Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

194. Memorandum for President Johnson¹

Washington, November 9, 1965.

Rusk and McGeorge Bundy discussed this memorandum on the telephone on November 9 at 6:07 p.m. Rusk asked Bundy if he had any reaction to the memorandum; Bundy replied there was none from McNamara and he had not read it yet. Rusk said that McNaughton and Vance “had mild reactions” to it and Rusk himself thought it “pretty good.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

SUBJECT

• Courses of Action in Viet-Nam

We face major policy decisions with respect to Viet-Nam. This memorandum attempts to frame the substance of the choices and to recommend a course of action.

I. Underlying Strategy.

We are helping the South Vietnamese as part of our underlying strategy of seeking to prevent the extension of Communist power beyond the outer limits of aggression reached by the overrunning of China in 1949-50. This strategy is based on the conviction that the extension of Communist power by force beyond these limits could so alter the power balance as to create unacceptable risks for the United States and the rest of the Free World.

In pursuance of this strategy we have consistently opposed all aggressive actions by—

(a) the Soviet Union (Berlin, the Cuban Missile Crisis);

(b) Communist China (Formosa, India); and

(c) smaller Communist regimes supported by both the Soviet Union and Communist China (Korea, South Viet-Nam).

We have made few exceptions to this strategy:

(a) We did not intervene militarily to support French efforts to deny the whole of Indochina to the Communists in 1954.

But we did (in the SEATO Treaty and subsequently) commit ourselves to assist the Government of South Viet-Nam to prevent Communist aggression beyond the 17th Parallel.

(b) We have not yet put ground combat troops into Laos (although we have delivered certain air strikes) because President Kennedy sought a political settlement which has not yet succeeded because of non-compliance by Hanoi.

The decision you now face is whether to invest substantially more men and money in South Viet-Nam and to assume the increased risks of a higher level of action against North Viet-Nam. This decision must be made in relation to our over-all strategy, our past commitments and the effect of the decision on our relations both with our friends and opponents.

This decision should be approached in light of the following considerations:

A. Such a decision must be consistent with our larger strategy.

It is justified only if the United States is determined to continue that strategy (pending limited settlements, as the major Communist power centers become sufficiently benign and tractable). This means:

(1) That we will continue to play an active role in Western Europe and maintain the NATO defenses;

(2) That we will continue building the strength, and encouraging the anti-Communist will, of the countries on the southern and western frontiers of China.

(a) Japan-Formosa-Korea;

(b) India-Pakistan;

(c) Southeast Asia.

B. The decision must be made in relation to all that has gone before.

We have made commitments to South Viet-Nam. We have taken losses of men and money. We have accepted substantial political costs. To quit now would mean a major loss of prestige and would undermine the credibility of our commitments elsewhere in the world.

C. In deciding our actions in Viet-Nam we should—so far as possible—avoid those acts that exacerbate relations with countries friendly to the United States.

D. We should also—to the greatest extent possible—avoid actions that might enlarge the war by involving either China or the Soviet Union in more active intervention.

In planning our air offensive against North Viet-Nam, we should, therefore, be quite clear as to the possible effects of particular types of attack. We should avoid actions likely to provoke Chinese reactions, since it is explicitly not our purpose to seek to create a pretext for the destruction of Chinese war-making power. We should instead concentrate on those actions designed:

(1) To impede the supply of men and equipment to South Viet-Nam; and

(2) To persuade Hanoi of the need to settle the South Vietnamese conflict on a basis more advantageous to South Viet-Nam than a mere ratification of the situation on the ground.

II. Estimate of the situation in South Viet-Nam.

The massive infusions of United States ideas, aid and manpower have frustrated any Communist design to move into their conventional-warfare “Stage III,” but the guerrilla war continues at a high pace, inflation in South Viet-Nam is becoming increasingly serious, and the internal political situation remains fragile.

a. Military. The large United States deployments have thwarted the Viet Cong monsoon offensive designed to impose a major defeat on the Government forces. The “Phase I” deployments, 160,000 of whom are already in place, have enabled the government forces to begin restoration of their strength, morale and tactical integrity, which is essential if they are to retain their fighting capability in the months ahead. The United States forces have also substantially secured their own bases and the areas immediately adjacent to the bases (see Map 1, attached).² United States ground combat elements deployed offensively have moved rapidly—in conjunction with tactical air support and often following up B-52 strikes—to probe into Viet Cong base sanctuaries that had long been untouched. The United States forces have also proved to be an effective quick-reaction reserve for Government forces and have turned potential defeat in several battles into Viet Cong retreat or at least a stand-off.

But the pace of the war remains high, with the Viet Cong at the end of October attacking in regimental strength in Phu Yen province and in battalion strength in Hau Nghia province and against the Marine perimeter outside Danang. There are increased casualties on both sides. Viet Cong attacks, terrorism and sabotage show no sign of abating. Desertions from Government forces remain high, but recruitment has improved, permitting a gradual increase in force levels. On the other side, defections from the Viet Cong are running at 1,000 a month and are increasing slowly.

