260. Draft Telegram From the President’s Consultant on Vietnam (Taylor) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1
Having noted your messages on the resumption of Rolling Thunder2 and understanding thoroughly the sound military reasons behind your recommendations for a prompt resumption, it occurred to me that you might be interested in getting more of the feeling at the Washington end on this subject.
Since returning from Saigon last August, I have made nearly fifty speaking or TV appearances about the country, an experience which has opened my eyes to problems of the domestic front which I did not know existed. Although there is a strong majority support for the Administration’s position on Viet-Nam, it is more the normal American reaction to rally around the President in time of crisis than the result of any deep conviction that our course of action is necessary and right. There is still confusion over the basic issues in spite of the many statements of our leaders and a subdued but real uneasiness that important facts are being held back or concealed from the public.
One often expressed doubt is over the sincerity of our desire for a negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam. This doubt has been fed by the false rumors of rejected feelers which have received extended press treatment. A recurrent allegation is that we deliberately create conditions under which Hanoi could not be expected to respond to our offer of unconditional discussions.
Most of these critics make common cause in urging a prolonged bombing pause to give Hanoi a chance to respond. I have always opposed such a pause for a variety of reasons but have always feared that pressures for one might sometime get out of hand. Hence, once the Christmas cease-fire became a fact, I was inclined to take the position that, if a bombing pause were ever to be undertaken, now is the time to do it. It can be done in a low-key way without elaborate comment or explanation and terminated without fanfare after running for a short, unspecified period. If such an action would expose once and for all the futility of letting up the pressures on the enemy, it would be a worthwhile exercise despite the military disadvantages which you see so clearly.
[Page 729]The overall thought which I want to convey is that there is justified concern over the long-term durability of our home front. Everything depends on the ability of the President to keep the country aligned behind his Viet-Nam policy in spite of mounting casualties, a vast budget increase and the seeming endlessness of the conflict. If the suspension of Rolling Thunder to New Year’s or some such time will materially help him in this task, I have no personal hesitation in advising him to do so. After this test period is over, I would hope that Rolling Thunder would be resumed with a heightened intensity which, after the lull, would be all the more unpleasant for Hanoi.
Regards to you both,
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-360-69. Secret. Also addressed to Westmoreland. Taylor sent this draft to the President under cover of a memorandum that reads: “I understand you indicated yesterday to Mac Bundy that it would be helpful if I sent some such message as the attached to Sharp and Westmoreland. If the text is satisfactory, I shall send it at once.” A note by Taylor on the memorandum indicates that the President wanted Wheeler to receive a copy as well. Apparently the telegram was sent.↩
- See Document 245 and footnote 3 thereto.↩