Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 23, 1965, 3 p.m.

2248. For the Secretary. Ref: A. Deptel 1509.² B. Embtel 2247.³ After the conversation with Huong reported in Ref B, we passed to the subject of dependent evacuation. I explained to Prime Minister Huong that there had long been doubt in Washington as to the soundness of our dependent policy in SVN. Many of our senior officials felt that, in a war-time situation such as we have here, it was psychologically wrong to have dependents whose presence suggested a desire for life as usual. I had had numerous discussions of this matter with Washington over the months during which time we had weighed carefully the pros and cons of a no-dependent policy.

Recently a new factor had been introduced—clear indication of the VC intention to make American personnel the target of terrorist actions. I cited the Brink Hotel incident on Christmas Eve and six additional incidents in the month of January, the most serious being the explosive charge placed in our Special Services swimming pool compound. It made no sense to expose our dependents unnecessarily under these circumstances. Inevitably in the course of a mounting terrorist campaign, heads of families would be diverted from the main effort of fighting the war by concern over the safety of their families. Thus there are now two strong arguments for changing the dependent policy, the long-standing one of the need of a posture of maximum readiness and now the new one of relieving dependents from exposure to danger and heads of family from concern for their safety.

I explained that a decision had not been reached although the weight of arguments for evacuation of dependents was inclining the scales sharply in that direction. If an affirmative decision were taken, it would be followed by a Presidential statement explaining the reason for our action, the initiation of a deliberate evacuation which might run a month or more. But before taking a final decision, we were most anxious to receive Huong’s advice and frank reactions as we were aware of possible internal complications.

Huong took the news quietly but in clear recognition of its importance. He said that he would like to reflect on the matter before giving a reply. He said he could understand our position but was concerned that the Vietnamese population might regard it as a step toward US withdrawal. I responded that we too were aware of this danger and the consequent need of a reassuring statement to the public at proper time. We would stand in need of his assistance in this matter.

I asked that he keep this matter entirely to himself unless he wished discuss it with Vien.⁴ He agreed readily to the need for security with the aside remark that it was difficult for Chief of State Suu’s office to keep any secrecy because of the unreliable characters in it. I verified that he had no intention of mentioning to Suu at this time either the subject of evacuation or our conversation reported in Ref B.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis;LOR. Received in the Department of State at 4:28 a.m.
2. Document 31.
3. Document 33.
4. Later that day, after Huong had apparently discussed the matter with Vien, Taylor also discussed with Vien the possible evacuation of American dependents. Their conversation was reported in telegram 2261 from Saigon, January 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)