The present assessment is that our Phase I deployments (bringing the United States total to about 210,000 to 225,000 men) when completed will achieve the limit of its military potential between December 1965 and March 1966. Assuming, as we in prudence must, that the Viet Cong are able to maintain the strength and morale of their forces, the military estimate illustrated by Map 1 is that Phase I forces, working with the South Vietnamese, will result in “control” of 40 percent of the population and 5-10 percent of the area; these forces will keep open 20-25 percent of the critical lines of communication; these forces will permit 10-20 percent disruption of the Viet Cong’s political/security infrastructure.

We will then be in a position where a few enclaves, including perhaps 5,500,000 of South Viet-Nam’s 15,000,000 people (of which only some 1,000,000 are in the Delta) are under United States or Government “control”—and even these will, of course, be subject to sporadic Viet Cong mortar and suicide satchel-charge attacks of the October 27 kind.³ Security conditions within the enclaves will be suitable for reconstruction of political infrastructure, but it is probable that the enclaves will be too small and the percent of population controlled too little to give any hope that such pacification will be rapid or that it will tend to snowball beyond the enclaves.

The capabilities and intentions of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese are unknowns complicating our estimate of the situation at this time. There are signs that Viet Cong morale is sagging. But, even when confronted by the United States force build-up and by our program of actions against North Viet-Nam—and with increasing casualties and weapons losses—the Viet Cong have demonstrated an ability to continue the build-up and supply of their forces in the South. The build-up is continuing both from in-country sources and by infiltration over improved roads in Laos and, to a lesser extent, by sea via Cambodia. The indications are that the Viet Cong are not reverting to a lesser level of insurgency, but are still striving to build up for the transition to conventional warfare—that they are continuing both to upgrade guerrilla units in the Delta and to infiltrate additional regular army elements from the North in order to restore the balance temporarily upset by United States deployments.

(The other factor difficult to estimate in the situation is the degree to which improved morale among the South Vietnamese will be reflected in more effective military operations and governmental performance as well as in resistance of the local population to cooperation with the Viet Cong.)

The Viet Cong forces are now estimated at 71,300 “main force and logistic,” 40,000 political cadre, and 110,000 guerrillas. This represents an increase in our estimate since early last summer of some 6,000 (9%), 10,000 (33-1/3%) and 18,200 (20%) in the three categories respectively. In addition—although as of last month there were estimated to be three regiments of North Vietnamese regular forces in the South—early this month two additional North Vietnamese regiments were confirmed and three others were estimated as possible. In total, therefore, the Communist forces are now believed to number about 230,000 men, and there is reason to believe that they will continue to increase.

b. Political. In Saigon, the Ky “government of generals” has survived, but accomplished little more during the period since last summer. The Government, while recognizing many of its problems and working willingly with the United States Mission, still lacks any broad, or even developing, base of support among the various political factions. No major faction (e.g., Buddhists, Catholics) is in open opposition, and all appear to be continuing their “wait and see” attitude. This lack of support probably will not be important over the short-run, so long as the generals in power remain united; over the longer term, however, some base of political support must be developed if the non-Communist elements in South Viet-Nam are ever to build a viable society. While we are doing all possible to facilitate and encourage the development of such a political base, this is a long-term process. It reaches into the roots of Vietnamese society and psychology and is not subject to quick solution by any measures within our power. The only encouraging factor in the situation is that responsible Vietnamese seem to be increasingly concerned with the problem.

In the countryside, the Government’s political situation is even worse than in Saigon and other urban centers. The Viet Cong have savagely destroyed most of the political structure of the rural areas. The potential leaders who could form the nucleus of counter-Viet Cong efforts in each locale have been killed, intimidated or driven out, leaving the old, weak and incompetent behind. Absent security (and where there is security, absent willing and able leadership), rural reconstruction (pacification) continues to make little, if any progress. The very difficult problem of getting pacification moving has not been solved.

c. Economic. South Viet-Nam’s economic situation today is grave for two reasons:

(1) The Communist strategy has been to draw on the Vietnamese economy to support the Viet Cong’s own operations and to withhold the remainder from the Government and from those of the people who support it. Thus, in large part as a consequence of Viet Cong operations, Viet-Nam has become a food-import area; commodities cannot move freely within the country (e.g., rice from the Delta to Saigon), and the Viet Cong are in a position to derive much of their own needs (e.g., construction material, food, medical supplies) from within the South Vietnamese economy.

(2) The rapid and large United States/South Viet-Nam force build-up has introduced a new and strenuous competition for Viet-Nam’s human and material resources. When added to the Viet Cong economic warfare efforts, the build-up has resulted in a growing inflation in the Vietnamese economy.

III. Acceptable Settlement Objectives.

Our basic objective is the restoration of a South Viet-Nam “free to determine its own future without external interference.”

We are proceeding on the assumption that South Viet-Nam can eventually be made into a workable and reasonably stable non-Communist nation, which, under the right conditions, could cope with the powerful Communist-led apparatus that is now the Viet Cong.

