Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

68. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)¹

Washington, March 3, 1964.

MEMORANDUM ON VIETNAM

Following my trip to Saigon in late December, 1963, I concluded that while the problems of accomplishing the U.S. objectives in South Vietnam are not insurmountable they are indeed formidable and there were more reasons to be pessimistic about obtaining our objectives than there were reasons to be optimistic.²

Since then Khanh’s coup has removed Generals Don, Kim, Xuan and Dinh. This has precipitated a decided change in the situation, necessitating a reassessment of the outlook.

In making such a reassessment the following areas must be considered:

1. The South Vietnamese Political Situation.

a. General Khanh has demonstrated that he is an able military leader. He is young (36 years old), relatively inexperienced. He was a lieutenant in 1954 and void of any political experience. He is unknown to the people and hence there is no evidence of strong popular support or great confidence in his leadership on the part of the people. We note considerable gossip among the people with whom the Station is in contact indicating lack of confidence in Khanh and his government.

b. General Khanh has appointed General Big Minh as Chief of State and three Vice Prime Ministers. General Minh is little more than a figurehead if that and has indicated some residual unhappiness at having been displaced by Khanh. Of the three Vice Prime Ministers, Nguyen Ton Hoan is a leader of the Dai Viet Party with a strong political motivation, but has been out of the country since 1954 until January of this year. Nguyen Xuan Oanh is a technician in economics and finance. He has spent most of the past 18 years out of his country and returned only this year. Do Mau is a general, formerly Chief of the Military Security Services and attache in Paris, but has little background in the cultural and social affairs he is supposed to supervise.

c. In addition he has appointed a slate of ministers. These have been drawn from various political and religious groups and with some attention to their geographic origin in an attempt to include most currents of opinion. Due to the lack of experience of the ministers, however, and their varying backgrounds, we cannot expect the cabinet to be especially strong. In addition some able men were not selected because of prior associations with Diem-Nhu, Minh-Don or the French and some others have not wished to serve because of the uncertainty as to the future of this government. We are already receiving reports of planning for new coupe, especially from the political circles of the Dai Viet party. We conclude that the prospects for a strong government are not bright.

d. In the provinces and districts there is both confusion and lack of direction. Some chiefs appointed by Minh have been removed, others do not know their future. Most are awaiting guidance from the new government in Saigon. Therefore, there is no strong political direction at the level of province and district chiefs.

e. As a result of what appears to be a weak and ineffective central government and a confused situation at the level of provinces and districts, many essential programs such as the strategic hamlet program and various civic action programs have come to a virtual halt. This is giving the VC an opportunity to fill this vacuum with their own political and military action with the result that many areas have been lost to the government and there is a growing feeling that the VC may be the wave of the future.

All of the above leads to the conclusion that the situation is worse now than it was in December and therefore I am more pessimistic of the future of the American cause in South Vietnam than my December report reflects.

2. South Vietnam Military Organization

a. The organization still exists in the proportions built up by Diem-Nhu and taken over by Minh-Don. However, there is some evidence that morale is low because of constant changes in leadership at the senior and intermediate levels. This situation might change as the new commanders assume control.

The situation is particularly bad within the Security Forces in Saigon. There have been three different commanders of the Saigon Police and Security Forces in the last few months. We are receiving reports of increased VC activities in Saigon itself. Lack of morale in the military and lack of confidence in Khanh’s leadership is causing a new round of coup plotting and also rumors of plans to assassinate Khanh. Either might happen. Khanh is being warned of these plans and plots and is said to be taking precautions. However, his success is dependent upon his mastering the role of leader of the country and being accepted as such by officers at all levels, as well as by the civilian, political and private leadership.

From the above I conclude that the military situation, bad in December, has worsened and the problem of reversing the trend is formidable. A continuation of the present nature of GVN and U.S. military and political actions does not appear to me to be enough to reverse current trends toward defeat.

4.[sic] Viet Cong Activities

Militarily the Viet Cong situation has improved in the last 90 days. They have organized 5 additional battalions, their communication network has been improved, and there are indications that they are organizing units into regiments. Captured equipment gives evidence that VC’s now have heavier equipment then they possessed a year ago, bazookas, mortars, anti-aircraft, etc. Much of such heavier equipment is of Chinese Communist origin but does not reflect any sudden great increase of direct Chinese Communist support or presence as much of it could come from DRV inventories. Of the smaller arms, the largest amounts are American made (most captured but some older items infiltrated). The VC’s also use some equipment which originated in Communist China, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The VC’s appear to have substantial supplies of arms, perhaps not the most modern, although they still probably have a serious logistic, maintenance and ammunition problem.

VC leadership seems to be sound; their political action and terrorism are effective, as evidenced by their ability to persuade whole areas to abandon the strategic hamlet program and turn in their arms as a price for pacification.

There is a continuing flow of evidence that VC operations are being directed from North Vietnam, leadership is being supplied from the north as well as war materiel and trained cadres. However it is evident that a very substantial part of the VC organization, strength and support is indigenous to South Vietnam.

