Office of the Historian

59. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President1

Saigon, February 22, 1964—2 p.m.

This is in further reply to your 1256.2

1.
In my 15833 I mentioned the external threats to Viet-Nam and the steps which should be taken internally. In my 15944 I referred in detail to steps which should be taken with regard to North Viet-Nam. In this telegram, I suggest steps to be taken with regard to France.
2.
Because French is by all odds the Western language which the largest number of Vietnamese possess the best and because they have many personal relationships with individual French people, General De Gaulle’s declaration on neutralism is having a demoralizing effect on the will to win of both senior and junior officers, and of the politically conscious population generally which is quite out of proportion to French power here which is actually quite skimpy. It starts a line of thought which runs: “It was Laos last year; this year it will be Cambodia; and next year it will be us.” Obviously such thinking does not make for bravery and for hard fighting. To this psychological campaign is added the activity of French agents; Gen. Khanh’s statement to me which is yet to be verified that these agents have conspired with the Viet Cong terrorists during the last week; and reports that some of the explosives which have been found near the theater and the stadium in which Americans were wounded and killed were of French origin. All of this can have a potentially very dangerous effect on Franco-American relations, and they create a totally false and dangerous [Page 103] emphasis here in Viet-Nam. I firmly believe that conditions are fundamentally much worse in North Viet-Nam than they are here. Yet, due in large part to De Gaulle’s public utterances and the work of French agents, this community is concentrated on itself and its own fears instead of taking the initiative against an enemy which is having a very hard time in many ways.
3.
I suggest, therefore, that General De Gaulle be told that all men of good will obviously desire the end of the Viet Cong war and the creation of a Vietnamese state which is not a satellite, which is free and independent and which is strong enough to be neutral if it wants to be. There is no disagreement about the goal, but simply as to how we are to achieve it. The following questions therefore arise:
a.
How can so called “neutralization” be attained if the aggressor is determined not to be neutralized, as is obviously the case as regards North Viet-Nam?
b.
South Viet-Nam is experiencing a change of government after a period of deterioration with an inevitable temporarily adverse effect on the war effort. Obviously, the word “negotiation” makes no sense when one side is much weaker than the other. Under these circumstances, there is no negotiation; there is simply an ultimatum and a capitulation. If France had gone to a “neutralizing” conference in 1943, for example, it would merely have confirmed the occupation by the German army. VC activity is not as devastating as was German occupation, but the comparison is applicable. How then can South Viet-Nam go respectably to an international conference when she is weak on the battlefield, and when to go to an international conference under those conditions is to go to inevitable defeat?
c.
How can one avoid the conclusion that a chief of state who talks about neutrality at such a time is lessening the will to win of the Viet-Nam army and would thus bring Viet-Nam to a conference weaker than she is already?
d.
In view of the fact General De Gaulle must be aware of the above, why does he speak of neutralism at the worst possible time from the standpoint of a truly just solution thus directly helping the Communists and why does he speak publicly of something which should not be public at all, but which should be the subject of a very secret declaration to North Viet-Nam, accompanied by effective pressures of many different kinds?
4.
I suggest this one question be then put to him: “Believing you to be a man of good will who would not intentionally work to destroy the RVN or the vital interests of U.S., I, President Johnson, ask you to make a public statement making it clear that your remarks about neutralism were not meant to apply to the present time.”
Lodge5
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1606 from Saigon, which is the source text. Passed to the White House on receipt at the Department of State.↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 53.↩
  3. Document 53.↩
  4. Document 55↩
  5. Telegram 1606 bears this typed signature.↩