Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, December 30, 1965.

1277. Deptel 1075 to Bangkok.²

1. In absence of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, I conveyed requested information to Acting FonMin Pote Sarasin as directed in para 4 reftel.

2. After a long pause Pote asked that I convey to the Secretary his understanding of the action taken. He said that as an Asian, thinking as an Asian, he thought it was a mistake. It would be interpreted in Asia as a sign of weakness and indecision and would reinforce Hanoi determination to carry on until American public opinion forced withdrawal. Consequently, he thought it would prolong war rather than shorten it and cost more American casualties rather than fewer.

3. In referring to third purpose as outlined in para 4-D reftel, Pote doubted effect on third countries would be as beneficial as we might have thought. He said it would not help to convince the already convinced and as for the others we would always get the argument that if the pause had been extended for “another day, another week, another month,” it might have been successful.

4. In response to my direct inquiry he said that he personally had no doubt whatever as to American firmness.

5. I later conveyed the same information to Deputy Prime Minister Praphat who had much the same reaction as Pote. He added reporting of comment which Tun Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, attributed to Ne Win, who had suggested closer consultations between Burmese, Thai, and Malaysians for their own protection when Americans pull out. He said he had told Tun Razak he did not expect Americans to leave until the safety of Southeast Asia was assured. He also added that every day the pause continued, however, the more question there would be of American intentions and this, he added, was a dangerous attitude to let build up for too long a time.³

Martin

1. Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 2, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:53 a.m. and passed to the White House.
2. In telegram 1075, December 28, the Embassy in Bangkok was instructed to inform the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the decision on and purpose of the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. In telegram 1096 to Bangkok, December 30, the Department of State sent assurances to Thailand that the bombing pause was not the prelude to U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, but a test to see if Hanoi could come to a realistic appraisal of the situation. The United States was in Vietnam “to stay whatever and how long it takes.” (Ibid., EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 2, Vol. 1)