I can only conclude from my observations that both militarily and politically the VC are gaining at the moment.

5. United States Operations

1. The military operations conducted by MACV follow the pattern of equipping, training and advising the RVN to get out and fight the war. The Korean situation was different; American forces fought and inspired the Koreans to do likewise. In Vietnam we have had limited experience with this technique but it seems to have been favorable among the Special Forces. There are many causes for Vietnamese reluctance to rush out and fight stemming from the long history, some doubt as to the eventual outcome, many early abuses and the lack of any strong appeal from the GVN. Whether American participation can overcome this or may intensify xenophobic feelings about the Whiteman’s war is not clear. It is clear that the present course is not successful.

The various units which were trained for the purpose of defending their own strategic hamlets should be used in this way, that is, as a defensive organization and not as offensive units. They are neither trained nor capable of offensive operations. The concept of the civilian defense units should be expanded, along the “oil stain” principle of the Pacification Plans.

Intelligence has been spotty. There has been submersion of bad news and an overstatement of good news. For the past year we have been misinformed about conditions in Vietnam. The entire intelligence apparatus is undergoing review and reorganization. It is essential that this be completed promptly and that there be a very close liaison between the J–2 organization, dealing with enemy capabilities, and the J–3, dealing with RVN capabilities and plans.

I conclude that our military operations in South Vietnam have not been as successful as we assumed up to last December. I think the whole concept has to be reviewed. It is the only time in our history that we have put such a large force into a country for the purpose of telling others to go out and fight. It is conceivable that we have unwittingly lifted the responsibility for the success of the battle from the shoulders of the South Vietnamese onto our own shoulders without accepting combat responsibility. In other words we may have gone beyond a MAAG operation, but have not selected the best way to carry out a combat operation in Vietnamese circumstances.

6. New Courses of Action

In view of the fragile political situation and the deteriorating military situation, one asks the question, “What should we do?” The courses of action are these:

1. Immediately develop a program which will remove us from South Vietnam by negotiating a neutralist “solution”. In doing so we must recognize that such a negotiation would lead to South Vietnam falling to the Communists. With this, we could expect others in Southeast Asia to follow “The Domino Theory”. Laos would probably fall quickly. Burma and Cambodia would certainly move closer to Peiping and we would need considerable treasure, effort and luck to keep Thailand from slipping away through accommodation or Communist subversion. On the other hand, this might be inevitable if the situation in South Vietnam should be even now beyond the point of no return. The evidence to date, gloomy as it is, does not bear out this prospect as one cannot say that Khanh and company with new and better U.S. support of various kinds cannot develop enough dynamism to hold the Viet Cong to give the GVN and the U.S. time and opportunity to begin turning the tide. We should also recognize that DRV resources and strength are limited and that while they will undoubtedly continue their outside instigation and steady support of the Viet Cong, this prospect is not one of a sudden escalation of their effort.

2. We can continue as we are now doing, restricting ourselves to actions of the same type we have been engaged in. This to me does not seem to be productive. 15,000 or 16,000 Americans have been engaged now for two years training and directing the South Vietnamese. Likewise the South Vietnamese are supplied with all of the arms and ammunition they can use; therefore an increasing quantity of materiel, except in certain special items, would not be productive. Nonetheless, present trends are down and will probably remain so if no great changes occur in either GVN performance or U.S. techniques.

3. We could greatly increase the U.S. military and political commitment in Vietnam and surrounding areas and take a far greater direct role in the operations. This would be accomplished by a series of actions to step up the dynamism and effectiveness of Khanh’s government and its programs. This would require a very direct input into the political posture of the Khanh government and its machinery at the national level and a great increase in our counterinsurgency advice and support at the local levels. As an element of this program we might add the placing of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam to secure the Saigon base and strengthen Khanh’s government against possible coupe. These moves might have some negative effects in terms of highlighting the issue of white-faced intervention but the overall result would appear to be more positive than negative.

4. We could carry out dramatic operations against North Vietnam, theoretically non-attributable but actually well identified as coming from South Vietnam with U.S. support. The consequences of this type of action must be examined but, more important, we must make a judgment as to whether action of this type would accomplish the U.S. objectives in South Vietnam. It seems obvious to me that unless the Khanh government is strengthened in South Vietnam, then carrying the action into North Vietnam would not guarantee victory. It might stop the North Vietnamese supply for a short time. It would not stop the Viet Cong military or political action. It would not guarantee victory. If, on the other hand, the Khanh government can be strengthened, then actions against North Vietnam would be warranted although the cost and risk to the United States would be great. There would be danger that the war would escalate, either through large scale DRV operations into South Vietnam or Laos, Chinese Communist support in these areas, threats of Chinese Communist air strikes against Saigon or U.S. naval forces, or Soviet naval convoying of shipping into the DRV. We should of course be prepared for such contingencies in undertaking any course of extreme pressures against North Vietnam, although I incline to the view that the Communist powers would not in fact feel that such extreme reactions were either necessary or worth the risks involved. I do not think that any extreme U.S. pressures against the DRV would materially affect Sino-Soviet relations.