We recognize the possibility—at the end of the road—of North and South Viet-Nam freely deciding the issue of reunification.

In concrete terms—and roughly in the order they might be approached—the conditions precedent to the attainment of our objective—whether worked out through new formal negotiations or resulting from tacit arrangements—are:

A. A cessation of infiltration of men and arms, and an end to leadership ties (represented concretely by radio communications) with the North.

B. Cessation or sharp reduction in military actions and terrorism in the South.

C. Withdrawal to the North of the maximum possible number of those who continue to accept Hanoi discipline.

This means particularly post-1954 North Vietnamese citizens (whether Northern or Southern born). In practice this group breaks down into readily identifiable North Vietnamese regular units and individuals born in North Viet-Nam, and the much less readily identifiable “regroupees” or “returnees” who are of Southern origin and who formed the bulk of the infiltration up to early 1964.

D. Cessation of United States/South Vietnamese bombing attacks on the North.

We have said we would do this in return for some combination of A through C above.

E. The establishment of conditions for a viable political structure in the South.

The South Vietnamese have spoken of the use of “established democratic processes,” by which they clearly mean a gradual and controlled extension of indirect representation methods, perhaps based on progressive local elections, subject at every point to security considerations and controls.

Hanoi’s present position calls for the National Liberation Front taking over through the device of a coalition (without elections).

The United States has categorically rejected Hanoi’s position and would equally oppose the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong remaining intact under any name as a legal political organization. But we have left the door open to amnesty and non-reprisal treatment for any individuals now in the Viet Cong who lay down their arms and accept Government rule.

F. An eventual total “cease-fire.”

The United States and the Government of Viet-Nam would insist on total freedom for the Government to establish law and order throughout the country, and would resist the probable Hanoi attempt to create a situation in which the Viet Cong were able to maintain themselves in key areas they now control. (Hence the danger of the terms “cease-fire” and “stand-fast” as they have been used, e.g., by Senator Mansfield.)⁴

G. Restoration of the Geneva non-interference provisions between North and South for the future.

On this point we and Hanoi are not far apart—verbally. Hanoi adds “pending reunification,” but this need not be serious. However, the substance of this is what the war is about.

H. Better international machinery to verify cessation of infiltration and withdrawal, and to enforce future non-interference between North and South.

We have not tried to spell this out, partly because we do not want to get drawn into any acceptance of international supervision of the political structure in the South. (Such supervision could well favor the Viet Cong, as Acheson has stressed.)⁵ But—to the degree possible—we would wish to see stronger machinery than the present ICC to police external interference, perhaps backed by some form of multilateral power guarantee.

I. Acceptance of limited “Neutrality” for an independent South Viet-Nam.

We have said that South Viet-Nam need not be tied to any alliance—and thus “neutral” in this sense. But the South Vietnamese insist that they must retain the sovereign right to call for outside help if they need it, and we would insist on this too unless there were equivalent and really effective international, multilateral guarantees and policing machinery.

J. Withdrawal of United States combat forces and elimination of United States bases.

We have said we would accept this when the South is truly free to run its affairs without interference, i.e., when at least points A through F are resolved satisfactorily. In this sense we agree verbally with Hanoi on the eventual status. However, Hanoi occasionally says our withdrawal must precede any negotiations (we don’t believe they mean this), and would in any event seek to get American forces out much sooner and with concomitant performance on their side being limited to the withdrawal of only their own regulars. We would probably seek to retain military advisors, and in any case would expect to maintain economic assistance, which would be badly needed for a long time.

K. Provisions for possible reunification.

We have taken our stand squarely on the principle of ultimate free determination under international supervision, but have said nothing on timing. Hanoi does not mention free elections, but appears content to let the issue be handled later, doubtless expecting that they will succeed in establishing a Communist-oriented government in the South that would move toward reunification in due course. At this stage they also may not wish to offend Southern sentiment—even in the Viet Cong—by making their ambitions nakedly clear. The South Vietnamese are generally willing to accept an indefinite division of the country.

IV. Practical Elements of Achieving Settlement.

While the above analysis indicates the ultimate complexity of a settlement—whether through negotiation or withering away—in practice, we do not have to cross all these bridges now. What we really need to focus on is the kind of factual situation in the South that would, over time, give us the best chance that a stable non-Communist South Viet-Nam would emerge.

From the standpoint of our public posture and any communications we may have with Hanoi on any channel, we need to focus on five areas where we could be “hard, “less hard but still acceptable”, or “soft” in ways that would affect the chances of a favorable non-Communist outcome. It would be convenient if we could stay absolutely firm on conditions that would assure a 100% chance over the long run of a non-Communist outcome. In fact, there can never be such absolute assurance. And, in assessing whether to keep up the military pressure in the hope of achieving an ideal result we must weigh the scale of conflict this might involve and the intangible, but perhaps crucial, effect of our continued massive presence on a future healthy South Viet-Nam.

