152. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Hanoi’s 23 September Memorandum on Negotiations2
Hanoi has now responded to U.S. policy statements on settling the war with an official government memorandum detailing their own current “views”. This statement, in the form of a Foreign Ministry paper, is the most extensive pronouncement on Hanoi policy since the four point proposal of 8 April.3 Hanoi probably regards the document as its side of a dialogue with Washington on terms for negotiation. The memorandum also serves as a response to the many recent proposals by free world leaders on ending the war. Its timing may have been set by a Hanoi desire to go on record prior to the opening of the UN General Assembly. (Incidentally, the paper flatly rejects the use of the UN in settling the war.)
The memorandum offers no new proposals for settling the conflict, and no explicit concessions. It does, however, by dint of its phraseology on several points and by its omission of several hard-line concepts contained in prior statements, convey an impression of greater flexibility than has been present overall in any past policy pronouncements. It is apparently not a signal that Hanoi is now ready to step to the negotiating table, but rather that the North Vietnamese have reviewed their bidding, made some adjustments, and are waiting to hear the response of the other principals, most notably the United States. The statement follows other indications, both public and private, that Hanoi is now more interested in hearing what U.S. officials and friends of the U.S. have to say about negotiations, and that Hanoi is also trying to be more explicit in outlining its own position.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos (A). Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw this memorandum.↩
- The text of the memorandum is printed in FBIS, Daily Report, Far East, September 24, 1965, no. 184. On September 24, the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA prepared an intelligence memorandum, OCI No. 2324/65, assessing the DRV memorandum. (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 251, NV/SV Negotiations Sept-Dec 1965) The Director of Intelligence and Research sent the Secretary of State, also on September 24, an intelligence note on the DRV memorandum. (Ibid.: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam INR Studies, 64-65) The DRV memorandum rejected unconditional discussions and solutions seeking U.N. intervention, insisted on recognition of the NLF’s right to have a “decisive say” in negotiations, and asserted that the DRV’s four points were the “sole correct basis for a settlement.”↩
- See vol. II, Document 25.↩