Office of the Historian

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, January 23, 1965, 3 p.m.

2247. For the Secretary. Deptel 1508.2 In the course of a call this morning with Alex Johnson on Prime Minister Huong, I discussed reprisal procedures in accordance with the authorization contained in reftel. [Page 76] Unfortunately, because of a breakdown of communications in the Prime Minister’s office, Deputy Prime Minister Vien had not been invited to attend.

I opened the discussion by citing the document which we had transmitted to the Prime Minister at our meeting on December 73 which included the following paragraph:

“During the course of such intensified operations (i.e., against infiltration routes in Laos and at sea) the armed forces of the GVN and the US must be prepared and ready to execute prompt defense against or reprisals for any unusual hostile act by the other side. The US mission is prepared to work out with the GVN appropriate plans and procedures to this end.”

I indicated that, because of the political events which followed shortly thereafter, we had not implemented this paragraph by the development of agreed procedures for the execution of reprisals for “unusual hostile acts”. It now seems timely to develop such procedures.

I mentioned the strong feeling on our side of the need for rapid reaction if and when a decision were taken to execute a reprisal, indicating that a 24-hour reaction capability should be taken as the norm. To reach such a reaction capability, several preliminary actions should be taken. First, we could select possible reprisal targets in south DRV and work out detailed strike plans for them. In making such plans, we should be guided by certain principles, such as the desirability of joint VNAF/USAF participation regardless of whether the victims of an “unusual hostile act” were Vietnamese, US nationals or both. Another basic consideration would be that US participation would be at the request of the Vietnamese Government and that the first bombs would preferably be dropped by VNAF pilots.

Once these strike plans were jointly developed, they should then be approved by the appropriate officials of the GVN and USG for possible use in case a decision were taken by both governments to execute a reprisal. To implement such a decision, it would be important for agreed procedures to exist as to the channel of transmittal of such approval. I would undertake to expedite communications on the US side.

Finally, it would be useful to consider as a preparatory measure the need for explanatory statements to be issued by both governments in the time of execution of a reprisal strike.

Having laid out the problem in the foregoing terms, I asked Huong for his reaction. If he were in general agreement, would he authorize the opening of discussions with his military leaders? In this connection, we were uncertain as to where the military contact should be made. Was it [Page 77] with new second Deputy Prime Minister Gen Thieu, Defense Minister Gen Minh or with C-in-C Gen Khanh?

The Prime Minister showed quiet satisfaction that we were now willing to undertake such discussions. He said that he had been very much surprised that no retaliation had taken place following the Bien Hoa and Brink incidents. He said that he was inclined to discuss the matter at once with Vien, Thieu, Minh, and Khanh. We discussed at some length the best way of broaching this matter with the military and ended by deciding that Johnson and I should call on Vien today and go over the same ground with him as we had with Huong4 and that, following the Monday5 meeting of the US mission and the Internal Security Council, Johnson, Westmoreland and I would meet on this subject in closed session with Huong, Vien and the three generals mentioned above. I believe this is a satisfactory arrangement and gets around the possible consequences of inaccurate reporting by Huong of our proposal to his colleagues. It is not that I would expect deliberate distortion, but we are dealing in matters in which Huong has no experience and hence is liable to error.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis;LOR. Received in the Department of State at 3:46 a.m.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. For a report on the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 982–984.↩
  4. TaylorTaylor and Johnson’s conversation with Vien later that day is described in telegram 2260 from Saigon, January 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
  5. January 25.↩