Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

49. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, February 18, 1964.

1574. For Harriman and Hilsman. I have just seen JCS 4893 to MACV² calling for a plan for “an immediate concentrated counterinsurgency offensive in Long An Province to restore effective GVN control.” This is the most discouraging instruction I have seen since joining our Vietnamese effort two months ago. It reveals an almost total lack of comprehension of the character of the Vietnamese problem and of the present situation here.

It assumes that:

1. An indigenous Communist insurgency enjoying full external Communist support can be defeated by such an “offensive” in a measurable period of time.

2. The GVN has adequate political cohesion and leadership, centralized control, and local administrative talent and organization to launch a “concentrated counter-insurgency offensive in Long An” or anywhere else.

3. The U.S. Mission here has sufficient influence and control over the GVN to persuade it to do so.

None of these assumptions are true in Viet-Nam today.

I have suggested to MACV that its reply which will to extent possible receive Country Team coordination include frank statement re utter impossibility of launching “an immediate concentrated counter-insurgency offensive” or of achieving quick success even were such action possible. It is my hope that our reply can convey a more realistic appreciation of our task than instruction which engendered it.

Doubtless Ambassador Lodge will have more to say on “quick victory” approach upon his return. In my opinion we face a long hard pull with final success probably dependent more on developments external to Viet Nam than on our counter-insurgency efforts here. On these U.S. Mission is and will continue to exert maximum effort.

Nes

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no time of transmission. Received at 10:01 a.m. A note on the White House copy of this telegram indicates that the President read it. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 216A.
2. Dated February 14, this cable transmitted the JCS belief that a counterinsurgency offensive in Long An Province would be a symbol of “revitalized war effort.” The JCS requested development of a comprehensive plan in coordination with the Country Team for “earliest possible accomplishment this purpose.” Johnson Library, National Security File. Vietnam Country File. Vol. IV. Memos and Misc.)