The patient has got to learn to walk some time, and attempted total eradication of his Communist disease may be worse for his recovery than throwing him more on his own—with some degree of risk—as soon as the chances look reasonably good.

The five areas we need to focus on are:

1. What to accept in return for cessation of bombing of the North.

We should rule out even a limited pause if the quid pro quo were only the initiation of negotiations. Bombing is our only bargaining counter that offers hope of an agreement that does more than ratify the situation on the ground in South Viet-Nam and the balance of forces there. It is, therefore, important that we carefully preserve it and play the card of cessation of bombing only at the optimum point in any type of negotiations.

2. What degree of withdrawal of Hanoi-directed elements.

Our initial position must be that of the South Vietnamese Government—that they all be withdrawn. We should maintain this position inflexibly as to Northerners and also as to identified Southern-born military and political leaders. At the same time we must recognize that it would not be practicable to try to weed out every last man of the 45,000 estimated to have infiltrated—or to attempt to deport to the North all the Viet Cong, whether they come from the North or not. In carrying out any final agreement it would be necessary to apply a practicability test to the former, and to let some of the latter stay.

3. What political status in the South for individuals now in the Viet Cong.

The Geneva Accords—which we are seeking to revive—contain a non-reprisal provision. We do not wish such a provision to be policed by an international body, and we certainly cannot accept the National Liberation Front as a legal political entity. But a full-scale amnesty program—now at best limping along—would be most useful even while the conflict continues. It might be extended, as the Acheson Plan suggests, to allow political participation, under Government control at all stages, of Viet Cong individuals who had laid aside their arms.

4. How complete a roll-up of the Viet Cong military forces.

Although there should certainly be no legalized safe havens, and we must insist that the Government’s police power have the right to operate throughout the country, we could in practice settle—as Ambassador Lodge has suggested—for some hard-core Viet Cong remnants off in the hills.

5. What timing for United States withdrawal.

This depends on too many variables for us to take any sure position now. If, as suggested above, we settled for less than total withdrawal of the infiltrators, it would give us the basis to keep some of our forces for a long time if we desired to do so.

The above analysis indicates areas where we could show some “give” at the right time and still have as good a chance as we could expect of the final favorable outcome. But it also identifies “soft” positions that, if taken, would so greatly prejudice the chances of attaining our objectives that we should not accept them unless and until we decide that the problem is not manageable.

Among these are: (a) stopping bombings in return merely for initiation of negotiations, without more concrete action; (b) accepting the National Liberation Front as a valid political entity; (c) legalized Viet Cong safe havens; (d) United States withdrawal on any firm timetable unrelated to other elements.

V. Tools available.

The interacting tools available to us in working toward a solution to the problem in South Viet-Nam are:

(a) Military power in South Viet-Nam, Laos and in the adjacent waters;

(b) Military interdiction in, and pressure on, North Viet-Nam;

(c) Political, economic and psychological efforts in South Viet-Nam; and

(d) Political and diplomatic pressures on Hanoi and Peiping.

Military variables.

The military variables are (1) a pause, (2) Rolling Thunder, and (3) the deployment of additional forces:

1. Pause—An interruption in the program of bombing North Viet-Nam.

It has been suggested that we have a pause that would stand down all strikes and armed reconnaissance in North Viet-Nam for approximately four weeks unless its futility became apparent earlier. It would not involve stoppage of other reconnaissance or intelligence operations in North Viet-Nam or of any operations elsewhere. Ground and air operations in South Viet-Nam would continue. The pause would be publicly acknowledged, but a serious effort would be made to avoid advertising it as an ultimatum to North Viet-Nam. Third countries would be encouraged to use the pause to help produce negotiations for an acceptable settlement. With respect to termination of the pause, our state of mind would be (a)“hard-line” or (b) “soft-line”:

(a) “Hard-line” Pause.

Under a “hard-line” pause, we would be firmly resolved to resume bombing unless the Communists were clearly moving toward what is described above as an acceptable settlement.

(b) “Soft-line” Pause.

Under a “soft-line” pause, we would be willing to feel our way with respect to termination of the pause, with less insistence on concrete concessions by the Communists. (This kind of pause makes sense only if we are working toward something much less than what has been described above as an acceptable settlement.)

2. Rolling Thunder and armed reconnaissance.

This program (a) could be intensified abruptly by a sharp heavy blow, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (b) could continue to increase at the present pace, or (c) could be maintained at approximately its present level.

(a) JCS “sharp blow.”

The JCS would initiate immediately, and carry out in a few days a program of air strikes against

• —Phuc Yen, Hanoi/Gia Lam, Hanoi/Bac Mai, Haiphong/Cat Bi, and Haiphong/Kien An airfields, including the aircraft thereon (Phuc Yen to be struck by B-52s).
• —Rail, highway and waterway routes and traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong and between Hanoi-Haiphong and South China.
• —Petroleum storage facilities at Haiphong (or four thermal power plants generating approximately 50% of North Viet-Nam’s thermal power).
• —SAM installations and other anti-aircraft defenses which pose a threat to the above air operations.

