Office of the Historian

46. Memorandum for the Record1

Saigon, January 28, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Discussion With General Khanh
1.
General Khanh accompanied me to Da Nang in the T-39 today. This trip stemmed from a request made to General Moore through General Ky. During the flight up we had a lengthy discussion summarized in the following paragraphs.
2.
I told General Khanh that I was going to Da Nang primarily to look into the alleged report that ARVN soldiers had participated in the demonstration in Hue on Wednesday, which demonstration reportedly had an anti-government and anti-U.S. objective. This situation I viewed with grave alarm and concern and suspected that he was conducting an investigation to determine why such extreme breach of discipline and unacceptable conduct for an ARVN soldier would be tolerated. Khanh said he shared my concern and was having the matter investigated in detail. He agreed to give me a copy of the report of investigation.
3.
Khanh explained that he was going to Da Nang on political business—distasteful to him but necessary under the circumstances. He expected to return to his military duty in ten days when new government would be formed. His commanders shared his distaste for politics but as a group they felt there was no one else capable of stemming the tide of deterioration in RVN. He had met for four days and nights with the Armed Forces Council and they had agreed that there were two essentials of success in this country: [Page 102]
a.
A government supported by the people.
b.
The support of the United States.
4.
Upon questioning the motives of the Buddhists, Khanh said he had made a secret agreement with the Bonzes which he expected them to fulfill. This involved removing the Buddhist chaplains from the Armed Forces (this is part of a general policy to remove all chaplains which he stated was also acceptable to the Catholics); the Buddhist Institute would get out of politics; Tri Quang and Ho Giac would leave the country; and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would exile himself in a pagoda to pursue his religious studies. If the Bonzes continued to create trouble, he would be forced to take strong measures against them, if necessary “kill” them.
5.
Khanh personally plans to appoint the members of the Armed Forces and People’s Council (some may be “good” members of the former High National Council) which organization will select the Chief of State who will in turn appoint a Prime Minister and subsequently form a Cabinet acceptable to the Armed Forces Council. He expects both the Chief of State and the Prime Minister to be civilians and would prefer such an arrangement, although I received the impression that Khanh could easily change his views in this regard. The new government would be staunchly backed by the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces would retain the ministerial posts recently acquired plus that of the Minister of Interior.
6.
Khanh does not expect any particular trouble from the Catholics since he had talked to Catholic leader, Bishop Binh, who had agreed to lend his support to his efforts to stabilize the situation. He was prepared to deal forcibly with the students if they create trouble.
7.
Khanh has not made his plans public but intends to do so. His first step in this regard was at his press conference yesterday where he attempted to pave the way for further public explanation of his approach at later conferences.
8.
If his efforts to form a new government are unsuccessful and destructive elements attempt to destroy his country, Khanh says he will have no choice but to take over as a military dictator.
9.
I expressed my concern about the anti-Ambassador Taylor theme in recent demonstrations in Hue2 and Da Nang, pointed out that Ambassador Taylor was perhaps the best friend Vietnam ever had but more fundamentally an attack on the Ambassador was an attack on the United States Government since he was the official representative of the United States. Khanh said he well understood and stated that one reason [Page 103] that he was going to Da Nang was to explain this matter plus the fact that Ambassador Taylor supported the government of Vietnam and therefore its head. In the past, the U.S. Ambassador had supported Mr. Diem, General Minh, himself, and now Mr. Huong. The fact that the people in Hue and Da Nang did not like Mr. Huong was no basis for disliking Ambassador Taylor. “The people are simple minded and follow the old adage, ‘The friend of my enemy is also my enemy’.”
10.
As we returned to Saigon, General Khanh stated that he had spoken with approximately forty leaders from the northern provinces representing all political and religious factions and students. He had spoken for over an hour and then answered questions for another hour. He had urged them not to show animosity against Ambassador Taylor because of his support of Mr. Huong in his capacity as the head of government. He emphasized that the United States supports the government of Vietnam and not individuals. He thought his remarks were understood, well received, and accepted. He assured me that all “anti-Taylor signs” would be down or painted over in both Hue and Da Nang by morning.
W.C. Westmoreland3
General, United States Army
Commanding
  1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup, #13. Secret. Prepared by Westmoreland. Copies were sent to Taylor, U. Alexis Johnson, and Manfull.↩
  2. Signs denouncing Taylor as a lackey of Prime Minister Huong appeared throughout Hue on January 23, the same day that a mob attacked the USIS Library in Hue. (Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 95)↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