62. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
182. For Bundies from Cooper and Unger. Summary state of play at the half follows:
Re military situation—briefing on GVN plan for utilization US military forces and disposition provided by General Thieu and ARVN J-3. Briefly, GVN contemplates US force of 200,000 with 3 US divisions to take over responsibility for highlands in II Corps and defense of major US bases and installations throughout country. ARVN would concentrate on pacification primarily in populous sections throughout country. GVN also unveiled Home Guard plan with sketchiest explanation.
MACV and visiting team disinclined to accept GVN concept. MACV concept will be reflected in McNamara team and US Mission recommendations now in preparation.
Team given intensive briefings on MACV strategic and tactical situation and logistic requirements. Biggest bottlenecks appear to be in sea [Page 164] interdiction. McNamara is formulating recommendations to break this and other binds. Thus far little opportunity discuss pacification/rural reconstruction with either GVN or MACV.
Re economic situation—excellent briefings by acting USOM Chief and GVN Minister of Economic Affairs point up danger of incipient inflation, shortages of key commodities (e.g., rice, building materials) labor scarcities, black market and transportation bottlenecks. Recommendations to deal with these and some major policy proposals to cope with over-all GVN weakness will be incorporated in team report (some suggestions will be forwarded to Washington prior to team’s departure).
Re political situation—Meeting with Thieu, Ky et al., subsequent informal conversations at dinner, additional sessions yet to come, and intensive series of Unger-Cooper meetings with cross-section political types in and out of government should provide reasonably good feel of political scene. Initial, tentative impressions: Thieu and Ky appear to take pains to present collective front. Both make the right noises about solidarity, stability, revolution, Chieu Hoi, etc. Both convey sense of sincerity and determination, although both (especially Ky) seem to be concentrating on the daily quick-fix and neither seems to have yet harnessed the resources (if indeed they exist) to work out fundamental, solid plans for the longer term. Possibly excluding Co, other members of GVN’s first team, especially Econ Minister seem quite impressive.
Visitors have pressed GVN hard for their estimate of reaction to large US forces (no basic problem, but same underlying worries re black market etc.), Chieu Hoi (they say the right things, but see below), government stability (Ky and Thieu stress reliance on support of mass of citizens rather than individual groupings—neat trick if they can do it) and representation abroad (they are working on it, but no immediate progress seems in sight). In short, we want to probe more before coming to any firm conclusions.
Re Chieu Hoi—Ky claims he has given this program increased importance by combining it with rural reconstruction. He also claims that statistics of increased numbers of ralliers have been either inflated by provincial Chieu Hoi officials or are meaningless because the VC itself has used Chieu Hoi centers as “rest camps”.
In session with Chieu Hoi investigation team (Col. Jacobson et al.) Unger and Cooper got impression that program not doing too badly despite apparent massive indifference on part of GVN. Jacobson is preparing tentative conclusions and recommendations for incorporation in McNamara team report (final report of survey will not be available for a month).
Miscellany—Lodge and Cooper went to Cam Ranh Bay this morning and both extremely impressed with pace and scale of construction of logistics base. Unger to Hue to get provincial impressions. Embassy [Page 165] morale high, even inspiring. Hertz case cooking. CAS more optimistic of release (perhaps this week) than any time since February.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:16 a.m.↩