The Joint Chiefs would permit normal armed reconnaissance in all of North Viet-Nam, and would order follow-on strikes as necessary to keep the targets destroyed. They would conduct naval surface force operations against targets near the coast and against North Vietnamese shipping at sea. They would mine the harbors. Every effort would be made to minimize destruction of non-military installations; and the civilian populations, as such, would not be targeted.

(b) Extrapolation of Rolling Thunder Program.

Up to this point we have been conducting the Rolling Thunder program on the assumption that our air attacks against North Viet-Nam would become progressively more severe, both with respect to intensity and geography. At the present time, we are carrying out 600 armed reconnaissance sorties a week in the “three quadrants” and striking two fixed lines-of-communication (LOC) targets a week in the “northeast quadrant” (but not against targets in the “China strip,” the Hanoi circle,” or the “Haiphong circle”). If we should continue this progressively intensifying program over a five-month period, we would maintain activity in the three quadrants at the present level. The program might, however, evolve in the “northeast quadrant” along the following illustrative pattern:

• —1st month. Include Hanoi-Haiphong LOC targets (outside the Hanoi and Haiphong circles), with two fixed LOC targets in the quadrant each week.
• —2nd and 3rd months. No fixed targets in the quadrant, but “controlled armed reconnaissance” of selected routes at selected times and at the rate of 100 sorties a week.
• —4th month. EXTEND “controlled armed reconnaissance” to LOCs within the Hanoi and Haiphong circles and ADD strikes on three key petroleum installation targets a month.
• —5th month. In the first two weeks, ADD mining of Haiphong Harbor; thereafter, change the armed reconnaissance in the northeast quadrant to the kind carried out in the other three quadrants and with no geographical limit except the strip next to China. (Left unstruck would be population targets, power plants, and locks and dams.)

(c) Maintenance at present level.

This would involve continuing a level of armed reconnaissance sorties throughout North Viet-Nam adequate to keep military installations and the line of communication to the south as fully out of action as possible, and to maintain a limited pattern of fixed strikes in the “northeast quadrant”. It might involve elements of the extrapolated program such as strikes on the Hanoi-Haiphong line of communication targets (out-side the circles). And it might be extended in a small way to the “controlled armed reconnaissance” in the northeast quadrant designed to keep these major lines of communication under continuing harassment and interruption.

While the present level of 600 armed reconnaissance sorties a week would remain a rough benchmark, we would need to consider in any case whether the growing evidence of expanded lines of communication in Laos may warrant some diversion of effort to that area. We should also consider getting a much more pronounced daily and weekly variation into the total pattern of air activity over the North, so that the rate of sorties varies greatly. This varied pattern would have merit under any program, but it would be particularly applicable to a “continuing” level in that it would keep Hanoi guessing and minimize any implication that we had settled down without an increase.

The argument for maintaining bombing at the present level is that no feasible amount of bombing of the North is going to achieve an acceptable settlement in the absence of a substantial improvement in the situation on the ground in the South. Therefore, a substantial increase in bombing of the North will have a maximum “climactic” effect if carried out at a time when the situation in the South is more clearly moving in our favor. It would also continue to maintain the Haiphong Harbor and petroleum storage as “hostage” for the now very vulnerable port and petroleum storage at Saigon.

3. Additional (Phase II) Deployments.

United States force deployments (I) could stop at the presently approved 225,000 # during 1966.

(a) Stop at Phase I. Limit United States forces to the presently approved 225,000. Added expenditures attributable to Phase I, through FY 1967, are estimated to be $13 billion.

(b) Deploy additional Phase II forces. Deploy 28 additional combat battalions and four additional tactical air squadrons and associated support forces (125,000 additional men), bringing the totals to 62 United States combat battalions (plus 10 third-country battalions) and 26 United States tactical air squadrons, or approximately 350,000 Americans in South Viet-Nam. These deployments would be essentially completed by the end of 1966, and would be—as proposed by MACV—at a considerably slower rate than the August-December 1965 rate, specifically at the rate of six, seven, nine and six ground combat battalions for each of the four quarters of 1966.

These deployments could be accomplished without calling up the reserves or extending tours of duty, but, in that case, they would lead to further reductions in the strength of our strategic reserve to meet contingencies elsewhere. (An alternative would be to call up reserves—not only replenishing the strategic reserves, but also giving a clear demonstration of United States power and purposes.) Expenditures attributable to Phase II for its first 18 months are estimated very roughly at $3 billion. It is estimated—as can be seen on Map II⁶—that, by the time Phase II forces are making their full impact in the spring of 1967, the United States/South Vietnamese forces would have “control” of 65 percent of the population and 20-30 percent of the land; 60-65 percent of the critical lines of communications would be kept open; 40-50 percent of the Viet Cong bases and military logistical infrastructure would be subject to disruption; and 30 percent of the Viet Cong political/security infrastructure would be disrupted.

