Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

195. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Washington, November 9, 1965.

SUBJECT

• State’s Memo to the President (Courses of Action in Viet-Nam)²

The State paper is not substantially different from your draft³ in a number of respects. For example, the statement of US grand strategy is not fundamentally different, nor is the estimate of the situation in South Vietnam, nor is the paragraph dealing with “acceptable settlement objectives,” nor is the pessimism with respect to what can be done on the non-military side inside South Vietnam.

The State memo departs from your version in the following four important ways:

1. Pause. Secretary Rusk opposes a Pause now, preferring to consider it later “if Hanoi appeared to be weakening.” State’s main arguments are (1) that a Pause would allow Hanoi to trap us short of our goal so that we would not be able to resume Rolling Thunder and (2) that it would cause serious trouble in Saigon. They add (3) that it (especially if coupled with an intensified RT) would increase the risk of a Soviet “flash” when bombing resumed. They see no chance of a Pause leading to a favorable reaction from Hanoi or from the “nationalist” VC, and they see no need for a Pause to lay the domestic groundwork for the increase in US deployments—perhaps because they believe that Phase II deployments can be carried out quietly by a salami-slice technique. (Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the State memo seems to assume that the Pause is a “card” that can be “played” but once; whereas it is more reasonable to think that it could be played any number of times, with the arguments against it, but not those for it, becoming less each time.)

2. Rolling Thunder. Secretary Rusk opposes what State calls our “extrapolated” Rolling Thunder program, preferring a “leveled-off” program (with periodic “hot and cold” treatments to keep the enemy off base). State says that “no feasible amount of bombing of the North is going to achieve an acceptable settlement in the absence of a substantial improvement in the situation on the ground in the South.” Specifically, they would postpone strikes on POL targets and would postpone mining of harbors; they would permit strikes at LOC targets between Hanoi and Haiphong and would permit “controlled armed recce” in the northeast quadrant outside the Hanoi-Haiphong circles; they would perhaps shift some of the 600 sorties per week to Laos. As in the case of the Pause, State would postpone the intensification of Rolling Thunder, “leaving open the option of moving to the extrapolated program if Hanoi appeared to be weakening.”

3. Phase II. State apparently agrees with your proposal to deploy Phase II forces. They apparently would put the deployments in two packages (first two quarters of 1966 and last two quarters of 1966) and wrap the packages as inconspicuously as possible. I gather that they would not postpone preparations or budget submissions beyond what would be required to meet the MACV Phase II schedule. (Notice that you may have had in mind a faster deployment of Phase II than MACV requested or that State’s plan would permit.)

4. Evaluation. State seems to be more optimistic than you. While they do not give good odds of success (and while they give your approach higher odds both of a quick success and of a “flash”), they are avowedly choosing a course “designed to play for the breaks (as we did in the Berlin blockade and Korea) without actions that would bring the situation prematurely to a head.”

My judgment is (a) that there is no real issue with respect to Phase II deployments, (b) that State has a good point in their opposition to “extrapolating” Rolling Thunder, and (c) that State is wrong with respect to the Pause (I hate to miss the small chance it offers to turn this thing around).

Furthermore, I think (d) that both papers set the goals unrealistically high (we should not be fooling ourselves in this respect), (e) that neither memo gives adequate emphasis to what Phases III and IV are likely to look like (“occupation” of South Vietnam, “quarantine” of Indo-China, pressures to invade North Vietnam, war costs at a rate equal to 10-20 times the GNP of the people being fought for, etc.) and the odds that we will have a Phase III and a Phase IV (50-70%), and (f) that neither memo spells out a vigorous “diplomatic offensive” to accompany the military actions.

John T. McNaughton⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (A). Top Secret; Eyes Only.
2. Document 194.
3. Document 189.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.