Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

266. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 21, 1965.

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting²

ATTENDED BY

• The President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Vance, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, and Admiral Raborn³

The purpose of the meeting was to consider Secretary McNamara’s memorandum for the President, 21 April 1965, forwarding the conclusions of his meeting in Honolulu.⁴ After reading the statement the President asked McNamara to explain the reasoning behind the report.

McNamara stated that the deployment of additional U.S. forces is necessary to avoid serious losses of U.S. forces now deployed which he considered inadequate to meet the threat of a Viet Cong attack. Furthermore, committing of U.S. forces to combat would be effective against the Viet Cong and would release ARVN forces for more distant operations. McNamara proposed a continuation of the strikes against the North at the present tempo. He did not propose extending the area geographically although later in the discussion William Bundy stated this was a possibility. McNamara definitely opposed striking industrial targets, power plants, POL centers, or anything in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. McNamara stated that what he was in effect proposing was to extend the bombing for a protracted period of 6 months or a year or even more, but not to intensify it.

The thrust of McNamara’s statement and subsequent discussions was to change the purpose of the bombing attacks on North Vietnam from one of causing the DRV to seek a negotiated settlement to one of continual harassment of lines of supply, infiltrations, etc., while the combination of SVN forces and U.S. forces were engaging in defeating the Viet Cong to such a point that the DRV and other interested Communist States would realize the hopelessness of the Viet Cong effort and therefore would seek a peaceful negotiation. McNamara estimated that he did not expect to move towards political settlement at least for 6 months, and possibly 12 months.

Secretary Rusk stated that he and Thompson had briefly reviewed the paper prior to the meeting and that they concurred in the level of bombing effort as outlined in paragraph 2.

Mr. Ball stated⁵ he thought we were making a major decision and that he was privately exploring an alternative scenario of action which he would like to discuss.⁶ He said that he felt there was more room for negotiation than was popularly accepted and that the DRV’s “4 points” was, in reality, a signal of a willingness to negotiate. Ball stated that the war we are engaged in has very serious risks, i.e. escalation, capsizing of the Saigon government and increased opposition of one sort or another from both the Soviets and the ChiComs (hence he did not feel that the Sino-Soviet differences would be eliminated but rather that they would take independent courses of action in supporting the DRV). Ball stated that in his opinion it was totally unrealistic to feel that we could sustain an operation of the type envisaged for a year or two without something of an explosive nature taking place.

McGeorge Bundy pointed out that the program outlined in the McNamara paper is quite different from the course of action heretofore considered, and should be carefully studied. An estimate should be prepared on the reactions in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow to the deployment of American troops in the numbers indicated and committing those troops to military engagement in SVN. He also raised the question of the effect of this new course of action on past estimates of VC and Communist reactions. I said the proposed course of action troubled me greatly. I felt that the level of our bombing against NVN had undoubtedly inconvenienced and created difficulties for the VC and the DRV in their supply and infiltration operations but had not brought them to a halt, and I felt a continuation of such bombing could be absorbed by the DRV and would stiffen their determination rather than bring them to the conference table. I pointed out that the current estimate⁷ states that bombing at this level against targets in the southern DRV would result in increased VC activity in SVN with greater support from the DRV and possibly from the ChiComs. I stated that I could envisage a gradual but deliberate build-up of these forces and that this would present our ground forces with an increasingly difficult problem requiring more and more troops, that what we were talking about now was merely an early stage in a big effort. I felt we would drift into a combat situation where victory would be dubious and from which we could not extricate ourselves. I agreed with Mr. Ball that the risks and dangers were great and the Saigon government, while appearing better today, was indeed fragile.

The President asked if I opposed committing forces, and I responded that I did not, but the commitment of forces must, in my opinion, be accompanied by a more dynamic action against the north. I recommended air strikes against industrial targets, power plants, POL centers, and the taking out of the MIGs.

