will call in the morning to learn your pleasure.” It was revised in Bundy’s hand after his conversation with the President. The Marvin to whom he refers is Marvin Watson, a Special Assistant to the President.
7. Top Secret. The source text bears the date “7/19/65” in the top right corner.