Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, January 28, 1965, 8:31 p.m.

1559. For General Taylor from McGeorge Bundy.

1. The President sends thanks for your 2334² and so do I. I look forward very much to visiting you. President sees force of your argument that my visit should not come when there is no government to talk with. On the other hand, it looks to us as if General Khanh for better or for worse is the principal present power. We see no early prospect of solid and stable administration, no matter what happens in the next few days. In order to get on with our own thinking about next steps, it does seem important for me to come quickly, although delay of a day or two beyond proposed arrival February 2 is manageable if you think it wise. As for Cabot Lodge, we are inclined to accept your judgment.

2. It remains clear to us that however irresponsible they may be, Buddhist leaders as well as Khanh himself are essential elements in our problem, and we now wonder whether there are any Americans of lower visibility that might be worth bringing along or even sending ahead for the purpose of quiet and informal soundings with them or with generals. We may have further suggestions on this and would allow any you may have.

3. We do not have to decide departure time until 24 hours ahead, but would like your advice daily until decision made.

4. On the evacuation of dependents, the President’s view is that it is not the timing of the decision but the decision itself that is important to him. He wants his people here and in Saigon to work out together the best way of clearing the decks, and is quite willing to have final decision on timing and method await my visit and talks with you.

5. A lot will turn on your first talk with Khanh. We think you should certainly seek from him a firm statement of determination to carry on with the war, and if, as we would expect, he takes this position, we think you should certainly respond that US is equally determined to go on supporting Vietnamese government and people. You could then make use of plan for DeSoto patrol next week as indication our position. Object of meeting should be to establish firmness of both sides and create atmosphere that would begin to bury past problems and get us into position to talk hard with him on all subjects including evacuation when I come or earlier if you think wise. So far we have been holding off on public statement our continued support, but we think we should make this just as soon as Khanh has made right noise to you. If trend of talk is in this direction, you are authorized join with Khanh in joint statement at time of call if you desire.³

6. My own current thought is that my party would include men like McNaughton, Gaud, Cooper, Colby, and Unger or Corcoran from Department. Central purpose of meeting would still be for me to have a conference with you and others as you think wise, but unless you object we would like to use the trip also for exchanges with country team members too. Statement on purpose of trip would be framed as you suggest.

7. Bob McNamara is lending us a plane. Let us know what we can bring you.⁴

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy; cleared in substance by Ball, McNamara, and Unger; and approved by the President.
2. Document 45.
3. In telegram 2347 from Saigon, January 29, Taylor reported on a meeting he had with Khanh that morning before receiving McGeorge Bundy’s cable. Taylor stated: “I would not favor making any commitment now to this present interim government or to Khanh and would hold out any action such as the DeSoto patrol for use in connection with our plan for dependent evacuation.” Taylor also suggested that Bundy delay his arrival until February 4 and offered reasons for reducing the number of people in the mission. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. In telegram 1563 to Saigon, January 29, McGeorge Bundy told Taylor that his telegram 2347 “makes sense to us, but we do persist in view that next week is best time for these talks and suggest we agree definitely on arrival early February 4.” Bundy also offered further comments on the details of the trip. (Ibid.)