Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

269. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 22, 1965, 12:34–2:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee²—22 Apr 65

ATTENDING

• The President, Secty Rusk, Secty Ball, William Bundy, Secty McNamara, Secty Vance, Gen. Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, Admiral Raborn and Mr. McCone³

I briefed the group on the April 21st estimate on the probable Communist and world reactions to the proposed U.S. courses of action in Vietnam.⁴ In my briefing I followed the exact wording of the sections of the briefing that are underscored and adjacent to the numbers that appear in the margin of the attached,⁵ modifying the wording as appears in ink. With reference to the statement that “We believe the Communists think time and tide is running in their favor,” the President asked whether that was also our own estimate. I responded in the affirmative.

Secretary Rusk took some exceptions to my statements concerning world opinion, indicating that he believed that the intransigence of the Communists and their refusal to engage in negotiations would be understood and absorbed by world opinion and therefore world opinion would lean in our direction.

McNamara stated he agreed with the estimate, particularly the appraisal of the present situation in paragraph 1 and the appraisal of the probable ultimate reaction in paragraph 13. He said these two estimates defined our areas of maneuver. I immediately pointed out the implications and the importance of paragraph 10 in the paper and stated that in my opinion the Viet Cong build-up in South Vietnam initiated by the VC, NVN and Chinese Communists would probably be slow and deliberate and it would be progressive and would always confront us with an increasing demand for men, increasingly serious problems, and increasing casualties. I therefore, urged the group not to overlook the implications in paragraph 10.

McGeorge Bundy stated that Lodge had had satisfactory talks with the Australians and they are willing to provide the brigade indicated in the McNamara paper. His talks with Macapagal had been satisfactory but there had been no commitment, and the position of Korea had not as yet been determined. General Wheeler then stated that the JCS unanimously supported the April 21st paper.⁶ He said it was necessary to deploy the additional men and to make preparations for still more men. He made no comment on the tempo of the bombing. He made no appeal for authority to bomb industrial targets, POL, power stations, etc. He expressed no concern over the idea that bombing would be carried on over a long period of time and, indeed, the operation itself would go on for a protracted period. He stated there was a need for more air power in South Vietnam because their air power was getting used up.

• Note (a): His position was diametrically opposite from that taken by Admiral Mustin, Director of Planning for the Joint Chiefs, in his briefing to me 10 days ago. In that briefing the Admiral said that we were using less than 5% of our air power and he strongly advocated bombing the targets which are excluded above.
• Note (b): I did not at this point raise the differences as it was obvious that Wheeler’s position had changed as a result of the Honolulu meeting.

The President asked for Quat’s reaction. McNamara stated that we cannot tell. We assume that he will go along. Some work has to be done with the South Vietnamese military leaders to insure their enthusiastic acceptance of large U.S. and third country forces; that the command structure has to be worked out carefully, but he said no problems. I raised the question of South Vietnam public reaction pointing out that the Vietnamese might feel that the war was being taken off their shoulders and fought by others and therefore they would relax. Also, I pointed out that the lift in morale, if it came about, might be quickly offset by an adverse reaction if the war intensified. Rusk elaborated on my statements, confirming them and supporting the estimate in this regard. Wheeler stated that this did not happen with air and when U.S. air went into action, South Vietnam air stepped up their effort. He also said that General Thi finds no problem with the military brigades now in the first Corps area.

The President then made brief reference to the alternative proposal of promoted negotiations and the memorandum prepared by Secretary Ball⁷ (which has been seen by only Mac Bundy, McNamara and Rusk and no others), and expressed the desire to discuss this subject only with those directly concerned, i.e., State and McNamara.

The President then discussed at great length the public reaction and the reaction on the Hill. He complained that no supporting speeches were being made and he felt that our Congressional support was very uncertain and wobbly and we could lose it rapidly. He felt that speeches by Morse, Gruening, Clark, and the statement by Fulbright would have their effect and he exhorted everyone to carry on an intense personal campaign with sympathetic senators and get them on their feet. He also thought that McNamara and Rusk should take every opportunity to make speeches, go on television, etc., and point out the reasonableness of U.S. policy and the ridiculousness of the suggestion that we stop bombing while the VC continue bombing of a type that has been carried on. The President in his remarks, which were extended and quite bitter and directed toward McNamara and Rusk, to me represented a feeling on the President’s part that his chief lieutenants had failed to carry Congressional opinion and public opinion with us. He said his mail was running about 50 to 1 against our policy. All in all he seemed very dissatisfied with the public relations effort. He made some passing reference to my working on certain senators but I made no comment nor did I make a commitment. Admiral Raborn suggested that I make a nation-wide television speech. The President did not respond.

The meeting adjourned without action on the McNamara paper. It was obvious that the President wished to give the subject further thought. He wished to get the reaction from South Vietnam. He also wished to explore the diplomatic track prior to making a commitment.⁸

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Feb-30 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)
2. The term “NSC Executive Committee” is McCone’s and was not a formal designation of the group.
3. McNaughton also attended. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)
4. Document 268.
5. Not attached.
6. Document 265.
7. Document 267.
8. Following this meeting in the Cabinet Room, President Johnson met in his “little lounge” from 2:50 to 3:40 p.m. with Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found, but see Document 272.