McNamara then summarized my views and indicated that the only difference between his views and mine was in the level of effort against the north, and that he felt that strikes against the north should be limited in the manner outlined in paragraph 2 of his memorandum. Rusk agreed.⁸

The President raised the question of the Quat government. McNamara quoted Amb. Taylor as stating that Quat is more confident than he has been, he feels morale is better, he recognizes dissension within the military but feels there is no coalition of dissident forces which will threaten his government. Rusk warned that we are setting a bad example for the Quat government by problems within our own camp and he indicated that the several U.S. organizations in SVN are not working together and, as a result, the Vietnamese are confused. McNamara felt that a great deal has been done to straighten out recent problems, details of which were not discussed.

The President raised the question of the kind of support we can expect from the U.S. public, the press, friendly countries, world opinion, etc. on the protracted program. He noted the amount of propaganda being directed against us and asked how serious it was. Secretary Ball stated that we were losing the propaganda war. McNamara contradicted this view by stating that he thought we were winning public opinion and that criticism appearing here and there did not amount to much. The President insisted that we must improve our propaganda and must do everything necessary to get our message over. He felt that his Baltimore speech⁹ and later statements had had little effect. Both McNamara and Rusk disagreed with him.

The President questioned whether there is an organized effort within the United States and elsewhere to discredit U.S. efforts in Vietnam and, if so, how would this develop under the proposed plan. He also questioned the effect on our normal friends of continuing the operations plus those which are now planned.

The President urged that all take the initiative in the propaganda war to put the Communists on the defensive. He urged that we emphasize the good things that we are doing in every area such as medical, supplies, education, construction, aid, etc., and likewise to emphasize the villainous and cruel things being done by the Communists.

It was agreed to meet again on Thursday at 11:00 o’clock¹⁰ to consider the estimate.¹¹ No action was taken on the McNamara recommendations although Secretary Rusk recommended that they be accepted. The President, however, was non-committal.

At the conclusion of the meeting I called the group’s attention to the improved casualty ratio, pointing out that for the 4 weeks (Feb. 13 to March 13 ‘65) GVN killed and missing action—2,132 and VC killed and captured—2,085. However, in the 4-week period March 14 to April 17 (with the days March 28 to April 2nd missing), the SVN killed and missing in action were 683 and the VC killed and captured 1,893. I stated that we had now analyzed the effect of the bombing within SVN as summarized in SC-04463 of 21 April¹² and had concluded that the strikes had had a very considerable effect on the VC, that there was evidence that many VC had been killed and many VC compounds had been damaged or totally destroyed. I thought this was encouraging.

1. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The meeting was held from 11:15 a.m. to 12:20 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) McGeorge Bundy’s handwritten notes of the meeting are ibid., Papers of McGeorge Bundy. For Ball’s recollection of the meeting, which he incorrectly dates April 20, see The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 393.
2. McCone mistakenly identifies this meeting as an NSC meeting. The 551st NSC meeting was held on April 2, and the 552d on April 11. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File)
3. McNaughton also attended. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary)
4. Document 265.
5. According to McGeorge Bundy’s notes, Ball said, “This transforms our whole relation to the war. The world reaction will be very difficult.”
6. See Document 267.
7. Document 268.
8. According to McGeorge Bundy’s notes, McNamara said that the “situation in South is place for a signal[;] situation in North might bring Chinese in.” The President then asked, “Are we pulling away from our theory that Bombing will turn ‘em off?” McNamara responded, “That wasn’t our theory. We wanted to lift morale; we wanted to push them toward negotiation—we’ve done that.”
9. See Document 245.
10. See Document 269.
11. Document 268. In telegram 2379 to Saigon, April 21, Rusk informed Taylor that McNamara had summarized the results of the Honolulu conference at a “highest level meeting” that day but that a final decision had been deferred at least a day to allow time to consider an intelligence estimate of “likely Communist views and reactions.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–3 VIET S)
12. Reference is to an intelligence memorandum entitled “Results of U.S. Air Strikes in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Intelligence Material, Vol. V)