Office of the Historian

60. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President, at Palm Springs, California1

Washington, February 22, 1964.

There follows another pair of messages from and to Lodge. The first is a long and important proposal for dealing with the French.2 The second is an interim answer3 which we will send as soon as the President approves.

This is the trickiest area yet opened in this dialog, and I am working with Sullivan and Tyler to prepare alternatives for President and Secretary on their return. Meanwhile, they will probably wish to discuss the matter together. (Message from Lodge)

(Draft answer to Lodge from the President follows.)

“Your 1606 has been relayed to me in California. Dean Rusk and I will talk about it here. Let me say at once that we entirely agree with the purpose of your recommendation and that the problem is simply to find the right ways and means of getting the French to understand the damage done by their current position. Ambassador Bohlen has tried repeatedly on this, but I agree with you that we must leave no stone unturned in this effort.”4

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Also sent to Rusk in Palm Springs. The source text is the copy Smith sent to the Department of State as White House telegram CAP 64056, February 22. No time of transmission appears on the original message, but CAP 64056 was received in the Department of State at 1:49 p.m.↩
  2. Document 59.↩
  3. See below.↩

  4. The reply as it was approved in slightly different form reads as follows:

    “Your 1606 has been relayed to me in California. Let me say at once that Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bohlen have probed the French repeatedly to impress upon them futility and danger of empty talk of neutralization of South Viet Nam. We will keep at the French end of it and wish to be informed of any evidence local French activity cutting across our efforts.”

    “We must expend every effort and mobilize every resource to get Viet Nam strong enough to be independent and feared by any aggressor. We believe that your leadership can make this the driving zeal of every American working with the Vietnamese and that a dedicated and united effort on the American side can inspire them and impress Hanoi with the danger of pursuing its present course.” (Telegram CAP 64058, February 22; Department of State, Central Files, PER-Taylor, Maxwell)

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