138. Memorandum by Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff1
SUBJECT
- Status Report on U.S. Non-Military Programs in Vietnam
Attached is a brief discussion and status report2 of our more important non-military programs. This represents the first in a series of monthly reports for the President.
The range and complexity of our non-military activities are noteworthy—from training village policemen to controlling inflation. The [Page 381] key elements of this comprehensive program are touched on briefly below.
Security and Political Operations. An ambitious internal security program is concentrating on building national, provincial and Special Branch police forces. Recruiting, training and equipping a force of almost 80,000 men is proceeding on schedule. Important steps have also been taken to improve techniques of population control; 7 million identity cards have been issued and population checkpoints have been established.CIA-trained counter-guerrilla units are operating against the VC in its own territory.
The objective of attracting popular support for the Saigon government permeates the full range of programs involved in the counterinsurgency effort. Ky has attempted to project an image of revolutionary reform, but promises have only been slowly fulfilled, and the lack of effective government ties into the villages has dulled the impact of Ky’s revolutionary fervor.
The Mission is encouraging Ky to give concrete meaning to his program and to build support for it among the various elements of Vietnamese society. In theory these groups welcome Ky’s objectives, but his defensive attitude and the problem of enlisting the support of one group without alienating another inhibit greater progress.
On the level of local action, CIA has trained and equipped various types of small, highly motivated teams which operate throughout the provinces, applying Viet Cong tactics of living and working with the villagers.
The Mission is working with all important political groups to sublimate their deeply embedded historic frictions and encourage their joint effort to defeat the Viet Cong. There is greater covert than overt room for maneuver and programming in this field and CIA has initiated programs to convince both leaders and rank and file that only through cooperation and concentration on prosecuting the war can they avoid Communist domination and realize their respective objectives. The evolution of a national program which can attract their collective energies and subordinate their self-serving interests remains essential if greater progress is to be achieved.
Provincial Operations—Ex Security. The comprehensive military-civilian operation in the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon has shown progress. The political situation is stable except in Hau Nghia Province where GVN military interference with the Province Chief’s operations and instances of indiscriminate shelling have alienated some of the local population.
The refugee problem continues to be serious, although not critical except in the overcrowded camps at Qui Nhon where additional housing [Page 382] is being built. Through the Mission and Dr. Howard Rusk3 we are bringing maximum assistance from both U.S. private and public sectors to bear on the problem.
The recommendations of the Chieu Hoi (rally and amnesty) task force have been approved by our Mission and form the basis for current negotiations with the GVN for a much improved program.
Economic and Social Operations. Economic assistance programs are giving priority to countering the growing threat of inflation, meeting serious logistic problems created by Viet Cong interdiction of land routes, and developing tactics for combatting Viet Cong economic subversion.
Traditional AID programs for agricultural and industrial development continue within the limits of security, with most progress in the Delta and Saigon areas. There is special priority for establishing a light industry complex and creating a planned community in the Cam Ranh Bay area where a major port and U.S. military base are being constructed.
Emphasis is being placed on improving medical facilities in the provinces and increasing the number of surgical suites staffed by U.S. and other Free World medical personnel.
The GVN has initiated some limited new land reform measures. While the GVN is still moving cautiously because of landlord sensitivities, at least the initial step has been taken after a long period of inactivity in this important area.
Psychological Warfare and Information. USIA propaganda directed at North Vietnam has increased considerably with the expansion of Voice of America Vietnamese language service and the initiation of extensive leaflet drops.
Propaganda and psychological operations in South Vietnam have also expanded and grown more effective with the buildup of U.S. information personnel.
U.S. troop orientation programs are attempting to reduce potential causes of friction between U.S. troops and the Vietnamese. There have been instances of friction in urban areas near U.S. military installations; there does not seem to be much of a problem in the countryside.
[Page 383]Veterans benefits programs for the Vietnamese military are being developed to improve morale and sustain their commitment to the war effort and a non-Communist Vietnam.
Our efforts to convince the GVN of the necessity for an effective external information program are now bearing fruit. Pamphlets and other materials have been produced for foreign distribution; newly recruited personnel for assignment abroad are being trained; foreign correspondents, at long last, are being briefed by Saigon spokesmen. The GVN is focusing on better diplomatic representation abroad; agrement has been requested for a new and effective Ambassador to Washington.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Pt. Program in Non-Military Sphere in SVN. Secret.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- With the active encouragement of the Johnson administration, Dr. Howard Rusk was involved in creating an American Southeast Asia Foundation as a non-government fund raising and assistance program for public participation in President Johnson’s Southeast Asian program. Secretary Rusk told Dr. Rusk to ignore bureaucratic obstruction with his plans as he had “a direct line to the President.” (Memorandum from Thomson to McGeorge Bundy, September 2; Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Howard Rusk Project) McGeorge Bundy sent the President a memorandum on September 23, summarizing Rusk’s recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Howard Rusk Mission)↩