It should be noted that the MACV-proposed Phase II does not allocate any forces to the Delta. To handle the Delta properly, Phase II would have to be augmented by one or two additional divisions—30,000 to 60,000 additional men—bringing the Phase II total to 155,000 to 185,000 men, or an overall total of between 380,000 and 410,000 men in South Viet-Nam.

VI. Alternative Courses of Action.

A theoretical case can be made for a course of action such as a “soft line” pause, extreme negotiating efforts and—following the pause—maintenance of present force levels in the South and the present level of Rolling Thunder attacks in the North, all designed to feel our way toward a “compromise outcome”. We all believe, however, that such a course of action would not support our basic strategy. It would end up in disintegration in Viet-Nam, in political humiliation for the United States, and impaired American political effectiveness on the world scene. It could also lead to more costly confrontations with the Chinese Communists later on. In essence, it simply is not consistent with the definition given above of what would constitute an acceptable settlement.

Thus, the realistic choices boil down to:

First Course: No Pause, With Continuing or Evolving Rolling Thunder and With No Substantial Further Deployments to South Viet-Nam.

This course of action can be supported in this way:

(a) It will be January before the weight of our full presently-approved deployments really comes into play. By then we might see at least an adverse morale trend in the Viet Cong that would indicate we were getting somewhere.

(b) It may be useful to give ourselves time to digest the impact of 225,000 men in terms of their effect on the Vietnamese psychology and economy. This is a factor that some reports, notably a recent cable from Saigon on inflationary and labor division problems, suggest may be becoming very serious even to the point of being a limiting factor on our basic effectiveness in appealing to the people.

(c) It would give the Government of Viet-Nam additional time, hopefully without serious frictions with us, to get on with its part of the job and to build up a South Vietnamese contribution that would not be dwarfed by the United States role.

On the drawback side are two factors:

(a) Deferring additional United States deployments—particularly in the face of continuing increases in Viet Cong strength—raises grave problems in our domestic situation. This is not solely a question of the war dragging on—which, one can argue, it would be likely to do even with additional deployments—but rather a question of not having clearly done all on the ground in Viet-Nam that appears wise. It would be still more serious, of course, if the rate of progress slowed down, as is likely to be the case.

(b) The second drawback is that, by delaying the added deployments, we should lose momentum in Viet-Nam—a momentum that reflects a determination and confidence crucial to the psychology of the confrontation.

Basically, this course can continue to assure against a Viet Cong “victory” as long as our relations with the Vietnamese government and people remain good; it can, as indicated above, result in an indefinite stalemate if Hanoi and the Viet Cong can maintain the morale and strength of their forces. It presents the least danger of overt Chinese Communist or Soviet intervention. The two important variables difficult to predict are the morale on the South Vietnamese side (and correspondingly our relations with them) and the morale on the Hanoi-Viet Cong side. Morale has unquestionably improved in South Viet-Nam and we are beginning to see a few small signs of deterioration in morale among the Viet Cong. These hopeful trends may be expected to continue for the time being as the forces we are now deploying there move toward full effectiveness. Their indefinite continuation might result in an acceptable settlement at some time in the foreseeable future even though the balance of military force were not such as to assure a military destruction of the Viet Cong.

But it is not possible to be certain that these trends will continue indefinitely. If there were a stalemate, or only very slow progress, there would—sooner or later—be a tendency for South Vietnamese morale to sag and frustrations to focus on the American presence and the problems associated with that presence. On the Viet Cong-Hanoi side, the continued infusion of North Vietnamese forces may serve somewhat to offset the many factors unfavorable to them.

This development would not be overcome merely by intensified bombing of the North. We have always thought such bombing would bring Hanoi to an acceptable settlement only if the tide were clearly running against them in the South. If the prediction of probable stalemate above held true, in the absence of additional deployments, even the extrapolated Rolling Thunder program would be unlikely to bring Hanoi around.

In sum, this course of action does not appear hopeful.

Second Course: Pause, Extrapolated Rolling Thunder, and Additional Deployments.

In view of the intensified actions involved, Secretary McNamara would not recommend this course of action unless it were preceded by a “hard-line pause”, as set forth in Paragraph V 1. (a) above.

The purposes of—and Secretary McNamara’s arguments for—such a pause are four:

(a) It would offer Hanoi and the Viet Cong a chance to move toward a solution if they should be so inclined, removing the psychological barrier of continued bombing and permitting the Soviets and others to bring moderating arguments to bear;

(b) It would demonstrate to domestic and international critics that we had indeed made every effort for a peaceful settlement before proceeding to intensified actions, notably the latter stages of the extrapolated Rolling Thunder program;

(c) It would probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation after we had resumed the bombing, at least insofar as the Soviets were concerned;

(d) It would set the stage for another pause, perhaps in late 1966, which might produce a settlement.

Against these propositions, there are the following considerations arguing against a pause:

(a) In the absence of any indication from Hanoi as to what reciprocal action it might take, we could well find ourselves in the position of having played this very important card without receiving anything substantial in return. There are no indications that Hanoi is yet in a mood to agree to a settlement acceptable to us. The chance is, therefore, very slight that a pause at this time could lead to an acceptable settlement.

