325. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson1
While I was in Europe for the meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers, I discussed with U.S. civilian and military representatives the movement [Page 707] of IL28 bombers into Hanoi and possible U.S. responses.2 Their views follow:
Ambassador Bruce: He does not believe that it is necessary for either political or military reasons to strike the bombers now or in the immediate future. Such an action would carry with it a high risk of escalation. He suggests it would be well for the U.S. to inform the Soviets, through appropriate private channels, that we view the introduction of these aircraft with great concern, and if they are used to strike our forces or military or civilian centers of the South Vietnamese, we would find it necessary to respond with great force. He emphasized the absolute necessity of “prior consultation” with the British in the event we do carry out a strike on Phuc Yen.
General Lemnitzer: So long as there are no more than a small number of IL28’s in North Vietnam (I reported to him that at present we estimate there are approximately 9 aircraft at Phuc Yen), he would be inclined to defer a strike against them. When the number becomes large and militarily significant General Lemnitzer would strike to destroy them. In his opinion, the Soviets would not respond to a U.S. strike against Phuc Yen with overt military action in Western Europe—they might harass the corridors to Berlin, and in that event General Lemnitzer would suggest we harass their seaborne commerce.
Ambassador Bohlen: He does not believe the Soviets will allow the bombers to be used initially against Saigon or other civilian targets in South Vietnam. For this and other reasons, he recommends against attacking the IL28’s until they move south of the 17th parallel. If and when they do so, we should hit back hard. He said it would be a tossup as to how the Soviets would react if we strike the IL28’s before they move south of the demarcation line. He pointed out the Soviets are in a bad spot: They do not want to become involved in the war in Southeast Asia, but they do have to protect their position in the Communist world, and the current regime does not have the stability of Khrushchev’s. In the event we did strike first, he doubts that the Soviets would start any military action in Europe because they would recognize that to do so “would be committing suicide for fear of death.” And he does not believe they would go to war in the Far East because they would think such action would lead to war in Europe. Their military reaction would probably be slight, but the international reaction to our move would be very bad, e.g., we would probably lose the support of the British. He made exactly the same suggestion as Ambassador Bruce, i.e., couldn’t we get word to the Soviets that if the IL28’s are used against us or against the South Vietnamese, “we will blast you.”
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and McGeorge Bundy. The covering memorandum indicates that McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson on June 5.↩
- See Document 318 regarding prior discussion of air strikes against the IL-28 bomber base in North Vietnam.↩