Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

43. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 13, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia

The essential points to be made by the President to a conference of Congressional leaders, in asking for a Resolution, are these. They would require coordinated elaboration (as at President Truman’s famous conference on Greece and Turkey in 1947)² among yourself, Secretary McNamara, and General Taylor.

1. Southeast Asia is a critical area to the United States and to our world position. The loss of Viet Nam would endanger Southeast Asia. Thailand would no longer rely on U.S. backing. Laos, Cambodia, and probably Burma would go to the Communists. Taiwan’s morale would crumble. The Philippines, Korea, and Japan would be insecure. Sukamo would be confirmed in his semi-pro-Communist stance. Malaya would be endangered. The Indian subcontinent would be outflanked. The Middle East and East Africa would be substantially opened up. The credibility of our European stance under the Johnson Administration would be put in question; for our commitments to South Viet Nam are no less explicit than our commitments to Berlin.

2. South Viet Nam is in danger. The internal position in South Viet Nam created by the systematic operations conducted from North Viet Nam is precarious. From outside: the 1962 Geneva Accord and the 1954 Accord are not being respected. North Vietnamese troops are still in Laos; North Vietnamese arms and men are being introduced into South Viet Nam; the war is run by a general staff in the north via a complex communications network; the morale in South Viet Nam (and Southeast Asia) has been weakened by the failure of the West to stop this violation of the 1962 Agreement.

3. Although difficult tasks would still be faced in South Viet Nam and Laos if North Vietnamese compliance with the 1962 Agreement was enforced, we see no possibility of achieving short-run or long-run stability in the area until it is enforced. This is not a new judgment. General Taylor reported to President Kennedy on November 3, 1961: “While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training, and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of aggression, after the fact of external aggression is clearly established? It is our view that our government should undertake with the Vietnamese the measures outlined herein, but should then consider the broader question beyond.”³

4. We have given the 1962 Agreement a chance to work. The time has now come for the United States to use every means at its command, diplomatic and military, to enforce compliance.

5. We believe there is a fair chance that compliance can be enforced without substantial military engagement if there is a united expression of determination by the Executive and Congressional branches of the Government, backed by our people, for these reasons:

a. Ho has an industrial complex to protect: he is no longer a guerrilla fighter with nothing to lose.

b. Ho does not wish the Chinese in Hanoi.

c. The Chinese Communists are militarily and economically weak but committed to split from Moscow and anxious to come out in the world.

d. Mao’s doctrine has always been: “When the enemy advances, withdraw; when the enemy falters, attack.”

e. Moscow has ample reasons not to engage its forces in Southeast Asia or elsewhere if U.S. is determined and united. In short, if our objective is compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Agreements—and not the invasion of North Viet Nam or China—we may be able to achieve it without major military operations, but only if we are united, determined, and prepared for any level of escalation.

6. If we do not take this action now, we not only endanger Southeast Asia, but we encourage the Communists everywhere (including the Caribbean) to believe that it is accepted by the West as legal to conduct wars of “National Liberation” across borders, with resistance possible only from within; and that if guerrilla war successfully takes hold, the West surrenders. Obviously, at some stage, we would react; but then we will have to do so with greater violence from a profoundly weakened Western position.

7. Therefore, we are asking Congressional and national support to draw the line in the dust at the borders of South Viet Nam. The essentials of a Congressional Resolution are:

a. To call attention to the continued violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords;

b. To reaffirm the United States commitment to Southeast Asia under the Manila Pact;

c. To reaffirm the United States commitment, made by three Presidents, to the continued independence of the people of South Viet Nam;

d. To call on the President to use all the means at our command to enforce compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

8. At the time of presentation to the Congress of the case for a Congressional Resolution, we shall be publishing evidence of the violation of the Geneva Accords.

9. In the wake of a Congressional Resolution, we shall:

• —Move additional forces into the area;
• —Take a series of diplomatic moves to inform both our Allies and the various Communist regimes of our intention to impose measured, limited sanctions on North Viet Nam, if necessary, to enforce compliance.

10. There will be considerable confusion in the Free World, which will fear a confrontation; and this will be heightened by the Communists, De Gaulle, Lippmann, etc. The chances of not having to drop bombs in the North will depend substantially on whether the Executive Branch and the Congress remain united and resolute. Let us put all other considerations aside and stay together.

11. If we can make this proposition stick in Southeast Asia, our job with Castro will be greatly eased and the long-run prospects for a peaceful world under law enhanced.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Southeast Asia. Top Secret; For the Secretary Only. Rusk’s initials appear on the source text.
2. Apparent reference to a meeting with congressional leaders, February 27, 1947, described in Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II (Garden City, NY, 1956), p. 103.
3. Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, p. 477.