Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, December 31, 1965.

965. For President and Secretary from Harriman.²

1. Upon reflection on talks at Warsaw I and officers traveling with me are convinced from statements and attitude of Rapacki and Michalowskias well as Gomulka that Polish Government intends to carry our message faithfully to Hanoi and add their own arguments to influence Hanoi. They are deeply concerned over their own possible involvement if war continues to escalate and as Rapacki put it “everyone including U.S. may lose control of events”.

2. Poles also frankly expressed concern over possibility of increased Chinese influence unless we move towards peaceful solution.

3. The Poles repeatedly emphasized the time required to present their arguments to Hanoi, indicating that their usual means of communication were erratic and that special means might have to be used.

4. In order maintain pressure on Poles for prompt response from Hanoi you may wish to authorize Ambassador Gronouski to tell Rapacki that the U.S. Government is following with close interest the Polish efforts with Hanoi and also explain purpose of my trip to India as consultation with Chairman ICC—although we realize that Indians do not have the intimate relations with Hanoi as have the Poles. Furthermore, because of Polish emphasis on secrecy he might indicate that my visit to India (ICC Chairman) and other countries will serve to divert attention from Polish efforts.

Elbrick

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:02 a.m. and passed to the White House. Repeated to Warsaw for Gronouski.
2. Harriman was in Yugoslavia to talk to Tito, but his appointment was delayed until January 1, 1966.