(b) A unilateral pause at this time would offer an excellent opportunity for Hanoi to interpose obstacles to our resumption of bombing and to demoralize South Viet-Nam by indefinitely dangling before us (and the world) the prospect of negotiations with no intent of reaching an acceptable settlement. It might also tempt the Soviet Union to make threats that would render very difficult a decision to resume bombing.

(c) In Saigon, obtaining South Vietnamese acquiescence to a pause would be difficult. It could adversely affect the Government’s solidity. Any major falling out between the Government and the United States, or any overturn in the Government’s political structure, could set us back very severely.

(d) An additional factor is that undertaking the second course of action following a pause would give this course a much more dramatic character, both internationally and domestically, and would, in particular, present the Soviets with those difficult choices that we have hereto-fore been successful in avoiding.

On balance, the arguments against the pause are convincing to the Secretary of State, who recommends that it not be undertaken at the present time. The Secretary of State believes that a pause should be undertaken only when and if the chances were significantly greater than they now appear that Hanoi would respond by reciprocal actions leading in the direction of a peaceful settlement. He further believes that, from the standpoint of international and domestic opinion, a pause might become an overriding requirement only if we were about to reach the advanced stages of an extrapolated Rolling Thunder program involving extensive air operations in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Since the Secretary of State believes that such advanced stages are not in themselves desirable until the tide in the South is more favorable, he does not feel that even accepting the point of view of the Secretary of Defense, there is now any international requirement to consider a “Pause”.

Third Course: No Pause, Continuing Rolling Thunder at Present Levels, and Gradual Phase II Deployments.

This course of action would, like all of those considered, also include maximum diplomatic efforts to explore and exploit all possibilities of achieving an acceptable settlement.

The principal element in this Third Course would be to increase our ground deployments on the basis of a progressive evaluation of need and effectiveness, but to avoid any dramatic decision to the maximum extent possible. This would involve immediate preparations for additional deployments to the South along Phase II lines during 1966. It would almost certainly mean a final decision in early January to carry out first and second quarter Phase II deployments (six and seven combat battalions respectively). Such further deployments would be presented, not as a new “phase” but as the carrying out of your often repeated statement that “we are going to do what we need to do.”

Preparations would also go forward for third and fourth quarter Phase II deployments, but final decision would not be made until late spring.

(Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State agree that at the present time and under present conditions the risks resulting from the reduction in our ready reserve that will result from such additional deployments are acceptable.)

Under this course of action the Rolling Thunder program would be conducted on the “continuing” basis defined in Paragraph V 2. (c) but leaving open the option of moving to the extrapolated program if Hanoi appeared to be weakening. Likewise, a pause would be deferred, but might later be considered if Hanoi appeared to be weakening.

Essentially, this course of action is designed to maintain momentum in the South so that South Vietnamese morale and performance can be improved. In essence, it is designed to “play for the breaks” (as we did in the Berlin blockade and Korea) without actions that would bring the situation prematurely to a head.

From a strictly military standpoint, even the full carrying out of Phase II deployments during 1966 would not extend the areas of government control or weaken the Viet Cong structure decisively. (See Map II.) The major variables would continue to be whether the South Vietnamese Government achieves effectiveness—and above all whether Viet Cong morale cracks significantly.

We cannot say that the chances are better than even that this would happen by the end of 1966, but at least we would be keeping the pressure on and giving ourselves every reasonable chance of getting this decisive “break”.

As between the Second and Third Courses, the Second Course may offer us—if it were to work out favorably—a somewhat greater chance of an acceptable outcome by the end of 1966. On the other hand, with the political dangers of an immediate pause, and the uncertainty and possible widening of the war involved in the latter stage of the extrapolated Rolling Thunder program, the Second Course would also involve significantly greater chances of either an adverse development in the South or a wider war.

The Third Course would give us every reasonable chance of moving ahead in the South before we had to take the critical and difficult actions involved in a pause and a substantially intensified Rolling Thunder program. It would clearly be slower, but it might in the end be surer, particularly in light of the time needed to develop a more solid and effective political structure in the South.

VII. Possible Further Actions.

Neither the third nor any of the other courses of action considered in this memorandum could give positive assurance of success. The North Vietnamese probably could, by additional deployments, match our deployments on a 1-for-3 or 1-for-4 basis, thus effectively cancelling the likelihood that the additional forces set forth in this memorandum would be able to provide security to areas beyond the enclaves shown on the attached maps. If the Hanoi authorities should do this, we could find ourselves in a position where—with our killed-in-action casualties at 500 to 800 per month—the pressures would be great to invade or to bomb the cities in the North—actions which would be likely to lead to a severe reaction from China and possibly from the Soviet Union.

