Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

67. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, March 2, 1964.

SUMMARY STATEMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The Problem

In Southeast Asia today the Free World is facing an attempt by the Communists of North Vietnam to subvert and overthrow the non-Communist government of South Vietnam. North Vietnam has been providing direction, control, and trained cadres for the 25,000 Viet Cong guerrillas and the 60,000 to 80,000 irregulars engaged in harassment, systematic terror, and armed attacks on the people of South Vietnam.

2. Our Objective

Our purpose in South Vietnam is to help the Vietnamese maintain their independence. We are providing the training and the logistic support which they cannot provide themselves. We will continue to provide that support as long as it is required. As our training missions are completed, certain of our troops can be withdrawn. In December 1000 men came home. This group included, for example, two military police units whose airport guard duty had been taken over by Vietnamese trained for that purpose.

3. The Current Situation

In the past four months, there have been three governments in South Vietnam. Each of them has appointed its own cabinet members, its own provincial governors, and its own senior military leaders. The Viet Cong have taken advantage of the confusion resulting from these changes by raising the level and intensity of their attacks. They have been using larger forces and more powerful weapons.

This increased activity has had a good deal of success. Strategic hamlets formerly under government protection have been lost to the Viet Cong; roads formerly open to free movement have been closed. On the other hand, Viet Cong fatalities have been high. The unfavorable rate of 3 or 4 Viet Cong killed for every Vietnamese has continued. Although 15,000 to 20,000 Viet Cong have been killed during the past 12 months, their strength has remained approximately level through receipt of cadres from North Vietnam and recruits from South Vietnam.

4. Alternative Courses of Action

At least four alternatives are open to us today:

A. We can withdraw from South Vietnam. Without our support the government will be unable to counter the aid from the North for the Viet Cong. Vietnam will collapse, and the ripple effect will be felt throughout Southeast Asia, endangering the independent governments of Thailand and Malaysia, and extending as far as India on the west, Indonesia on the south, and the Philippines on the east.

B. We can seek a formula that will “neutralize” South Vietnam. But any such formula will only lead in the end to the same result as withdrawing support. We all know the communists’ attitude that “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” True neutralization would have to extend to North Vietnam as well, and this possibility has been specifically rejected by the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist governments.

C. We can send the Marines and other U.S. ground forces against the sources of the aggression. But if we do, our men may well be bogged down in a long war against numerically superior North Vietnamese and ChiCom forces.

D. We can continue our present policy of providing training and logistical support for the South Vietnam forces. This policy has not failed. We propose to continue it.

Secretary McNamara’s trip to South Vietnam will provide us with an opportunity to appraise the future prospects for this policy, and the further alternatives that may be available to us.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. No classification marking. In a covering memorandum, McNamara informed the President that this was the 2-page South Vietnam summary which he had requested.