Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, October 8, 1964—8:18 p.m.

795. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Ref: Embtels 983, 1036, and 1054.²

1. We concur that we must do our best to avoid any public espousal of charters or people, although we will undoubtedly be charged in any event with considerable responsibility for the selection of the form and personnel of any new government. More basically, we believe we cannot privately disclaim any preference for individuals or form of government because of our intense interest in seeing a new government having sound organization, able members and broad basis of popular support. We also want to avoid any private impression that we are dumping Khanh and that as far as we are concerned everything is up for grabs. Some US guidance also seems a necessary precaution, given the backgrounds of the Council members, some of whom look like neutralists on basis past records and a few of whom seem to have had past Communist associations.

2. As seen from here, evolving political situation in Saigon contains at least two major problems for US. Embtel 1054 strongly suggests HNC is leaning toward parliamentary form of government with all the weaknesses which were so apparent in the French Fourth Republic. The second problem, highlighted in Embtel 983, is to avoid a sharp split between the only real power in the country, the military, and the civilian HNC. This split could occur not only over the form of the new government, but also over its personnel. It seems to us, therefore, that the US must exercise privately all the influence it can bring to bear to obtain as stable a form of government as possible and one whose personnel will be acceptable not only to the HNC but also to the military. We realize, of course, that any US initiative on these matters may leak and we leave completely to your discretion the manner in which you decide to exercise influence along the lines suggested.

3. We concur with the six points outlined in Embtel 983. In an effort to stimulate further thinking on additional stabilizing devices under a parliamentary system, we offer the following thoughts on Embtel 1054, which you may use in your discretion in private conversations. All are directed at primary US interest in creation of strong, effective central government whose mandate will run at least until orderly machinery for a change is functioning

A. HNC should take courageous and firm action in designating Chief of State who could nominate Prime Minister subject to HNC approval. Prime Minister should select cabinet. Important point, however, would be that Chief of State, Prime Minister and cabinet would not be subject to change until after provisional Assembly completely formed, either by designation or direct or indirect elections. HNC could, as suggested 1054, perform legislative functions of Assembly in interim.

B. Power of Assembly to change government should be limited to a vote of no confidence by highest acceptable majority (ideally three-fourths) and result in the dissolution of the Assembly and new elections. Perhaps government could be given minimum period of office (one year) during which vote of no confidence could not be taken. As balance to this position, maximum term of both government and Assembly might be limited to fixed period (four to seven years).

C. Although individual Ministers should not be subjec4 removal by Assembly except in connection vote of no confidence against government, they might be subject to censure by two-thirds vote of Assembly, giving Prime Minister choice dismissing them or making public defense before Assembly.

4. On question of personnel in new government, two criteria have to be met. The Prime Minister and Cabinet should be as decisive and disinterested people as can be found. They must also, however, be acceptable to the major power groups, of which the military is probably the most important. For this reason we concur your view Embtel 983 that arrangement with Minh as titular Chief of State with civilian Prime Minister and Khanh as Deputy Prime Minister or Defense Minister offers best possible combination. We should vigorously oppose suggestion of multiple Chief of State reported in Embtel 1054. We foresee, however, that military or Khanh may demand a higher role, particularly if form of government looks weak. Possible fallback positions, therefore, might be the creation of a dual Premiership, i.e., a civilian Prime Minister in charge of civilian affairs and Khanh as coequal in charge of military affairs and pacification or even a civilianized Khanh as Prime Minister. We tend to see Khanh as best hope at moment for bridge between military and civilian power groups. This would seem to follow from Khanh’s apparent ability to get along with military Young Turks, Buddhists and possibly other elements, such as Hue University faculty group, as well as from his military qualifications. Therefore, we believe that in private discussions with HNC members and with Khanh himself, we should make point we have high regard for his military abilities and believe he could play major role in any new government. We should not, how ever, leave impression that Khanh is inevocably [irrevocably?] our chosen instrument.

5. We agree that if HNC cannot reach agreement on the personnel and form of a stable government by deadline of October 27th, we should strongly urge all factions, both in and outside HNC, to agree to extension. Perhaps form of government could be announced first with designation personnel and investiture coming later. This might fit with formula proposed in Para B Embtel 1054.

6. We are not clear whether statement contained Embtel 1036 intended for publication. We see some danger in public statement which leaves impression that we are completely disinterested in the political shape of the new government since this could contribute to thought that we do not intend to remain to work with it. Privately, we would expect to be more specific as suggested above. If a public statement becomes clearly necessary, something along following lines might indicate appropriate US concern.

“The United States Government supports the efforts of the High National Council and the Government leadership to form an essentially civilian government capable of pursuing successfully the pacification campaign against the Viet Cong. We have no specific preference as to the form of government or as to individuals who will hold key positions. However, it is clear such a government must have the cooperation of all the patriotic non-Communist elements in the country. We believe all leaders of Vietnamese political life are in agreement on this point.”

7. Finally, there is a delicate problem, during this transition period, in our relations with General Khanh and his military supporters. The present truth is that they hold such power as exists in South Vietnam. Their acceptance of new governmental arrangements is a prerequisite to any successful constitution of a new government. Our problem is that we must not abandon one horse before there is another horse which can run the course. I would suggest, therefore, that you have full and frank discussions with General Khanh about how he sees the development of the situation so that what we ourselves do is consonant with the consensus among military and civilian leadership which it is now our highest purpose to build. If the Council’s effort fails, we shall continue to have to live with and support Khanh. As indicated above we think that a successful High National Council effort should include Khanh in a responsible position, at the very minimum as Minister of Defense. But the important thing is that during this period we not find ourselves in a position where there is no one with whom we can work.

With warm personal regards,

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared with William and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Secretary Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. An undated draft of this cable with different wording is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXV111, Cables.
2. Telegram 983, September 29, transmitted preliminary views on what the Embassy would like to see emerge from the sessions of the High National Council. Telegram 1036, October 6, transmitted the text of a statement that the Embassy would give if asked whether the United States insisted on having Khanh continue as Head of Government. Telegram 1054, October 7, reported the trends in the High National Council on the form that the new Vietnamese Government might take. (All in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)