Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

42. Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, February 12, 1964.

BRIEF

SNIE 50–64, Short-Term Prospects in Southeast Asia

This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 12 February 1964. Significant judgments of this estimate are as follows: Certain signs of new North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist military activities, together with an upsurge of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, recent Viet Cong successes there, and recent Communist advances in Laos, raise the question whether the situations in South Vietnam and Laos may be on the verge of collapse. After carefully reviewing the evidence, we believe:

That the situation in South Vietnam is very serious, and prospects uncertain. Even with US assistance approximately as it now is, we believe, unless there is a marked improvement in the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and armed forces, that the South Vietnamese have at best an even chance of withstanding the insurgency threat during the next few weeks or months.

That if present trends in Laos are not checked, there will be continued erosion of non-Communist military and political positions there. The Laos situation may deteriorate rapidly, and it could take a turn which would further improve the Viet Cong position in South Vietnam.

That dramatic new Chinese Communist intervention in Vietnam or Laos is unlikely. North Vietnam, however, is stepping up its support of the Pathet Lao, and may do so for the Viet Cong-perhaps with some increase of Chinese Communist material assistance. The Communist hope in South Vietnam would be to gain sufficient quick victories before General Khanh’s new government could bring its full military potential to bear, to undermine the South Vietnamese will to resist, and to induce the US to consider a negotiated settlement its only feasible option.

That developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia, save in Cambodia, have thus far had little impact on those in Vietnam and Laos. However, the outcome of the present war in South Vietnam will have a serious effect on the future willingness of governments in Southeast Asia to adopt anti-Communist, rather than neutralist, stances.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 350.05 Southeast Asia. Secret. Attached to a memorandum of transmittal, February 12, from Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Carroll to Secretary of Defense McNamara. SNIE 50–64, “The Situation in Southeast Asia,” is not printed. Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimate File, 14.3 NVN)