Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

137. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, September 8, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Systematic Bombing in North Viet Nam

On my return from leave I found that not much progress had been made with respect to bombing policy in North Viet Nam. It may be useful, therefore, for me to set out briefly the proposition about which I talked with you two weeks ago.²

1. Perhaps the most firmly based proposition about the use of airpower is that its systematic and thorough application against a few target systems is geometrically more effective than its diffuse application against many target systems.

2. For this reason, there is little doubt that the most effective use of airpower against North Viet Nam would be systematically to attack certain target systems which are critical to the military supply and production capabilities of that country. The two best candidates are: oil storage and electric power. Although attacks on these target systems need not be sanguinary in terms of civilian casualties, it is evident that they raise issues which have led the President thus far to hold off.

3. This fact does not relieve us of the responsibility of insuring that the use of airpower against North Viet Nam, within present limits, is as efficient as it can be made. At the present time, from the evidence available, I believe our attacks on North Viet Nam suffer from excessive diffusion of effort with respect to target systems. We are attacking ammunition dumps; barracks; some accessible power stations and oil storage depots; transport targets; etc. The indecisive character of the results is suggested by the analyses of the effectiveness of our bombing. They indicate that we have damaged or destroyed a modest proportion of each target system (roughly 5-20%).

4. I propose, therefore, that while keeping open the question of an optimum use of airpower (i.e., systematic attack, including targets near Hanoi, on oil storage and electric power), we devote ourselves forthwith to a transport interdiction campaign with the objectives of:

• —isolating Hanoi from the Laos and South Viet Nam borders;
• —isolating particular regions of southern and western North Viet Nam from each other and from Hanoi.

5. This judgment is based on ample evidence that our transport attacks in North Viet Nam are producing a series of substantial effects on the military and civil economy, as well as on psychological and political morale; but there is also evidence that the lack of system and follow-through in those attacks is denying us their full potentialities.

6. To do this we must establish, by careful analysis, the 50 or so critical transport bottlenecks in North Viet Nam and make a maximum commitment of force to hold those cuts, if possible, by night as well as by day. In turn, this would require that we permit the use of our full sortie capabilities against this transport target system, dropping, if necessary, attacks on target systems of doubtful or lesser value—perhaps barracks and ammunition dumps.

7. No guarantee concerning results can, of course, be made. But a careful reading of the evidence suggests that the transport system of North Viet Nam has been rendered so vulnerable by bombing up to the present point that such a truly systematic interdiction effort might not only make even small military movements across the North Vietnamese borders impractical but also produce significant economic, social, and political consequences.

7. [sic] The adoption of such a program would make urgent an effort which is not lacking in our government; namely, a sophisticated and systematic effort to evaluate from all sources the various different military and civilian effects being imposed by our bombing in the North.

8. A related transport interdiction system should be considered for concurrent or later application; namely, the interdiction of Hanoi from external sources of supply. This system involves the cutting (and holding of cuts) in the rail and road system between Hanoi and the Chicom borders and the mining of Haiphong harbor. A government in Hanoi isolated from its own borders and hinterland and from regular flows of external supplies is likely to take a relatively dim view of its prospects, while still retaining its hard-won industrial and urban infrastructure.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1965. Secret. Copies were sent to Unger and McGeorge Bundy. The source text is Unger’s unsigned copy; McGeorge Bundy’s signed copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Cables.
2. No record of this discussion has been found.