I am inclined to believe that if the political climate in South Vietnam is proper, then it is worth taking these risks, as the loss of the game in South Vietnam would have too serious consequences to be acceptable. On the other hand, if the Khanh government remains fragile, if the people remain disinterested, and disaffected, and we are continually confronted with coup plotting and the consequent hazards, if the resentment of American presence increases, then it appears to me that carrying the war to North Vietnam would not win the war in South Vietnam and would cause the United States such serious problems in every corner of the world that we should not sanction such an effort.

5. There are steps that can be taken to strengthen the Khanh government. Some of these are:

a. The strategic hamlet program must be revitalized and attacked as the top priority. Plans exist for the implementation of this program according to the “oil stain” concept. The regular forces must establish as their primary duty the reinforcement of the strategic hamlet program according to these plans and the clearing and holding of additional areas. The irregular forces must be supported, trained, advised and inspired by a considerable increase in U.S. Special Forces and AID support, possibly organized as a separate Peoples’ Defense Authority.

b. A concentrated program of political action and agitation at the grass roots level must be established using supplied teams to conduct such agitation, organization and motivation efforts in conjunction with the strategic hamlet program. Additional information and civic action efforts must be conducted in support of these teams.

c. Assistance should be obtained from the Chinese Nationalist Government in a discreet but major scale manner. Detailed recommendations on this point have been submitted separately.³

d. An unofficial political advisor should be appointed to General Khanh to assist him in his early efforts as Chief of Government. Personnel having experience along these lines with Macapagal, Sarit, and others are available within CIA. In addition to the advisor to General Khanh appropriate advisors should be selected for other key political leaders.

e. Operations should be conducted against Viet Cong personnel and facilities across the Lao and Cambodia borders. In order to conduct such operations reconnaissance both by air and ground will be necessary. These operations should be conducted on a non-admitted (not necessarily deniable) basis.

f. The posture of U.S. personnel in Vietnam must be one of aggressive leadership although they might claim only an “advisory” mission. Thus the maximum use should be made of U.S. channels, organization and appeal to the lower ranking Vietnamese, even at the cost of some noses out of joint at the higher ranks. Our personnel must share the dangers of the Vietnamese peasants and fighting men and take full responsibility for stirring them into maximum action against the Viet Cong in their own protection and for no other purpose. Building overall loyalty to the Saigon government should be a secondary matter, to be sought after security is obtained, not as means thereto.

g. In our diplomatic approaches in Southeast Asia, we must establish the strengthening of the Khanh regime and the morale of the Vietnamese people as our primary objective. All steps in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Taiwan must be taken in this context. It will be particularly important to forcefully demonstrate our rejection of the neutralist solution advocated by the French. This may give us problems in Cambodia and Laos, but these would be both more manageable and of lesser gravity than a growth of defeatism their alternatives might inspire in Vietnam.

h. Consideration should be given to the dispatch of a U.S. battle group to the Saigon area. The ostensible mission of this group would be to insure the security of the Saigon area as the base for operations against the Viet Cong. Its real purpose would be the support of the Khanh government against possible neutralist coupe. There are solid arguments pro and con on the use of combat troops in this manner. General Khanh’s own approval would have to be obtained and his judgment might be best on the subject.

5.[sic] With these steps we should be able to strengthen the Khanh government enough to permit us to decide whether continuance along that line alone will be adequate to defeat the Viet Cong or whether these steps must be supplemented by operations against North Vietnam. In the absence of these steps, operations against North Vietnam would in any case not likely be worth the cost. With these steps we might be able to win without attacking North Vietnam but we at least would have sufficient basis to make such activities profitable.

6. The next few weeks or so are probably critical. We may find that Khanh and South Vietnam simply don’t have it, or just don’t want to be rescued by the U.S. But, if we find instead that there is still some stretch in the situation, then victory may yet come in time. It would be long in coming, in the best of circumstances, but we should never forget that the DRV and Chinese Communists have their own weaknesses, which could grow in time, and that if the peasant in South Vietnam could be assured of his physical security for some sustained period he would no longer actively support the Viet Cong. His support would be accelerated if he could be convinced that in addition to security he could look forward to social, economic and political betterment through loyalty to the GVN.

1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers. Secret. There was no designated recipient of this memorandum indicated on the source text, but a handwritten note by William Bundy reads: “McCone Draft. Bundy Working.”
2. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. IV, pp. 735–738.
3. Apparently a reference to an undated and unattributed memorandum received in ISA on March 25 on possible Chinese Nationalist aid to the South Vietnamese in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the South China Sea. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 306, 092 Vietnam) When reviewing his papers after he left office, William Bundy noted on the source text that this idea was “a bug with McCone.”