The Viet Cong can be expected to continue their “Phase II” sabotage, murder and guerrilla activities, while continuing to strive to build up a conventional military capability. They will depend more and more on regular PAVN forces; they will draw harder on the men and material in the areas they control, including the Delta; and they can be expected to try to bring the economy of South Viet-Nam to a grinding halt. The question, of course, is whether the pressure on the North and the added forces in the South can frustrate these Viet Cong designs. The question also is whether Hanoi will continue to have the will and the morale to carry this on.

If Hanoi and the Viet Cong are successful in their efforts to stand firm, we may be faced in late 1966 or early 1967 with critical decisions. One possibility which needs further analysis would be military action to “seal off” an infiltration corridor in Laos to a “barrier” just south of the 17th Parallel from the sea to Thailand. Such a “barrier” would require major military forces, including Thai and Laos forces on the West end and Vietnamese and United States forces on the East end. It would create major political problems in Laos, particularly in terms of obtaining the support of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, and major international complications in that it would be an open breach of the Laos settlement.

Another, and perhaps more likely, possibility would be the requirement for still additional deployments of American forces in the South. Finally, there would of course be the pressures mentioned above to invade or bomb the cities in the North, with the risks that would flow therefrom, as well as to mine Haiphong Harbor.

(Any consideration of the mining of Haiphong Harbor will, among other considerations, have to consider its effects on and our interests in the relative positions of Moscow and Peiping influence in Hanoi.)

VIII. Non-Military Actions.

Regardless of which of the possible courses outlined above is adopted, maximum effort must be given now and for an extended period to the political, economic and psychological efforts without which South Viet-Nam will never be made into a workable and reasonably stable non-Communist nation able to cope with the Viet Cong apparatus. In a sense, our military effort, however essential, is buying us time in which to work with the Vietnamese to build a political, economic and social base among the bulk of the people and primarily the rural people who make up 80 percent of the population.

The following are the principal elements in our present program:

(1) Do what we can to develop out of the present Government of Viet-Nam at all levels a government which will increasingly develop a commitment not only against Communism but also to the cooperation of all its factions and tendencies for the achievement of that objective and also to programs designed to enlist the loyalty and support of the people. As noted previously, this is a long-term process and there is nothing we can do that will produce dramatic results.

(2) Assist and encourage the Vietnamese Government and, where possible, groups with large popular followings, to develop cadres who can form the nucleus in rural areas for organization of the population for economic and social reconstruction and against the Viet Cong infrastructure.

(3) Develop with the Vietnamese Government, and press it to prosecute vigorously, national programs which will give support to the efforts of the cadres mentioned above. This includes land reform and agricultural credit, land development, tax reform, encouragement of small industry and handicrafts, and provision of a range of community development projects which can be put at the disposal of the cadres to be used by the cadres to support their political objectives.

(4) Advise and encourage the South Vietnamese Government to build from the provincial councils elected in May of 1965 toward some national representative body which might initially be elected indirectly and for some time would have only limited responsibilities, such as drafting of a new constitution. At provincial and lower levels, however, elected bodies should promptly be given increasing responsibility where security permits, and particularly where there are cadres who can work with such bodies effectively.

(5) Meanwhile support the Government of Viet-Nam and occasionally on an ad hoc basis substitute for it, in immediate programs (a) to meet emergencies such as the refugee problem, (b) to supply urgently required infrastructure and logistics for the military effort while trying to minimize adverse effects on the civilian economy, (c) to stem inflation, (d) to deny resources to the Viet Cong and secure those resources for those areas under government control, and (e) to establish machinery and a priority system to minimize to the extent possible competition for the increasingly scarce manpower and materials, Vietnamese and American, required for the complex of efforts now under way in South Viet-Nam.

The intensification of these efforts, of course, particularly the increased imports essential to control inflation, means increased AID expenditures. AID expenditures this fiscal year are likely to be in the order of $550 million. The amount required for FY 1967 is not yet determined but it can be anticipated that something in the order of $650 million will be required.

IX. Conclusion.

Perhaps all of the foregoing does not give sufficient weight to the problems as they appear to the other side. As has been pointed out they can now have no hope of “victory”. A large part of our task is to reinforce this conviction and not only to consult our own fears but also to weigh the fears of the other side in drawing up our balance. A stalemate can have no more attraction for them than it has for us. Our determination and our will are certainly not less than theirs. If we can, as recommended in this memorandum, continue to display an increasing level of determination we should not despair, any more than we did in Berlin, Korea and Cuba, of reaching a satisfactory conclusion even though at the moment we may only see through the glass darkly exactly how this is to be accomplished.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (A). Top Secret. On a covering index listing the nine sections of this memorandum, a handwritten note reads as follows: “The Secretary (from Ambassador Johnson).” A handwritten note by McNaughton on the Department of Defense copy indicates that U. Alexis Johnson was the author of the memorandum. (United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 6, Part IV, C, 7 (a), footnote 31)
2. Not found.
3. See footnote 4, Document 189.
4. See footnote 3, Document 174.
5. Presumably a reference to the argumentation supporting the Acheson Plan; see vol. II, Document 287.
6. Not found.