Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

278. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, December 31, 1965.

3701. For Secretary, Under Secretary and Yost. Department pass LBJ Ranch. As arranged I² called on General De Gaulle at the Elysee Palace and conversed with him for about an hour and ten minutes. General De Gaulle opened the discussion by expressing great appreciation to President Johnson for his letter³ and for the President’s extreme courtesy in advising him privately and promptly as to the moves President Johnson was taking in regard to the Viet-Nam conflict.

As requested in the Department’s 2943,⁴ I brought up the question of Cambodia and told the General that our desire [was?] to preserve the neutrality of this country provided Prince Sihanouk would maintain a neutral attitude on his part. The General expressed the strong hope that the Viet-Nam war not be extended in any form to Cambodia and I assured him this was not our government’s plan or desire. The problem, I explained, was the failure on the part of the Cambodian Government and the ICC properly to ensure that the border was sealed and that Cambodia was not used as a sanctuary for the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong and as a source of supply. I urged the General as I had done earlier in the day to Couve de Murville that the French Government support our efforts for an enlarged and effective ICC supervision of the international boundary. As reported in a separate telegram Couve de Murville stated that he had already made representations to this effect⁵ and the General indicated support for this move.

I in turn on behalf of the President congratulated General De Gaulle upon his re-election, assured him of the President’s great respect for substantial achievements on behalf of the people of France and thanked him for his courtesy in receiving me as the President’s representative on short notice.

The General then spoke at some length about Viet Nam. He said that the President’s latest move could have a good and constructive effect upon world opinion and would strengthen the position of the United States in the eyes of nations troubled as to its intentions. In all candor, however, he added that he did not believe that the bombing pause would lead to an acceptance by Hanoi of President Johnson’s offer for unconditional negotiations at Geneva or in any other forum. He said that in his view that only tenable solution for the Viet Nam problem was the withdrawal of US forces but he recognized how difficult this was since the honor and prestige of America as a great and powerful nation was involved by its commitments. Perhaps, he said, it is too late to consider whether these commitments should have been publicly extended but he recognized that they were there and that they were a substantial factor in the situation. Notwithstanding, he stressed that he thought withdrawal was the key to a solution of the problem and the only basis on which negotiations were possible. This, he added, did not mean that American troops had to be withdrawn immediately but he stressed that withdrawal had to be agreed upon in principle before the negotiations commenced if Hanoi was to be brought to the bargaining table. I intervened to point out that it has been our repeated policy that we desire no permanentpresence in Viet Nam and that the President and his advisors had made it clear that American troops could and would be withdrawn after the aggression from the north ceased and the south had an opportunity under free conditions to determine its own destiny. The principle of self determination did not preclude reunification, provided that the unification was determined by the people of South Viet Nam in a free and properly supervised [garble—election]. America, I added, however, would not withdraw its troops under pressure or force and leave South Viet Nam and its people to the tender mercies of the Communists.

This was not contemplated by the Geneva agreements and is not contemplated by our government. Without debating the point, the General went on to say that his view was that it was not detrimental to the interests of the free world, including the United States, if all of Viet Nam, Thailand and Laos were to have Asiatic Communist regimes. Asiatic Communism, in his view, would not be either Chinese or Soviet Communism but would follow its own patterns, and emergent nationalisms would control the future of these countries. Cambodia could and might remain neutralized although the same philosophy could be applied to Cambodia. The General, however, recognized that America was, despite his contrary views, firmly determined to support the independence and sovereignty of South Viet Nam. Of course, he said, the United States has the power to do this and perhaps after one or two years of demonstration of this power Hanoi might be willing to come to the conference table but he did not conceive that it would do so before then. Red China had no interest in any peaceful accommodation in that area of the world but he agreed that the Soviets and the Eastern bloc countries would be much more likely to encourage a detente with the U.S. Hanoi, however, would not now agree to any such detente and its lack of agreement would ultimately be supported not only by China but by the Soviet Union and the other bloc countries as well. I emphasized that one of the considerations leading to the pause was the repeated assertions of the bloc countries and even intimations from the Soviet Union that this would possibly lead to the conference table. General De Gaulle dismissed this as an assumption on their part not warranted by realistic understanding of Hanoi’s determination to unite the country along its lines and to eliminate American influence in the area.

As requested in the Deptel,⁶ I did not invite any proposals from President De Gaulle as to our future course of action nor did I attempt to indicate what it would be if the bombing pause did not lead to negotiations.

The views expressed by General De Gaulle were on his own motion.

The General reiterated that he was extremely grateful that the President had sent him a private letter indicating our intentions and he was particularly pleased that the President had dispatched me to give him a more extended review of President Johnson’s thinking in this grave matter.

He inquired about the President’s health and I assured him that President was in the best of health and spirits. I extended on behalf of the President and Mrs. Johnson their best wishes for the New Year.

As the meeting concluded, I brought up the question of our cooperation at the UN, pointing out that this was increasingly necessary because of the voting strength of the Afro-Asian bloc. I praised the cooperative attitude of his representative, Ambassador Seydoux, and told General De Gaulle that the Ambassador had played a very cooperative role in the Kashmir debate and in other matters before the Security Council. I further said that the Ambassador and I had discussed the necessity for coordination of the four big powers activities in preparation for the next General Assembly. The General said in reply that he in turn was grateful for my cooperation at the UN and that indeed the future of the UN depended upon the cooperation of the five major powers including China. He obviously meant Communist China. I said that we were not finding Communist China cooperative in Viet Nam or anywhere else. We parted, however, on the more cordial note of his expression of greetings for the New Year to President and Mrs. Johnson.

McBride

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:15 p.m. and passed to the White House.
2. Ambassador Goldberg.
3. The text was transmitted in telegram 2899 to Paris, December 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. Dated December 30. (Ibid.)
5. The discussion between Couve de Murville and Goldberg, which lasted 50 minutes, was reported in telegram 3700 from Paris, December 31. (Ibid.)
6. See footnote 4 above.